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Preface
This dissertation covers two distinct topics. In Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 we investigate
a model with a principal and two agents, where the hidden action of agents is a source
of moral hazard problem. We show how competition between agents can be used to
improve their incentives even if agents’ production technologies are independent. In
the first chapter we show that the principal is often better off financing innovation
race between competing agents, rather than only one (even the most advanced) of
them. In the second chapter we investigate advantages of competition as compared
to team production, which is technologically more efficient. Chapter 3 deals with
different topic: we study two-sided markets and develop a theory of compatibility
between subsequent generations of technology.
The economic literature has since a long time realized that competition improves in-
centives of individuals in various settings ranging from yardstick competition (Shleifer
1985) to design of team incentives (Holmstrom 1982) to design of managerial incen-
tives (Schmidt 1997). There are three basic channels through which the positive effect
of competition is realized. First, competition on the product market induces an agent
(a manager) to improve efficiency of his firm — otherwise he faces a threat of liquida-
tion (Schmidt 1997). Second, competition provides a principal with information about
agents’ efforts in the situation where their production technologies are correlated, even
if the effort itself is unobservable. This information can be used to design an incentive
scheme that is based on relative performance of the agents. It is well known that
in a static setting such relative performance evaluation dominates incentive schemes
based on absolute performance (Holmstrom 1982, Lazear and Rosen 1981, Green and
Stokey 1983). Third, competition has a disciplining effect on agents in the situation
where only one of them can succeed (for example, in case of patent race). Even if the
agents’ production technologies are not correlated, competition improves incentives
because each agent faces a risk that, while he shirks, his rival wins the prize. This
effect of competition has not received much attention in the literature. One excep-
tion is Levitt (1995), who recognizes the value of competition even in the absence of
common shock. The framework of his model, however, does not allow him to draw
any concrete conclusions in this case.
The first and the second chapter of this dissertation contribute to the literature on
incentives with many agents by investigating the benefits of competition in the frame-
work where agents’ production technologies are not correlated. Both chapters are
motivated by an observation that it is not unusual for the principals investing in
R&D (venture capital firms, grant agencies, government agencies, etc.) to finance
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an innovation race between competing agents (entrepreneurs). Two questions arise
from this observation. First is how far the advantage of competition goes in a dy-
namic set-up where one of the competing agents wins a leading position, while the
other remains a follower. In particular, should the principal chose the most advanced
agent and abandon the financing of the follower, or can he improve his own profit
by financing the innovation race? The second question is how far the advantage of
competition goes when compared with team production which is technologically more
efficient. Should the principal employ competing agents to perform a project or should
he rather prefer a team, which is subject to synergy effects? Chapter 1 addresses the
first question whereas Chapter 2 addresses the second.
In the first chapter we investigate a dynamic model of R&D where financing decisions
(made by a principal or a venture capitalist) and allocation decisions (made by agents
or entrepreneurs) are separated. This creates a moral hazard problem, because the
agents can divert part of funds, provided by the venture capitalist, for own uses. It is
shown that the venture capitalist can mitigate this moral hazard problem and hence
improve his own profit by financing an innovation race between entrepreneurs.
We consider a model with two agents who work simultaneously on a project, which,
if successful, generates a fixed prize. The project is developed in stages that are
observable and verifiable outcomes of the R&D, such as results of test, patent, etc.
The first agent who completes the second stage wins the prize. We ask, whether the
venture capitalist should finance both agents or whether he should choose one of them
and abandon the financing of the other. To this end we investigate two scenarios: a
scenario where the agents are on the same (the last) stage of R&D and a scenario
where one of them is the leader in the innovation race and the other is the follower.
We identify two effects which make the financing of competing entrepreneurs attrac-
tive to the venture capitalist. First effect is the higher probability of success (scale
effect) and the second is the positive effect which competition has on incentives (dis-
ciplining effect). In order to highlight the importance of competition in the moral
hazard setting, we compare it to the benchmark setting of no moral hazard. The
analysis reveals, that in the scenario where both entrepreneurs are on the same stage
of R&D both effects are important. Due to the scale effect financing of competing
entrepreneurs is attractive in the absence of moral hazard. Under moral hazard,
the disciplining effect reinforces the scale effect making the financing of competing
entrepreneurs even more attractive.
However, in the scenario with a leader and a follower, the scale effect is of little
importance, so that without moral hazard the follower will almost never be employed.
Nevertheless, with moral hazard in place, the presence of a competitor allows to
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reduce significantly the rent of the leader, which often makes competition an attractive
arrangement. We also find that by improving incentives the competition allows the
venture capitalist to increase the maximal research horizon during which he is willing
to finance the project, making it therefore closer to the first-best (infinite) horizon.
The key finding of this chapter is that competition can be used by the venture capital-
ist as an effective cure against the moral hazard, in a situation where the allocation of
funds by the entrepreneurs is not observable. Hence, competition serves as a “natural”
mechanism that allows to improve the efficiency of research and development. The
analysis of this mechanism contributes to the literature on venture capital, which up
to know considered mainly contractual arrangements, based on complicated security
schemes, as a mean of reducing the moral hazard problem (Sahlman 1990, Schmidt
2003). In many environments, however, the use of such securities is complicated or
not possible at all. In such cases the existence of a “natural” mechanism is particu-
lary important. Our prediction therefore is that venture capital firms, operating on
developing markets (that have not yet accommodated complicated securities schemes)
and grant agencies (that do not use such schemes following established tradition or
due to the lack of expertise) should be inclined to finance an innovation race between
the portfolio projects.
The second chapter goes a step further and asks to which extent the positive effect
which competition has on incentives dominates the production gains generated by a
team. Similarly to the previous chapter we investigate a model with the principal
and two agents, where the principal finances an R&D project, which, if successful
generates a fixed prize. The unobservable effort of agents (their investments) is a
source of moral hazard in this model: the agents can divert part of funds for their
own uses.
It is assumed, that the agents are symmetric and each of them is capable to perform
the project himself. The principal can choose between several organizational designs.
First, he can employ only one agent. Second, he can employ two agents cooperating
in a team. Finally, he can employ two competing agents. As is shown in the first
chapter the principal is always better off employing competing agents, rather than a
single agent, if the agents are symmetric. The second chapter is focused on comparing
the team production with competing agents.
As we know from the first chapter, competition has important positive effect on agents’
incentives (disciplining effect). Team production, on the other hand, exhibits synergy
effects (i.e. technological benefits resulting from specialization or from complemen-
tarity between agents’ skills) and is therefore the most efficient arrangement from
the technological point of view. We characterize the threshold value of synergy ef-
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fects such that above this value the principal prefers to finance a team, rather than
competing agents. This threshold increases with the value of the project: for more
lucrative projects positive effect of competition tends to dominate productivity gains,
generated by a team.
The intuition for this result stems from the fact that the principal has to balance a
reward which agents receive in case of success, and the amount of investment funds
allocated in the project. The larger is the reward and the smaller is the amount of
investment funds in their discretion, the less tempted are the agents to consume the
part of funds. However, the free-riding hazard in team weakens the incentives. The
presence of synergy effect only accelerates this problem by enabling agents to achieve
high success probability by investing small amounts. Hence, as the prize in stake in-
creases, the principal is forced to limit resources allocated to the team more severely,
than resources allocated to competing agents (while paying proportionally higher re-
ward in the former case). Therefore, if the prize is sufficiently large, competing agents
eventually perform better than a team.
In the second part of this chapter we show that the principal can improve incentives
in the team by enforcing sequential production or (if he is unable to do it himself)
by relying on the team leader to do so. There are two obstacles, however. First, it
is shown in line with existing literature (Gould and Winter 2005, Ludwig 2007) that
sequential production improves incentives only if the efforts of agents are strategic
complements. Second, if the principal relies on the team leader to enforce sequential
production, the latter is reluctant to employ a subordinate and tends to perform large
part of the project himself. This leads only to the minor use of synergy effects and
results in a significant loss of efficiency.
The results of this chapter lead to a number of interesting predictions about orga-
nization of R&D (or, more generally, production) process. First, the results suggest
that we should observe principals switching to financing competing multiple teams,
rather than a consortium of teams, as the prize in stake increases. Second, in an en-
vironment where a team is organized as a hierarchy and a team leader has difficulties
verifying the effort of his subordinates, we should observe the team leader executing
significantly larger effort, than his team peers.
The third paper deals with different topic. Here we develop a formal theory of com-
patibility choice in two-sided markets.
Rochet and Tirole (forthcoming) define two-sided markets as markets, where one or
several platforms enable interaction between two distinct group of agents and the
volume of transaction is affected by a price structure. Two-sided markets, in other
words, are the markets which are characterized by the presence of network externalities
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on both sides. At such market, utility of agents on one side of the market increases
with the number of agents (size of network) on the other side of the market with
whom they can interact.
On a market with network externalities, the compatibility of products (technologies,
platforms) affects the size of relevant network and hence the incentives of agents
to buy a particular product. It is, therefore, not surprising, that any decision of a
firm operating at such market crucially depends on the fact whether its product is
compatible with that of a rival or with the previous generations of the same product.
The issue of compatibility has been well investigated in the literature on simple (i.e.
there is only one group of agents) network externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Katz
and Shapiro 1986, Farrell and Saloner 1986, Choi 1994). This literature, however,
did not pay much attention to the fact that many markets which exhibit network
externalities, are two-sided markets.
The third chapter of this dissertation therefore contributes to the literature on network
externalities by analyzing the compatibility choice at two-sided market. We provide a
classification of the compatibility regimes which one can observe on two-sided markets
and develop a theory which explains how the choice of a particular regime depends on
the characteristics of the market (the size of the installed base and the market growth
rate) and technological features of the new platform.
To develop a theory of compatibility choice we consider a framework with two plat-
forms (old and new), owned by a single firm, the monopolist. The platforms enable
interaction between two groups of agents, users and sellers. Some of users and sellers
belong to the installed base (they are subscribed to the old platform), while there
is also a number of new potential users and sellers. The monopolist earns his profit
by selling the new platform to the installed base of agents and to the new agents.
He also can choose a compatibility regime between the platforms and the size of per-
interaction benefits, which the agents, using different platforms, derive interacting
with each other.
We investigate the monopolistic market due to several reasons. First, many two-
sided markets are indeed close to monopolistic (PC operating systems with Microsoft,
internet auctions with eBay, etc.) Second, we want to analyze incentives to achieve
compatibility rather, than those which stem from competition.
Our first important result is that the monopolist will never choose partial compati-
bility. He will either make technologies incompatible or will make them compatible
to the extent that agents, who interact using different platforms, can enjoy maxi-
mal possible network benefits. This result allows us to concentrate our analysis on
four extreme compatibility regimes: full compatibility, incompatibility and backward
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compatibility for each side of the market.
We show that the tradeoff which is in the heart of monopolist’s decision to make
technologies compatible, is the tradeoff between demand of new agents on one side
of the market and demand of the old agents on the other side of the market. In
particular, if the monopolist introduces backward compatibility for, say, users, he
encourages new users to buy the new platform but discourages the old sellers to do
so (direct effect). The decrease in the demand of old sellers triggers the decrease in
demand of old users and of the new users (feedback effect). The tradeoff between these
effects determines which compatibility regime will be chosen in equilibrium.
Investigating different market structures (mature market, emerging market and asym-
metric market) we characterize the choice of compatibility in terms of primitives of
the model. In particular, we show, that the compatibility for users will be imposed
if the proportion of new users is relatively small, installed base of sellers and users
is relatively small and the technological progress is moderate. Our predictions about
the pattern of compatibility choice are illustrated with two examples of two-sided
markets.
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Chapter 1
Financing of Competing Projects
with Venture Capital
1.1 Introduction
The classical approach in the literature on patent races is to model firms run by their
owner and to assume away any incentive problems within these firms.1 This approach
ignores an important fact that in many cases the financing and allocation decisions
in R&D process are separated. This problem arises within firms (for example, if they
subcontract R&D) but it is especially important for grant agencies and venture capital
funds.
Venture capital funds are usually directed to projects of uncertain quality, where
neither time nor financial recourses needed for successful completion of the project are
known ex ante. As a rule, venture capitalists are actively involved in monitoring firms
in their portfolio. Nevertheless, they can rarely control perfectly whether resources
are allocated efficiently, since such control requires an expertise which often only an
entrepreneur himself possesses. This creates a moral hazard problem: entrepreneurs
tend to misallocate the funds provided by the venture capitalist. In particular, they
may divert part of funds for their own uses, or may allocate them into activities, which
have high personal return but create little market value (Gompers and Lerner 2004,
p. 174).
The venture capital literature has extensively discussed contractual arrangements that
can be used by in order to alleviate the moral hazard problem. These are, for example,
convertible securities (Sahlman 1990, Kaplan and Stromberg 2003) and monitoring
1Loury 1979, Lee and Wilde 1980, Reinganum 1981, Grossman and Shapiro 1987, Choi 1991,
Malueg and Tsutsui 1997, etc.
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mechanisms (Gompers 1995). On one hand, these mechanisms are efficient in mitigat-
ing the agency conflict. On the other hand, they are costly, complicated, and in some
circumstances they are not feasible at all (most obviously, if the capital markets are
not sufficiently developed to allow the use of complicated securities schemes). This
creates obstacles for efficient funding of R&D.
This paper, as opposed to the existing literature on venture capital, proposes a non-
contractual mechanism, namely competition between portfolio firms, that can be used
to mitigate the agency conflict. The main question that we address is whether a
venture capitalist can use competition between portfolio entrepreneurs to improve
their incentives and thus his own profit. To answer this question we investigate a
patent race in a moral hazard setting, where financing decision (made by the venture
capitalist) and the allocation decisions (made by two competing agents) are separated.
Comparing the patent race with a basic set up where only one agent is employed,
we identify two effects of competition. Obviously, competition allows to increase the
probability of success, since two agents succeed (on average) more often than one
(scale effect). But, more importantly, the fear that the competitor wins the patent
race limits the option of the agents to divert funds for own uses (disciplining effect).
While the scale effect is important when the agents are symmetric, we show that it
plays negligible role when the agents are asymmetric, so that one of them is the leader
in the innovation race and the other is the follower. Nevertheless, the venture capitalist
will often employ the follower together with the leader, although in terms of success
probability the contribution of the former is minor. His presence, however, disciplines
the leader and limits the rent which the latter can extract from the principal.
The observation that venture capital firms, grant agencies and similar institutions
may find it profitable to finance an innovation race is well supported by casual em-
pirical evidence. The venture capital division of Vulcan Inc., a corporation owned
by Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, has contracted three competing agencies for the
project Halo, aimed at the development of the problem-solving software.2 National
Archives and Records Administration of the USA awarded two contracts to the com-
peting firms to develop an Electronic Record Archives, a revolutionary system of
record keeping.3 National Institutes of Health (USA) routinely finances competing
research teams working on the same problem.4
2See www.projecthalo.com for details
3For details see www.diglib.org/preserve/ERA2004.htm.
4Recent example involves two large scale competing studies which independently revealed a gene
responsible for multiple sclerosis. Both studies were supported by a grant from NIH. For details see
www.ninds.nih.gov/ news and events/press releases/.
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Despite the numerous evidence that financing of competing projects plays an impor-
tant role in the venture capital and the grant funding, the literature on venture capital
has up to now paid little attention to this potent mechanism of mitigating the agency
problem. The only exception is Levitt (1995), who analyzes the problem of a principal
employing two agents. The principal’s payoff depends on the best of agents’ outputs.
Unlike in our model, the author investigates a static situation that does not allow to
address a competition between the leader and the follower. Moreover his results rely
on the fact that production technologies of the agents are interdependent, and the
model is not able to deliver predictions for the case of independent technologies. We
address both issues in our paper.
Analyzing the innovation race between two competing entrepreneurs we consider a
research process consisting of several sequential stages that are observable and verifi-
able outcomes of R&D, such as a patent, results of tests, etc. Both entrepreneurs are
financed by a single venture capitalist, who incurs the research costs and rewards the
entrepreneurs if they succeed. He also determines the time horizon during which the
project will be financed. Within this structure we investigate the effect of competition
in two scenarios: when the entrepreneurs are at the same stage or at different stages
of research. The simplest situation that allows to analyze the first scenario is the
innovation race between two identical entrepreneurs who need to finish one stage of
R&D in order to complete a project. In this case, the scale effect is important and in
the moral hazard setting is re-enforced by the disciplining effect. We conclude that
with identical entrepreneurs, competition is unambiguously beneficial for the venture
capitalist: he will always prefers to employ two entrepreneurs rather then one.
The simplest situation which allows to analyze the second scenario is the research
process consisting of two sequential stages. In particular, we assume that the ven-
ture capitalist has in his portfolio a leader, who has successfully completed the first
stage of R&D. The venture capitalist now faces an opportunity to finance a second
entrepreneur, a follower, who is in the initial stage of R&D. Should the venture capi-
talist employ both agents, or should he proceed financing the leader alone? It turns
out, that the scale effect is negligible. Therefore, in the absence of the moral hazard,
the venture capitalist almost always prefers to employ the most advanced agent, the
leader. In the presence of the moral hazard, however, the existence of the follower is
important because it relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint of the leader. Due
to this disciplining effect the venture capitalist will often employ both agents.
Our modelling approach is closely related to that of Bergemann and Hege (1998, 2002,
2005). They investigate the decision of a venture capitalist who finances a single en-
trepreneur under uncertainty about the quality of the project and investments needed
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for its successful realization. Bergemann and Hege (1998) analyze a model in which
the quality of a project is not known and has to be resolved through a costly experi-
ment. Their main result is that agency costs lead to inefficiently early stopping of the
project. In their paper Bergemann and Hege (2005) extend these results and analyze
the difference between relationship financing and arm-length financing. Finally, in
the third model Bergemann and Hege (2002) investigate the value of staged financ-
ing. The authors show that the use of financing rounds (stages) allows to increase
the funding horizon and to make it closer to the socially optimal horizon. We use
the framework of Bergemann and Hege to study the patent race in the moral hazard
setting.
Another paper which is related to ours is Schmidt (1997). The author studies the in-
centives of a manager, who operates on the competitive product market. He identifies
a “threat-of-liquidation” effect of competition. As the product-market competition
increases, the manager is induced to spend more effort, because otherwise the profits
of his firm fall below the critical value and the firm will be liquidated. This effect is
somewhat similar to ours disciplining effect. In Schmidt (1997), however, competi-
tive environment is exogenously given. We, to the contrary, assume that the venture
capitalist can determine the extent of the disciplining effect by employing two agents
and specifying in contracts how long each of the competitors will stay in the game.
The structure of this paper is the following. We describe the set-up of the model
in Section 1.2 and derive the sequentially optimal contract in Sections 1.3 and 1.4.
We introduce strategic interaction among entrepreneurs in Section 1.5 and discuss
the advantage of commitment to finite horizon in Section 1.6. Section 1.7 concludes.
Proofs and results of numerical simulations can be found in Appendix 1.A.
1.2 Description of the model
1.2.1 Innovation process
There are two entrepreneurs with no wealth of their own. Both have an idea (a project)
how to solve a particular problem. For example, they try to find a cure against a
disease. Following Bergemann and Hege (2002), we assume that the project requires
each entrepreneur to complete N sequential stages. These stages are observable and
verifiable outcomes, such as a patent, first version of a product, results of markets
tests, etc. The stages are sequential in the sense that in order to enter the k-th stage
each entrepreneur has to complete successfully previous (k − 1) stages. Financing of
the projects is done by venture capitalist who provides necessary funds. If all stages
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are completed, the project generates a prize R and the prize is to be divided between
the venture capitalist and the winning entrepreneur. We assume that the winner
has a monopoly over the outcome of the project (by patenting the invention), hence
the second entrepreneur (the looser of innovation race) does not generate any value.
Entrepreneurs and the venture capitalist are risk neutral individuals with common
discount rate r.
In order to successfully complete the current stage, the entrepreneur needs to allocate
an amount c (provided by the venture capitalist) into the project. In that case the
R&D is stochastic and we model the innovation process as a Bernoulli trial, where
the stage is completed in the current period with probability p. With probability
1 − p the entrepreneur does not succeed and needs to invest further (conditional on
the fact that his rival has not yet won the race). We assume that the probability
of success p is the same for both entrepreneurs. Further, following Lee and Wilde
(1980) and Reinganum (1981) we assume that probability of success in each period
is independent across the entrepreneurs and across time. Funds are provided by the
venture capitalist, but allocation decisions are made by entrepreneurs. They can
either invest funds or divert them for private uses. The venture capitalist is not able
to observe the allocation decision. All he can observe is a success (completion of the
current stage) or an absence of success (which can either mean that an entrepreneur
has invested money but failed, or that he has diverted it).5
1.2.2 Moral hazard
We assume that there is a competitive market for innovative projects and a limited
supply of venture capital. The venture capitalist can choose any entrepreneur from the
pool of identical entrepreneurs. Therefore, the venture capitalist possesses bargaining
power, which also means that after paying an entrepreneur the incentive compatible
compensation, he retains the residual payoff from the project.
The allocation of funds in this model is subject to a moral hazard: In each period the
entrepreneurs face a choice between allocating the funds into R&D and consuming
them. The venture capitalist, however, is willing to finance R&D only if he can
ensure that funds are allocated truthfully in each period of time. That is, the venture
capitalist needs to suggest such reward to both entrepreneurs, so that they prefer to
5The innovation process in this game can be interpreted as following. Each entrepreneur owns a
coin (representing a project). He tosses the coin and counts a number of “heads” (successes) and
“tails” (failures). The first entrepreneur who counts N heads wins the prize R. In order to make one
toss, each entrepreneur has to pay a prescribed amount of money c. The venture capitalist provides
money for both entrepreneurs in exchange for a share of the prize R.
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allocate the funds to R&D, rather than to divert them. Moreover, since the allocation
of funds is not verifiable, the incentive scheme should reward the entrepreneurs only
if a stage was successfully completed.
There are several counteracting forces that determine the size of the incentive pay-
ments. On one hand, by consuming funds the entrepreneurs receive the immediate
utility c in each period. This way they also ensure themselves further financing, i.e.,
potential rent of c in the next period. Therefore, in each period of time the venture
capitalist should promise the entrepreneurs a reward which is at least as large as the
present value of all investments c which the entrepreneurs can consume. On the other
hand, by consuming the funds rather than investing them, each entrepreneur faces
a risk that his rival wins the prize. This lowers the expected present value of his
future consumption from diverting the funds and therefore limits the option of each
entrepreneur to deviate and to consume the funds. Hence, competition might make
it cheaper for the venture capitalist to meet the incentive compatibility constraints of
the entrepreneurs.
We analyze two scenarios: a basic scenario with entrepreneurs on the same stage of
R&D, and a variation with entrepreneurs on different stages of R&D. In the scenario
with entrepreneurs on the same stage of R&D, we consider the simplest case, where
each entrepreneur needs to complete only one stage in order to complete the whole
project. In this scenario we analyze the decision of the venture capitalist whether to
employ a single agent or both agents. In the scenario with entrepreneurs on differ-
ent stages of R&D, we again consider the simplest case, where in order to complete
the project the first entrepreneur needs to complete one stage (the leader) and the
second entrepreneur needs to complete two stages (the follower). We are, in par-
ticular, interested in the question whether the venture capitalist should in addition
to more advanced leader employ the less advanced follower. Bergemann and Hege
(2002) analyze a model with a single entrepreneur and N stages. However, for more
than one entrepreneur the analysis of the multistage game becomes extremely com-
plicated. In spite of this limitation, our model enables us to illustrate the importance
of competition between the entrepreneurs in venture capital financing.
1.2.3 Definitions and notations
We will call a regime (i/j) a situation, where one entrepreneur has i successes (he
has successfully completed i stages) and the other entrepreneur has j successes. Both
scenarios that we analyze can be then nested within the setup with N = 2 (i.e., the
project consist of two stages) and i, j ∈ {0, 1}: scenario with entrepreneurs on the
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same stage of R&D corresponds to regime (1/1), and scenario with entrepreneurs
different stages of R&D corresponds to regime (1/0).
We will use the following notation:
• T ij denotes the financing horizon in regime (i/j). It this time elapses, the
venture capitalist may abandon one or both entrepreneurs.6
• V ijt denotes the value of the project at time t in regime (i/j).
• ELt and EFt are the expected value of the reward of the leader and the follower
respectively at time t in regime (1/0). In regime (1/1) the value function is
denoted E11t .
• sLt and sFt are the rewards, which the leader, respectively the follower, earn upon
successful completion of the current stage at time t in regime (1/0). In regime
(1/1) the reward is denoted as s11t .
Furthermore, we will call regime (i) a situation, in which the venture capitalist finances
only one entrepreneur, who is on i-th stage of R&D. The corresponding value of the
project, value function of an entrepreneur, and his reward are denoted as V it , E
i
t , and
sit, respectively.
Sometimes, we also denote specific contracts (candidates for the optimal contract) as
Ck, where k = 1, 2, . . . . We will then use index k to denote the corresponding financing
horizon, value of the project, value function of an entrepreneur, and his reward.
1.3 Innovation race between identical entrepreneurs
We start with the first scenario, where the venture capitalists faces two identical
entrepreneurs, each of which is capable to perform the project. The project consist
of a single stage (or equivalently, both entrepreneurs are in the last stage) and the
venture capitalist has to decide whether to employ both entrepreneurs, only one of
them, or none. It is assumed that the agents observe whether their rival was employed.
In order to give the entrepreneurs incentives to invest in each period of time the venture
capitalist has to offer them an appropriate incentive compatible contract.7 Since the
allocation of funds is not observable, the reward, which agents receive according to
6In some cases, we omit the superscript specifying the regime.
7Any contract, promising positive expected reward is assumed to satisfy the participation con-
straint, as the entrepreneurs’ outside option is normalized to 0.
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the contract, has to be conditioned on observable outcomes. Those are the event and
the time of success and the identity of the winner.
In regime (i/j) a contract specifies the following terms:
1. Financing horizon T ij,
2. Stopping rule that is used when time T ij has elapsed, but no discovery has been
made,
3. Rewards for the entrepreneurs sijt , depending on the time t when success is
achieved, where 0 ≤ t ≤ T ij.
Following Bergemann and Hege (2002) and Neher (1999), we assume that the ven-
ture capitalist can determine the maximal financing horizon and commit to it. If
this horizon have been reached but no success was achieved, then, depending on the
stopping rule, either the financing of one entrepreneur or of the whole project will be
irrevocably terminated. We justify this assumption in Section 1.6.
In the situation with identical entrepreneurs we limit our attention to the set of
contracts, which use one of the following stopping rules:
1. Stopping rule R1: Finance both entrepreneurs until one of them wins or until the
maximal financing horizon is reached. If neither entrepreneur succeeds, abandon
the financing of both.
2. Stopping rule R2: Finance both entrepreneurs until one of them wins or until the
maximal financing horizon is reached. If neither entrepreneur succeeds, abandon
one entrepreneur randomly and continue financing in regime (1).
3. Stopping rule R3: Finance a single entrepreneur until he succeeds but no longer
than for T 1 periods.
These rules represent a set of deterministic stopping rules, i.e. they use the observable
outcomes to decide, which entrepreneur should be financed further and which should
be terminated. The set of deterministic stopping rules is not generally limited to these
three stopping rules. There is an additional class of rules within this set, where the
principal employs one entrepreneur in period t and the other entrepreneur in period
τ > t. We eliminate the latter class of stopping rules on the assumption that an
entrepreneur, who is not financed for at least one period, leaves the market (he either
becomes an employee or receives financing from other sources, such as bank loan,
grant, friends and family, etc.)
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To analyze the model we look for sequentially optimal dynamic contract which max-
imizes the profit of the venture capitalist in each regime of the game. In fact, such
contract can be viewed as a sequence of contracts, where the new contract is signed
after a regime switches. We require therefore, that in the beginning of the regime
(1/1) the venture capitalist cannot commit to a contract which will be suboptimal in
the regime (1).
In order to find the universally optimal contract we first develop an optimal contract
for each of the three stopping rules and then compare the contracts across the stopping
rules.
1.3.1 Value of the venture
The venture capitalist’s decision whether to finance one or two entrepreneurs and the
choice of the maximal horizon of R&D depends on the expected profit obtained in
each case. This profit is the difference between the expected value of the project and
the expected compensation of the entrepreneurs.
As our model is formulated in finite time, we can recover the value of the project
recursively. Consider first the stopping rule R3, which corresponds to a case when
the principal employs a single entrepreneur - this case is extensively discussed in
Bergemann and Hege (2002). In period t the expected value of the project can be
written as
V 1t = Rp+
(1− p)
1 + r
V 1t+1 − c. (1.1)
This value consists of three terms. The last term, c, represents funds which the venture
capitalist has to distribute to the entrepreneur. With probability p the entrepreneur
makes a discovery in period t. With probability (1− p) the entrepreneur fails, so that
the value of the project in period t is the discounted value of the project in period
t+ 1, that is 1
1+r
V 1t+1.
The sequence of values is the given by the solution of the difference equation (1.1)
together with terminal condition V 1T+1 = 0. This condition states that there is no
continuation after time T and the value of the project is therefore zero. Following
Bergemann and Hege (2002) we consider transition to continuous time. The innova-
tion process becomes a Poisson process and the above difference equation equation
becomes a differential equation. Solving it, we obtain the following expression for
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value function in period t:
V 1t =
(Rp− c)
r + p
(
1− e−(r+p)(T−t)) . (1.2)
The expression for the value function consists of two factors. The first factor represents
the expected payoff from the investment, discounted with a composite discount rate
which combines time discount r and the uncertain arrival of success. The second
factor shows how the value of the project decreases with time of discovery.
Using the same procedure it is straightforward to derive the value function V 11t for
the stopping rule R1, which corresponds to a case when the principal employs both
agents (see Appendix 1.A for details). The recursively determined value of the project
in period t is
V 11t = Rp(2− p) +
(1− p)2
1 + r
V 11t+1 − 2c (1.3)
This leads to the following value function:
V 11t =
2(Rp− c)
r + 2p
(1− e−(r+2p)(T−t)).
Finally, consider the stopping rule R2. It dictates that in the case when no en-
trepreneur succeeds before t = T , one of them has to be chosen randomly and fi-
nanced further for additional number of periods. In this case the value V 11t satisfies
equation (1.4). The expected value of the venture in the terminal period of regime
(1/1) is now V 11T+1 = V
1
0 , where V
1
0 is determined from (1.2) for t = 0. Solution of the
corresponding differential equation leads to the following value function:
V 11t =
(
V 10 −
2(Rp− c)
r + 2p
)
· e−(r+2p)(T−t) + 2(Rp− c)
r + 2p
. (1.4)
The value functions are summarized in Table 1 in Appendix 1.B.
1.3.2 Incentives of the entrepreneurs
In each period of time entrepreneurs face a choice between diverting the funds provided
by the venture capitalist for private needs, and investing them into the project. In
order to motivate entrepreneurs to allocate funds into research and development, the
venture capitalist has to promise them a reward which is at least as large as the stream
of rent that an entrepreneur can receive diverting the funds.
With our simple model of the R&D process, each entrepreneur has two available
16
strategies: he can either “work” (that is, allocate funds into the project) or “shirk”
(that is, divert all funds for private uses). For the time being, we make the assumption
that the entrepreneurs do not behave strategically, i.e. each of them believes that the
other entrepreneur always “works”, or allocates the funds into the project in each
period of time. We discuss the strategic interaction in Section 1.5 and we show
that it does not change the results, obtained under the assumption of non-strategic
interaction.
In each period of time, the venture capitalist has to offer each entrepreneur such
reward, that he finds it incentive compatible to invest in this period, rather than
consume funds. For illustration consider the stopping rule R1. According to this rule,
financing of both entrepreneurs is terminated if no success occurred before time T
elapses.
The intertemporal incentive compatibility constraint for period t:
E11t = p(1− p)s11t +
1
2
p2s11t +
(1− p)2
(1 + r)
E11t+1 ≥ c+
1− p
1 + r
E11t+1 , (1.5)
with terminal condition E11T+1 = 0. The left-hand side of (1.5) represents the expected
utility of the entrepreneur, if he allocates the funds into the project at period t. If
the entrepreneur wins while his rival loses, which occurs with probability p(1−p), the
entrepreneur earns his share s11t . If there is a tie (i.e., both win, which occurs with
probability p2), he earns this share with probability 1
2
. Last, if nobody wins (with
probability (1−p)2), the entrepreneur will receive further financing with present value
1
1+r
E11t+1.
The right-hand side of (1.5) represents the expected payoff of the entrepreneur from
diverting funds at period t. The incentive to divert funds arises from two sources.
First, the entrepreneur enjoys the utility c from consuming the funds rather than in-
vesting them. Second, by consuming the funds he ensures that financing of the project
will continue in the next period with probability (1 − p), which is the probability of
the rival not making a success. Note that since (1 − p) > (1 − p)2, by investing
the entrepreneur cuts himself off the future stream of rent. If there is only one en-
trepreneur, as in Bergemann and Hege (2002), then by diverting funds in period t,
he guarantees himself that the funding will continue in period t + 1 with probability
1, unless it is the terminal period. In case of two entrepreneurs, however, funding
of each is stochastic and depends on the fact that another entrepreneur has not yet
reached success. Therefore, competition softens the incentive compatibility constraint
and makes it easier for the venture capitalist to satisfy it.
The venture capitalist aims at paying each entrepreneur the minimal share which will
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force the latter to invest the funds rather than consume them. To determine the
optimal sequence of shares in each time t = 1, 2, . . . , T the venture capitalist solves
the following minimization problem:
E11t = min{s11t } p(1− p)s11t +
1
2
p2s11t +
(1− p)2
(1 + r)
E11t+1 (1.6)
s.t. p(1− p)s11t +
1
2
p2s11t +
(1− p)2
(1 + r)
E11t+1 ≥ c+
1− p
1 + r
E11t+1.
Obviously, in the optimum the incentive compatibility constraint will be binding.
Considering the transition to continuous time we derive expressions for the share,
which the entrepreneur receives in case of success, and the value function which de-
scribes the expected utility of the entrepreneur in each time t, given that he allocates
the funds into the project(see Appendix 1.A for the derivation of a value function and
of the entrepreneur’s share). We obtain
s11t =
c
p
+ E11t , (1.7)
E11t =
c
r + p
(
1− e(r+p)(t−T )) . (1.8)
As the entrepreneurs are ex-ante identical, in the sense that they are at the same stage
of R&D and have the same probability to complete the project, the value functions
(and the shares) are identical for both entrepreneurs.
The compensation scheme, described by the value function E11t , guarantees that each
entrepreneur invests the funds, rather then diverting them, in each period in the
regime (1/1). The above expression is very intuitive. The first factor of E11t represents
the value of perpetuity which an entrepreneur would receive if he diverted the funds.
The second factor represents a “punishment” for late discovery, in the sense that the
share of an entrepreneur decreases over time. Analogically as in the previous case,
it is easy to derive the share and the expected utility of the entrepreneurs for the
stopping rule R3:
s1t =
c
p
+ E1t
E1t =
c
r
(1− e−r(T−t)), (1.9)
Finally, the stopping rule R2 differs from R1 again only in the terminal condition.
Since there is probability 1
2
that the entrepreneur will be chosen to continue, we have
E11T+1 =
1
2
E10 , where E
1
0 is given by (1.9) for t = 0, Then it is straightforward to
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determine the corresponding share and the expected utility of an entrepreneur:
s11t =
c
p
+ E11t ,
E11t =
(
1
2
E10 −
c
r + p
)
· e−(r+p)(T−t) + c
r + p
(1.10)
The results are summarized in the Table 1 in Appendix 1.B.
1.3.3 Optimal stopping time
For each stopping rule the venture capitalist maximizes his profit from the project,
subject to the incentive compatibility constraints. Given the stopping rule, the choice
variables of the venture capitalist are the shares of entrepreneurs and the maximal
time horizon. The share is the function of exogenous parameters c, r and p, time t
when success is achieved, and the endogenously determined time horizon T . Hence,
optimally choosing the financing horizon the principal automatically determines the
sequence of shares.
Stopping rule R1
Consider the stopping rule R1, which requires that both entrepreneurs are financed
until one of them wins or until the financing horizon elapses. The optimal time horizon
is derived from the following program:
max
T∈(0,∞)
V 110 − 2E110 ,
where the value functions V 110 and E
11
0 are derived in the previous section and are
given by (1.4) and (1.8) with t = 0. The first order condition yields a unique solution
to the maximization problem. We will denote the optimal financing horizon as T 111 ,
where
T 111 = −
1
p
ln
c
Rp− c .
We denote the optimal contract, corresponding to the stopping rule R1 as C1. Ac-
cording to this contract the venture capitalist finances both entrepreneurs until one of
them succeeds but at most for T 111 periods. In case of success the winner is rewarded
with an appropriate share s11t as given by (1.7); see also Table 1 in Appendix 1.B for
the summary of contract terms.
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Stopping rule R3
The stopping rule R3 corresponds to the benchmark case with one entrepreneur. It is
easy to show that in this case the optimal financing horizon is T 1 = −1
p
ln c
Rp−c (see
also Bergemann and Hege 2002). The resulting contract is denoted C4.8 Since the
optimal financing horizon depends on costs of R&D and on expected payoff, it is not
surprising, that T 1 = T 111 . Indeed, two entrepreneurs spend twice as much on R&D,
but they also have twice as large probability of success,9 so that the ratio of R&D
costs to the expected payoff remains constant.
Note, that T 1 is positive if and only if Rp > 2c. The intuition behind this restriction
becomes clear when we re-write inequality as R > 2c
p
. The R&D in our model follows
a Poisson process with parameter p, so that the expected time of discovery when a
single entrepreneur is employed, is 1
p
. Hence, the requirement R > 2c
p
means that the
venture capitalist will finance the project only if the value of the prize is larger than
the expected cost of R&D plus the expected reward, payed to an agent. Otherwise,
it is not profitable for the venture capitalist to finance the project at all. From now
on we will assume, that Rp > 2c.
Stopping rule R2
Let us now consider the stopping rule R2. According to this rule both entrepreneurs
will be financed until one of them wins, or until the maximal allowed time elapses.
If no success was made, then one entrepreneur will be randomly chosen and financed
for additional period of time. For simplicity we denote the expected profit, which the
venture capitalist retains as F (T ) = V 110 − 2E110 , where the functions V 110 and E110 are
given by (1.4) and (1.10) with t = 0; see also Table 1 in Appendix 1.B. Maximizing
the profit of the venture capitalist, we obtain the following first-order condition:
F ′(T ) = −(r + 2p) ·B11 · e−(r+2p)T + (r + p) · A11 · e−(r+p)T = 0,
where A11 = E10 −
2c
r + p
, B11 = V 10 −
2(Rp− c)
r + 2p
. (1.11)
Depending on the relation of A11 and B11 the optimal time can be finite or infinite.
First note that B11 is always negative. Indeed the inequality B11 < 0 is equivalent to
Rp− c
r + p
(
1− e−T 1(r+p)
)
<
2(Rp− c)
r + 2p
,
8Here, we use T 1 instead of T 14 , since C4 is the only contract which arises in regime (i).
9Intuition for this result is explained in Section 1.3.4.
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which obviously holds for all values of parameters p, r ∈ (0, 1) satisfying the feasibility
condition Rp > 2c.
If (r+ p)A11 ≤ (r+2p)B11 < 0, then the expected profit F (T ) is decreasing in T and
the optimal research horizon is zero, so that effectively the venture capitalist employs
only one entrepreneur.10 The resulting contract is identical to the contract C4.
If (r + 2p)B11 < (r + p)A11 < 0, then the optimal research horizon is
T 112 = −
1
p
ln
r + p
r + 2p
E10 − 2cr+p
V 10 − 2(Rp−c)r+2p
,
and the corresponding contract is denoted C2. According to this contract, the ven-
ture capitalist commits to finance both entrepreneurs at most for T 112 periods; if this
time elapses without a success, then only one entrepreneur (randomly chosen) will
be financed further for the maximum of T 1 periods. The terms of the contract are
described in Table 1 in Appendix 1.B.
On the other hand, if A11 ≥ 0, the expected profit F (T ) is increasing in T and the
optimal research horizon is infinite i.e., the venture capitalist is willing to finance the
innovation race infinitely long. The corresponding contract is denoted C3. This case
corresponds to the favorable combinations of low costs of R&D and high probability of
success. The condition A11 ≥ 0 directly implies that (in expected terms) the venture
capitalist would have to pay higher compensation to one entrepreneur than to two
entrepreneurs, i.e., E10 >
2c
r+p
. If this is the case, the venture capitalist always prefers
a competitive arrangement to a single entrepreneur.
Remark 1.1. Note that for all contracts, the value functions and the cost functions at
the optimal time are homogeneous of degree 1 in (c, R) and homogeneous of degree
0 in (c, p, r). Therefore, if we denote W (c, p, r, R) the maximal value of the venture
capitalist’s objective function,11 then
W (c, p, r, R) = R ·W
( c
R
, p, r, 1
)
= R ·W
( r¯c
Rr
,
r¯p
r
, r¯, 1
)
, (1.12)
where r¯ is some particular value of the discount rate. Hence any comparison of
contracts for general values of parameters c, p, r, and R is equivalent to comparison
for parameters c and p with an arbitrary value of r and with R = 1.12 Later, without
10Note that F ′′(T ) < 0 and F (0) > 0.
11This is, for example, V 110,1 − 2E110,1 at time T = T 111 for contract C1.
12In particular, given c, p, r, and R, we choose an arbitrary r¯ > 0 and consider new variables
c¯ = r¯cRr and p¯ =
r¯p
r , which gives W (c, p, r, R) = R ·W (c¯, p¯, r¯, 1). We rename the variables to c and p
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loss of generality, we use the value r¯ = 0.05 in numerical simulations.
1.3.4 Optimal contract
For each of the three stopping rules we can now specify a contract in terms of maximum
time allowed for research and the share of the prize, which each entrepreneur receives
in case of success. As we showed in the previous section for the same stopping rule
the optimal contract can take several forms. In any case, the terms of the contracts
depend on the probability of success and the normalized costs (that is on the ratio
c
R
; see Remark 1.1). For each combination of parameters, the venture capitalist will
choose among three contracts, corresponding to three stopping rules. The optimal
contract then is the one which maximizes the residual payoff of the venture capitalist.
Proposition 1.1. Let Rp > 2c. Then, in regime (1/1) the optimal contract is to
finance both identical entrepreneurs for at most T 111 = −1p ln cRp−c periods and abandon
financing of both if no success was made (such contract is denoted C1).
The proof of the proposition can be found in Appendix 1.A. The above result is
based on two effects: scale effect and disciplining effect. The former means that
two entrepreneurs increase the total probability of success. In particular, when the
entrepreneurs’ R&D processes are independent (as opposed to Levitt 1995) and are
modelled as identically distributed Poisson processes, then the probability of suc-
cess is exactly doubled.13 Thus, at each moment two entrepreneurs create twice as
much value as one entrepreneur. Therefore, when it is profitable to employ a single
entrepreneur, then the scale effect makes competition more attractive.
At the same time, the expected reward to be paid to each of the competing en-
trepreneurs is less than the expected reward of a single entrepreneur:
E111 =
c
r + p
(1− e−(r+p)(T−t)) < c
r
(1− e−r(T−t)) = E1.
Hence, the competition disciplines the entrepreneurs making them working hard for
smaller reward, which obviously makes competition more attractive. This effect on
by dropping the bar.
13In discrete time, the probability that at least one entrepreneur succeeds is in each period equal to
1−(1−p2) = 2p−p2. On the other hand, in continuous time, one of the properties of Poisson process
claims that the probability of two events (two successes) occurring in time interval [t, t+∆] interval
converges to zero, as ∆→ 0. Therefore, after transition to continuous time, the second-order terms
converge to 0 and the probability that at least one entrepreneur encounters a success in [t, t+∆] can
be approximated by 2∆p. More precisely, 2∆p is the first-order approximation of the probability,
which can also be written in form 2∆p+ o(∆).
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incentives we call the disciplining effect.
1.3.5 The effect of competition
Now we compare our result with the first-best case. In the first-best world (without
moral hazard) the principal is also always better of employing competing agents rather
than a single agent. Indeed, in both cases the reward of the agents is zero. Hence,
if the expected value of the project is larger than costs, i.e. Rp > c, the venture
capitalist is willing to finance a project infinitely long. Therefore, in continuous time
the value of the venture with competing agents V 11FB and with a single agent V
1
FB is
given by the following functions respectively:14
V 11FB =
2(Rp− c)
r + 2p
, V 1FB =
Rp− c
r + p
. (1.13)
Obviously, V 11FB > V
1
FB for any Rp > c. This result is due to the scale effect: Two
agents succeed two times more often than a single agent. In the situation with the
moral hazard the total effect of competition is even more significant due to the ef-
fect on the incentives. Our model predicts therefore, that the venture capitalist will
always choose to finance competing entrepreneurs, if they are at the same stage of
innovation race. This strong conclusion is partially a result of the assumption that
the entrepreneurs are considered to be identical. In the next section we show however,
that the venture capitalist can often benefit from competition even if the entrepreneurs
are situated on the different stages of R&D.
1.4 Innovation race between the leader and the fol-
lower
Consider now the second scenario, where in order to finish the project an entrepreneur
has to complete two stages. Assume further that the venture capitalist has in his
portfolio an entrepreneur (a leader) who has already finished one stage of R&D.
Now the venture capitalist faces an opportunity to employ another entrepreneur (a
follower) who has not yet achieved his first success. Should the venture capitalist
finance the innovation race between those two agents or should he rather proceed
financing the leader alone?
14Subscript FB stands for “first-best.”
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When the innovation race starts in a regime with a leader and a follower, the en-
trepreneurs are not identical from the venture capitalist’s point of view. Indeed, the
leader has a higher probability of winning a prize. Still, as we discuss in this section,
competition can be beneficial, if the presence of the follower considerably limits a rent
which the leader can extract from the venture capitalist. The follower has to be a
credible threat in a sense that the probability that he makes a breakthrough and wins
the race should be sufficiently high. On the other hand, the costs of R&D should
be low, compared to the expected prize, so that the duplication of research efforts is
justified.
In our notations the game with with a leader and a follower corresponds to regime
(1/0). As before, to solve the game we look for sequentially optimal contract that
maximizes the profit of the venture capitalist at each regime of the game. That is,
we require that the venture capitalist cannot draft a contract in regime (1/0) that
would be suboptimal in regime (1/1) and/or in regime with a single entrepreneur.
Further, we will limit the set of available contracts to the contracts which use one of
the following stopping rules:
1. Stopping rule R1: Finance both entrepreneurs until one of them succeeds or
until the maximal financing horizon is reached. If neither entrepreneur succeeds,
abandon the financing of both.
2. Stopping rule R2: Finance both entrepreneurs until one of them succeeds or until
the maximal financing horizon is reached. If neither entrepreneur succeeds, stop
financing the follower and finance the leader until he succeeds, but no longer
than for T 1 periods.
3. Stopping rule R3: Finance the leader until he succeeds, but not longer than for
T 1 periods.
The set of deterministic stopping rules in the race between the leader and the follower
is generally not limited to the three stopping rules described above. There is, first
of all a class of rules where the venture capitalist employs one agent in period t and
another agent in period τ > t. Similar as in Section 1.3, we eliminate this class of
rules on the assumption that an agent who is not financed at least one period leaves
the market.
Further, the rules described above favor the leader in a sense that he is always financed
at least as long as the follower. Potentially, the venture capitalist could use some
stopping rule, which favors the follower. Intuitively, such rules are less attractive for
the principal. They unambiguously decrease the probability of success (and hence
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the expected value of the project) and, while, improving the incentives of the leader,
they weaken the incentives of the follower. One example of such stopping rules is
the counterpart of rule R3, where the venture capitalist employs only the follower.
Obviously, the expected profit of the principal in the former case is higher. The other
possibility is the counterpart of a rule R2, where the principal abandons the leader
and continues financing the follower after the agents fail to deliver a success until the
terminal period. It is easy to show, that the tradeoff between stopping rule R2 and
his counterpart is equivalent to the tradeoff between employing only the leader and
employing only the follower (the formal argument is provided in the working paper
version Goldfayn and Kova´cˇ 2005). Indeed, both stopping rules are equivalent in
terms of expected value of the project and required incentives in the (1/0) regime.
What matters for comparison of two stopping rules is what happens after the terminal
period elapses but no success was made. In the first case (rule R2) the venture
capitalist would continue financing the leader. In the second case (counterpart of
rule R2) the venture capitalist would finance the follower, which obviously generates
smaller expected profit than the former possibility. Hence, the limitation of the menu
of stopping rules to those described above is well justified.
Similarly as before, in order to find the optimal contract, we develop an optimal
contract for each stopping rule, and then compare the contracts across stopping rules.
A contract specifies, in each regime (i/j) that can be achieved, the following terms:
1. financing horizon T ij,
2. stopping rule determining that is used when time T ij has elapsed, but no dis-
covery has been made,
3. rewards for the leader sLt , and the follower s
F
t depending on the time t when
success is achieved, where 0 ≤ t ≤ T ij.
For each stopping rule, the value functions are derived recursively starting from the
terminal period of regime (1/0) following the analogical procedure as with identical
agents. Therefore, instead of providing all details about the derivation of the value
functions, we will only mention the main milestones. In each period t of the game
there are the following possibilities:
(a) With probability p the leader wins his second success and the game ends. Note
that this also includes the case when both agents complete a current stage.
(b) With probability p(1−p) the follower wins his first success and the game switches
to a regime (1/1) (patent race with identical agents).
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(c) With probability (1 − p)2 neither agent succeeds. If t < T then the game
continues further. If t = T , then according to the appropriate stopping rule
either the project is terminated, or the financing of the follower is terminated
and the leader is financed further for at most T 1 periods.
Further notice, that according to the stopping rule R3 the venture capitalist finances
a single agent (the leader). This situation is the same as in regime (1/1) and is
analyzed in Section 1.3. Hence, we will focus on the stopping rules R1 and R2. For
both stopping rules, the equations, that recursively determine the value of the venture,
the expected reward of the leader, and the follower, satisfy:
V 10t = pR− 2c+
p(1− p)
1 + r
V 110 +
(1− p)2
1 + r
V 10t+1, (1.14)
ELt = c+
p
1 + r
E110 +
1− p
1 + r
ELt+1, (1.15)
EFt = c+
1− p
1 + r
EFt+1. (1.16)
Clearly, the terminal conditions for stopping rule R1 are V
10
T+1 = E
L
T+1 = E
F
T+1 = 0.
On the other hand, the terminal conditions for stopping rule R2 are V
10
T+1 = V
1
0 ,
ELT+1 = E
1
0 , and E
F
T+1 = 0. Using these conditions and equations (1.14)–(1.16) it is
straightforward (after transition to continuous time15) to derive the expected value of
the venture and the expected reward of the agents. The results are summarized in
Table 2 in Appendix 1.B.
An important observation is that the reward of the leader has to be higher than the
reward of the follower. By diverting funds at some period of time, the leader can
guarantee himself a rent c + p
1+r
E110 , where
p
1+r
E110 is his expected payoff in the case
when the follower makes the first success.16 Therefore, the venture capitalist has to
offer the leader an incentive compatible share, i.e., such that the leader’s expected
reward will be at least as large as the stream of rents c+ p
1+r
E110 . On the other hand,
if the follower consumes the funds in period t, he can only guarantee himself a rent of
c in this period. Therefore, his incentive compatible share should be lower than that
of the leader.
15Recall, that due to the property of the Poisson process the probability of two events happening
at the same time period is 0. Hence, after transition to continuous time, all terms containing p2 will
become zeros.
16In the regime (1/1) the optimal contract is C1. Henceforth, for ease of notation when referring
to the terms of this contract we will relax the index of a contract. That is E11t := E11t,1, V
11
t := V 11t,1 ,
T 11 := T 111 .
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1.4.1 Optimal stopping time
Stopping rule R2
Consider first the stopping rule R2. In this case the value of the venture and expected
reward of the entrepreneurs are described by the following value functions:
V 100 =
(
V 10 −
p(R + V 110 )− 2c
r + 2p
)
· e−(r+2p)T + p(R + V
11
0 )− 2c
r + 2p
,
EL0 = E
1
0 · e−(r+p)T +
c+ pE110
r + p
(1− e−(r+p)T ),
EF0 =
c
r + p
(1− e−(r+p)T ).
Maximizing the expected surplus of the venture capitalist G(T ) = V 100 − (EL0 + EF0 )
with respect to stopping time T we obtain the first order condition:
G′(T ) = −(r + 2p)B10 · e−(r+2p)T + (r + p)A10 · e−(r+p)T ,
where
A10 = E10 −
pE110 + 2c
r + p
, B10 = V 10 −
p(R + V 110 )− 2c
r + 2p
. (1.17)
Depending on the relation of A10 and B10, the optimal financing horizon can be
either zero, positive finite, or infinite. The Lemma 1.1 summarizes the results; see
Appendix 1.A for its proof.
Lemma 1.1. Let Rp > 2c. Then in regime (1/0) the following statements hold:
(i) If A10 > 0, then B10 < 0. In that case G(T ) in monotonically increasing and
the optimal stoping time is infinite.
(ii) If (r + 2p)B10 < (r + p)A10 < 0, then function G(T ) reaches maximum at time
T 106 = −
1
p
ln
r + p
r + 2p
E10 − 2c+pE
11
0
r+p
V 10 − p(R+V
11
0 )−2c
r+2p
,
where T 106 > 0.
(iii) If A10 < 0 and (r + p)A10 < (r + 2p)B10, then function G(T ) is monotonically
decreasing and the optimal stoping time is zero.
Note that in case (iii) the venture capitalist finances a single entrepreneur, i.e., V 100 =
V 10 and E
L
0 + E
F
0 = E
1
0 . The resulting contract is the same as in regime (1/1) and is
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again denoted C4. In case (ii) the venture capitalist finances both entrepreneurs until
time T 102 is reached and then abandon the follower and continue financing the leader
for additional T 1 = −1
p
ln c
Rp−c periods. The resulting contract is denoted C6. In case
(i), the optimal financing horizon is infinite and the resulting contract is denoted C7.
Detailed conditions and value function for these contracts are described in Table 2 in
Appendix 1.B.
Stopping rule R1
Consider now the stopping rule R1. Maximizing the surplus of the venture capitalist,
it is easy to establish that the optimal stopping time is finite:
T 105 = −
1
p
ln
2c+ pE110
p(R + V 110 )− 2c
.
The resulting contract is denoted C5; see Table 2 in Appendix 1.B for details.
Note that 2c + pE110 < p(R + V
11
0 ) − 2c is necessary for T 105 to be positive. If the
reverse inequality holds, then the optimal stopping time is zero, so that the venture
capitalist prefers to finance the leader alone.
Conditions, such as the one above, determine whether a particular contract is feasible.
For the contracts with finite stopping time (i.e., contracts C4, C5, C6), these necessary
conditions require, that the optimal financing horizon is positive. For contract C7,
the necessary condition requires, that parameters are such, that the optimal financing
horizon is infinite. From now on we will call these necessary conditions feasibility
conditions. We will call a contract feasible in the range of parameters, where the
corresponding feasibility conditions are satisfied. The range of parameters, where
feasibility conditions for each contract Ck, k = 4, 5, 6, 7 are satisfied, is shown in
Figure 5 in Appendix 1.B.
1.4.2 Optimal contract
Given the values of parameters, we choose, out of the pool of feasible contracts, the
one that maximizes the profit of venture capitalist, i.e., we look for an optimal contract
with respect to stopping rules. Investigation of feasibility conditions and optimality
of contracts leads to Proposition 1.2. The proof of the proposition (partly numerical)
can be found in Appendix 1.A.
Proposition 1.2. Let Rp > 2c. Then in regime (1/0) the following statements hold:
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(i) If A10 > 0, then the feasible contracts are C4, C5 and C7. The optimal contract
is C4.
(ii) If 0 > A10(r + p) > B10(r + 2p), then the feasible contracts are C4, C5 and
C6. The optimal contract is C5, if parameters are such that T 105 < T 106 −
1
r+p
ln
2c+pE110 −E10(r+p)
2c+pE110
. Otherwise, contract C6 is optimal.
(iii) If A10(r + p) < B10(r + 2p) and (2c+E110 ) < p(R+ V
11
0 )− 2c, then the feasible
contracts are C5 and C4. The optimal contract is C4.
(iv) If A10(r + p) < B10(r + 2p) and (2c + E110 ) > p(R + V
11
0 ) − 2c, then the only
feasible (hence, the optimal) contract is C4.
Let us denote Di the domain of parameters (p, c) where contract Ci is optimal, where
i = 4, 5, 6, 7. Proposition 1.2 shows that the domain D7 is empty and hence the whole
parameter space can be divided into three domains D4, D5, and D6, as shown in
Figure 1.1.17
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
D4
←− D6
D5
p
c
c = 2p
Figure 1.1: Regime (1/0): Division of the parameter space into three domains accord-
ing to optimal contracts; for r = 0.05
The region D5 corresponds to the most favorable combination of costs of R&D and
the probability of success. In region D4, on the contrary, for each success probability
the costs of R&D are the highest. Finally, in region D6 the combination of costs and
success probability is moderately favorable. It is therefore intuitive that competition
17To draw the domains D4, D5, and D6 we considered fixed values of discount rate r = 0.05 and
prize R = 1 and used numerical simulations. On a grid 0.001× 0.001 and for values of parameters,
such that p ∈ [0, 1] and c ∈ [0, p/2] we plotted the points where the constraints for each domain are
satisfied. Due to homogeneity of the profit function the choice parameters values is without loss of
generality.
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is a beneficial arrangement for the venture capitalist, if values of the parameters lie
in the domain D5. In domain D6 competition is beneficial if the patent race doesn’t
take too much time. The costs of R&D are, however, relatively high in this domain.
Hence, after experimenting with patent race for some time, the venture capitalist will
continue financing the leader alone, if the agents fail to deliver a success. Finally, in
domain D4, competition is not beneficial, since the costs are too high to justify the
duplication of research efforts.
1.4.3 The effect of competition
In order to investigate the effect that competition has on the decision to employ
competing entrepreneurs, we compare the moral hazard setting with the benchmark
case without moral hazard. In the latter case the venture capitalist can perfectly
observe the allocation of funds and therefore the incentive compatible reward of both
entrepreneurs is zero (this is due to the assumption that the venture capitalist has
all bargaining power). Hence, the expected payoff of the venture capitalist equals the
expected value of the project. Therefore, for any Rp > 2c the venture capitalist is
willing to finance the project infinitely long.
The value of the venture with competing agents V 10FB and a single agent (the leader)
V 1FB are given by the following functions respectively:
V 10FB =
p(R + V 11FB)− 2c
r + 2p
, V 1FB =
Rp− c
r + p
,
where V 11FB is given by (1.13). The venture capitalist will finance only the leader, if
V 1FB ≥ V 10FB, which is equivalent to the condition:
c
Rp− c >
p · r
(r + 2p)(r + p)
. (1.18)
Otherwise, the venture capitalist will finance both entrepreneurs.
According to condition (1.18), we divide the parameter space into two domains, as
is shown in Figure 1.2. The border curve between single entrepreneur (SE) and
competing entrepreneurs (CE) corresponds to the case of equality.18 The region
above the line represents combinations of costs and success probability, where (1.18)
holds, i.e., where the venture capitalist finances only the leader. If the combination
of costs and probability is below the line, then the venture capitalist will prefer to
18The areas were plotted for r is fixed at r = 0.05. Due to the homogeneity of the profit functions
this choice of parameter is without loss of generality.
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finance both entrepreneurs.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
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0.4
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Figure 1.2: Regime (1/0), no-moral hazard case: Competing entrepreneurs (CE) vs a
single entrepreneur (SE); r = 0.05
Recall, that in regime (1/1) the venture capitalist prefers to employ competing en-
trepreneurs, regardless whether the moral hazard is present or not. Without moral
hazard this decision is motivated by the scale effect: with two entrepreneurs the prob-
ability of success is twice as large as with one entrepreneur. With moral hazard there
is additional effect of competition, which we call the disciplining effect. This effect
decreases the rent of each entrepreneur comparing to situation of no competition, so
that in case of success the venture capitalist retains larger share of the prize.
The analysis of a regime with the leader and the follower allows to understand the
relative importance of the scale and disciplining effects in the presence of moral hazard.
A comparison of Figures 1.1 and 1.2 shows that without moral hazard the range of
parameters where the competition is beneficial is significantly smaller than in a moral
hazard setting (although the whole feasibility region has increased). In the absence
of moral hazard the increased probability of success due to competition (scale effect)
is almost always not sufficient to justify financing of both the leader and the follower.
However, the disciplining effect of competition in case of moral hazard is so important,
that the venture capitalist will hire both the leader and the follower, although he does
not gain much in terms of success probability. The venture capitalist nevertheless gains
from the reduction of rent which he has to pay to both entrepreneurs. For certain
combinations of costs and probability, the decrease in compensation of the leader due
to competition is large enough to justify the financing of both entrepreneurs (domains
D5 and D6). Naturally, the competition can be justified only if the follower is not too
expensive to finance (c should be relatively small) and the reduction in the rent of the
leader due to competition is significant (p should be relatively large).
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Another result of competition between entrepreneurs is the increase in the total fi-
nancing horizon of the project. For the range of costs and probabilities where the
venture capitalist chooses to finance both the leader and the follower (i.e., domains
D5 and D6), the maximal financing horizon is longer with a competitive arrangement
than with a single entrepreneur. Indeed, a single entrepreneur (the leader) would be
financed for at most of T 1 periods according to contract C4. If both entrepreneurs
are employed, then the maximum financing horizon is T 10k + T
1 > T 1, where k = 5, 6.
Therefore, competition helps to alleviate one of the main problems created by moral
hazard — the limitation of the research horizon. We have shown that the first best
solution obtained in the absence of moral hazard is to finance the project infinitely
long. The same result was obtained for the case of one entrepreneur by Bergemann
and Hege (2002). Since the expected value of the project increases in the research hori-
zon, the presence of moral hazard reduces this value. Competition, however, limits the
amount of rent which the entrepreneurs can extract from the venture capitalist and
hence makes it profitable for the venture capitalist to set a longer financing horizon.
1.5 Strategic interaction
Up to this point we assumed that the entrepreneurs do not behave strategically, i.e.,
that each entrepreneur believes that his rival always invests all funds into R&D. In
other words, each entrepreneur believes that by diverting the funds in each period,
he faces a probability p that his rival wins the prize in the meantime. With this
assumption in hand, we have shown that competition softens the incentive compati-
bility constraints of the entrepreneurs and makes it cheaper for the venture capitalist
to provide an incentive compatible reward scheme. As we have discussed, the incen-
tive compatible reward of each entrepreneur is lower in the case of competition, than
in the case without competition.
However, if the entrepreneurs are well-trained game theorists and think strategically,
they will take into account all possible strategies of the rival. Those can be either
“work” (denote it w) or “shirk” (denote it s). Hence, in each period we can model the
behavior of the entrepreneurs by a 2×2 game. The venture capitalist, naturally, wants
to ensure the (w,w) equilibrium. Otherwise his investments are wasted. Our results
already imply that under the compensation schemes considered before, it is optimal
for each agent to play w, if his rival plays w (that is, w is the best response to w).
In this section we will show these compensation schemes are sufficient to ensure the
unique equilibrium (w,w). Note that for this it is sufficient to rule out the equilibrium
(s, s).
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We start with the situation where two identical entrepreneurs are involved in the
innovation race (regime (1/1) in our notations). Consider the terminal period T . Let
sT be the reward of an entrepreneur if he achieves a success. In the table below
we summarize payoff of one entrepreneur in four strategic situations (recall that the
entrepreneurs are identical).
w s
w (p− 1
2
p2)sT psT
s c c
In order to ensure that (w,w) is a unique Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies), the
reward sT should be such that: w ∈ BR(w) and s /∈ BR(s), where BR stands for
best response.19 Examining the payoffs, we receive:
w ∈ BR(w), ⇐⇒ sT ≥ cp− 1
2
p2
=: swT ,
s /∈ BR(s), ⇐⇒ sT ≥ cp =: ssT .
Since ssT < s
w
T for all p ∈ (0, 1), in the terminal period of the game the venture
capitalist can ensure the unique equilibrium (w,w) by promising the entrepreneurs
reward sT = s
w
T .
Consider now some period of time t ≤ T − 1 and assume that both entrepreneurs
invest in each period τ = t+1, . . . , T . We will determine such st that in period t both
entrepreneurs find it incentive compatible to invest funds rather than divert them.
The following table shows the payoff matrix of one of the two identical entrepreneur
19We will assume that when the entrepreneurs are indifferent between strategies “work” and
“shirk”, they choose to work.
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at period t.
w s
w (p− 1
2
p2)st +
(1−p)2
1+r
E11t+1 pst +
1−p
1+r
E11t+1
s c+ 1−p
1+r
E11t+1 c+
1
1+r
E11t+1
As before, we need to determine st such that for each entrepreneur w is a best response
to any strategy of a rival:
w ∈ BR(w), iff st ≥ 2cp(2−p) + 2p(1−p)p(2−p)(1+r)E11t+1 =: swt ,
s /∈ BR(s), iff st ≥ cp + 11+rE11t+1 =: sst .
In order to ensure the unique equilibrium (w,w), the venture capitalist has to promise
the entrepreneurs a share st ≥ max{sst , swt }. It can be easily shown that swt > sst , since
it is equivalent to 1
1+r
pE11t+1 < c, which holds since
pE11t+1 =
pc
r + p
(
1− e−(r+p)(T 11−(t+1))
)
<
pc
r + p
< c.
Therefore, by promising the entrepreneurs a reward st = s
w
t the venture capitalist
ensures the equilibrium (w,w). Note, that in continuous time s11t converges to
c
p
+E11t ,
which is exactly the reward we have calculated before, without accounting for strategic
interaction.
The result which we have established holds for any t ≤ T − 1, therefore it holds in
particular for t = T−1. We have proved that in the terminal period the entrepreneurs
will invest, if rewarded according to the (w,w) scheme. Therefore, they will also invest
in period (T − 1) if rewarded according to the (w,w) scheme. Recursively, we can
prove that the result holds for any period t of regime (1/1).
It is interesting to observe that if the entrepreneurs are compensated according to
the (w,w) scheme, then in regime (1/1) at each period of time the game resembles
the Prisoners Dilemma game. The entrepreneurs can be better off if they divert
the funds simultaneously in all periods. Indeed, in this case the expected payoff of
each entrepreneur is c
r
(1 − e−rT ), i.e., a properly discounted stream of rent c. If
both entrepreneurs invest, then the expected reward of each is c
r+p
(1 − e−(r+p)T ) <
c
r
(1−e−rT ). But under the incentive scheme (w,w), “work” is always the best response
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to “shirk”, therefore, a potentially attractive (for entrepreneurs) situation (s, s) is not
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Following very similar lines of reasoning, it is easy to prove that in regime (1/0),
rewarding entrepreneurs according to (w,w) scheme ensures the unique equilibrium
(w,w). The following discussion applies both to contract C5 and contract C6. Consider
the terminal period T . The matrix below summarizes the payoff of the follower (the
leader is the row player and the follower is the column player).
w s
w p(1− p)(sFT + 11+rE110 ) c
s p(sFT +
1
1+r
E110 ) c
Investigating the payoff of the follower, we derive the following conditions:
w ∈ BR(w), ⇐⇒ sFT ≥ cp(1−p) − 11+rE110 =: sF,wT ,
s /∈ BR(s), ⇐⇒ sFT ≥ cp − 11+rE110 =: sF,sT .
Comparing the compensation of the follower in case when the leader works with his
compensation in case when the leader shirks, we establish that sF,wT is always larger
than sF,sT . Therefore, if the venture capitalist promises the follower a reward s
F
T = s
F,w
T
he ensures that the follower will invest irrespective of a strategy of the leader. This
rules out equilibrium (s, s). Hence, to enforce the (w,w) equilibrium it is enough to
compensate the leader so that his best response to “work” is “work”. The same logic
holds for any period t < T . Therefore, if both entrepreneurs are compensated as if
the other always invests (i.e., “work”), the unique equilibrium of the game is (w,w).
This justifies our approach in Sections 1.3 and 1.4.
1.6 Finite horizon and commitment to stop
So far, we have assumed that the venture capitalist can choose the financing horizon for
each regime and can commit to it. This means that if the maximum time allowed for
experimentation in regime (i/j) elapses without success, then depending on terms of
the contract either the project will be irrevocably abandoned, or the venture capitalist
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will abandon financing of follower. In this section we provide a rationale for that
assumption.
If we assume that the venture capitalist cannot commit to stop the project after the
maximal allowed time has elapsed, then he will finance the entrepreneurs infinitely
long. Suppose that in regime (i/j) the contract between the venture capitalist and
entrepreneurs determines some (optimal) time T ij. If this time elapses but no success
was made by any entrepreneur, the venture capitalist is willing to start the game from
the beginning, as if the world is in the first period of regime (i/j). Indeed, all costs
that the venture capitalists has incurred up to time T ij are sunk, and the game has
not changed since the venture capitalist made his optimal decision at t = 0 of regime
(i/j). Because of this feature of our model (sunk costs and independent probability of
success in each period), the venture capitalist is willing to finance the entrepreneurs
infinitely long, if he enters the game once.
If the venture capitalist cannot commit to stopping the project, he is also not able
to condition further financing on successful completion of predetermined stages or
benchmarks. In a world, where commitment is not credible, the venture capitalists
will finance entrepreneurs until one of them wins the prize.
However, empirical literature on venture capital documents, that stage financing,
which is conditional on successful completion of prescribed milestones, is one of the
most important and commonly used control mechanisms in venture capital financing.20
Therefore, the commitment assumption is not only realistic, but is essential for the
ability of the venture capitalist to include the provision about the milestones into the
contract.
Obviously, in our model the venture capitalist prefers to commit to finite financing
horizon. Commitment to stop financing of the project is an important punishment
mechanisms, that allows to decrease compensation of the entrepreneurs and therefore
to increase profits of the venture capitalist, comparing to a situation with no commit-
ment. In the model, however, there is no endogenous mechanism, which would make
the ex-ante commitment credible ex-post. Hence, to justify the commitment power
of the venture capitalist in our model, we make an assumption, that the venture
capitalist is wealth-constrained.
This assumption is well supported by the evidence about practice of the venture-
capital funds. According to Inderst and Munnich (2003), the venture capital funds
are normally close-ended, which means that funds are raised once from the investors
and are directed afterwards into the portfolio of projects. The partnership agree-
20See, for example, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) and Sahlman (1990).
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ments, which govern the venture capital funds, often contain a covenant that limits a
possibility of the venture capitalist to raise further investments. Likewise, the part-
nership agreements restrict ability of the venture capitalist to transfer investments
across projects and across different funds, run by the same partners. The wealth-
constrained venture capitalist can credibly commit to limit resources directed to each
of his portfolio projects and hence can commit to the finite financing horizon.
In the world described in our model, this commitment can be understood as the fol-
lowing. Ex ante, the venture capitalist is able to calculate the optimal period of time,
during which he is willing to finance the project. He then commits a corresponding
amount of money for this project and commits all other resources to his other portfolio
projects. The partnership agreements restrict the ability of the venture capitalist to
raise additional funds and, therefore, the commitment to stop the project is credible.21
1.7 Conclusion
In this paper we study innovation race in the moral hazard setting. We explore a
model where two entrepreneurs simultaneously develop a project which, if successful,
generates a fixed prize R. The project is developed in stages and the first entrepreneur
who completes the second stage wins the prize. Research and development is financed
by the venture capitalist, but the funds are allocated by the entrepreneurs. This cre-
ates a moral hazard problem: the entrepreneurs can divert the funds to their own uses.
We investigate two possible scenarios: a basic scenario where both entrepreneurs are
at the same (the last) stage of R&D, and its variation where one of the entrepreneurs
is a leader and another is a follower.
We identify two effects which make the financing of competing entrepreneurs benefi-
cial for the venture capitalist. First effect is the higher probability of success (scale
effect) and the second is less obvious effect which competition has on incentives (dis-
ciplining effect). In order to highlight the importance of competition in the moral
hazard setting, we compare it with the benchmark setting without moral hazard.
The analysis reveals, that in the scenario where both entrepreneurs are on the same
stage of R&D both effects are important. Due to the scale effect financing of compet-
ing entrepreneurs is attractive in the absence of moral hazard. With moral hazard,
21More realistic approach to model the venture capital process is to assume the venture capitalist
have some prior believes about quality of the project. If the project fails to succeed, the venture
capitalist becomes pessimistic and will eventually abandon the project. This mechanism ensures
that the project will be stopped in finite time and is extensively discussed in Bergemann and Hege
(1998, 2005).
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the disciplining effect reinforces the scale effect making the financing of competing
entrepreneurs even more attractive.
However, in the scenario with a leader and a follower, the scale effect is of little
importance, so that without moral hazard the follower will almost never be employed.
Nevertheless, with moral hazard in place, the presence of a competitor allows to reduce
significantly the rent of the leader, which makes competition a beneficial arrangement
for the large range of parameters. We also find that by improving incentives the
competition allows the venture capitalist to increase the maximal research horizon
during which he is willing to finance the project, making it therefore closer to the
first-best (infinite) horizon. The prediction that the projects are financed longer in
the presence of competing ventures provides a scope for the empirical test of the
model since many databases on venture capital contain information about number
and duration of rounds.
Our key finding is that competition can be used by the venture capitalist as an effective
cure against the moral hazard, in a situation where the allocation of funds by the
entrepreneurs is not observable. Hence, competition serves as a “natural” mechanism
that allows to improve the efficiency of research and development. The existence of
such mechanism is particulary important in those cases, where the use of complicated
security schemes, developed in the venture capital literature, is difficult or not possible
at all.
In terms of empirical implications this result suggests that in particular grant agencies
and government agencies, as well as venture capital firms that are active on the less
developed capital markets, should use competition between portfolio projects as a
mechanism of mitigating the agency problems. Indeed, the former, usually do not
use complicated security schemes either due to the lack of expertise or following the
established practices.22 The latter, on the other hand, might find it difficult to use
such schemes on the capital market which is not sufficiently developed to accommodate
them.
The idea that competition positively affects incentives of the agents (i.e., relaxes
their incentive constraint) has already been applied in various settings, like yardstick
competition (Tirole 1997, pp. 41–42) or design of team incentives (Holmstrom 1982).
We contribute to this literature by investigating the effect of competition on incentives
in the dynamic framework, where only the winner’s output matters to a principal. We
22Consider for example the practise of NIH. The grant is usually split into several budget pe-
riods (analogy of stages in our model). Within each stage the financing is provided on a cash
request basis, where the cash is transferred to the grantee’s account based on his need. See
grants.nih.gov/grants/managing awards.htm
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show, that in this framework, competition has a positive incentive effect even when the
research technologies are independent (which is not the case in yardstick competition).
Alternative approach to modelling a patent race in the moral hazard framework is to
consider a setup where the entrepreneurs have different probability of success, in a
sense that the same stage of R&D corresponds to identical probabilities of success, and
a different stage of R&D corresponds to asymmetric probability of success. Then our
results suggest that as asymmetry between entrepreneurs increases, the positive effect
of competition becomes less pronounced. Moreover, in a setting with asymmetric
entrepreneurs, the competition is beneficial if the value of the output relative to the
costs is high and there is a high chance that the asymmetry will be eliminated (namely
probability of success is relatively high). In our future research we aim at investigating
this alternative approach in more details.
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Chapter 2
Organization of R&D with Two
Agents and a Principal
2.1 Introduction
On July 29, 2007 the results of two large-scale genetic studies were simultaneously
published. The studies “revealed two genes that influence the risk of getting multiple
sclerosis (MS) — data sought since the discovery of the only other known MS suscepti-
bility gene decades ago. The findings could shed new light on what causes MS . . . and
on potential treatments for at least 350,000 Americans who have the disease”.1 As
NIH reports in its press-release, the studies were conducted by two competing teams
of scientists and were both financed by National Institutes of Health (NIH, the re-
search and grant agency in the United States) and the National Multiple Sclerosis
Society.
The puzzling question is why, given the complexity of the task and the importance
of finding did the grant agencies that financed the research preferred to split their
resources on two teams instead of using potential synergies of a research consortium?
This case is by no means unique in the practice of grant agencies. A causal investi-
gation of the NIH’s web site reveals that it routinely aims at financing of competing
research teams which attack the same problem.2 Not only grant agencies, but also pri-
vate venture capital firms contract competing teams to pursue a project. Vulcan Inc.,
which is a multi-division corporation, owned by Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, has
contracted three competing agencies for the project Halo, aimed at the development
1The press release of NIH www.ninds.nih.gov/ news and events/press releases/
2The examples of grant projects can be found at grants.nih.gov/grants/guide.
40
of the problem-solving software.3
On the other hand, it is also common for financiers to grant a financial support to
a consortium of co-operating independent teams, rather than to each of these team
separately. NIH, for example, finances a number of consortiums, consisting of several
independent research teams (most notably, Human Genome Project Consortium or
Mouse Models of Human Cancer Consortium).4 The Vulcan Inc. provides financial
support to the Allen Institute for Brain Science, which is a consortium of researches
working towards constructing the map of a human brain.
These casual evidence immediately suggest a question: what is the optimal organi-
zational design of R&D activities from the principal’s point of view? Several papers
have addressed this issue. Levitt (1995) illustrates why it may be profitable for the
principal to finance competing agents rather than a single agent. Che and Yoo (2001)
analyze the attractiveness of the team production versus stand-alone production in
the repeated setting. Hemmer (1995) shows, that if there are synergies from perform-
ing two tasks, then assigning a team to the subsequent tasks results in higher product
quality than assigning separate agents to each of those tasks. Goldfain and Kova´cˇ
(2005) compare benefits from employing competing agents, rather than a single agent
in a dynamic framework with multiple stages of R&D.
This paper investigates, when (in the presence of moral hazard problem) it is in prin-
cipal’s interests to assign competing agents to the same task and when he prefers that
agents cooperate in a team. As is well known from the literature on multi-agent incen-
tives, in static setting competition (or more generally, relative performance evaluation,
RPE) improves incentives compared to the team compensation (or joint performance
evaluation, JPE). 5 The existing literature, however, is primarily interested in the
effect of various compensation schemes on incentives and therefore often ignores the
synergy effects of team production. The question which is not addressed is how far
does the advantage of RPE goes compared with a team production which is techno-
logically more efficient?
This paper answers this question by analyzing the tradeoff between team production
and competing agents, where the team production exhibits synergy effects. I charac-
terize a threshold value of synergy effects, such that (other parameters fixed) above
this value the principal prefers to finance a team rather than competing agents. This
3The information about the project can be found at www.projecthalo.com
4For information about projects see www.genome.gov and emice.nci.nih.gov/ mouse models
5See, for example, Lazear and Rosen (1981), Holmstrom (1982), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983),
Mookherjee (1984)
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threshold value increases with the prize in stake, so that the principal is more likely
to finance competing agents if the prize is large. In other words, for larger prizes
positive incentive effect due to RPE tends to dominate productivity gains generated
by a team.
To analyze alternative structures of research department, I develop a framework,
where research is financed by a principal, but the agents (protected by limited liability)
have discretion to decide whether to allocate money into a project or to divert them
for private consumption. The investment decision of the agents is not observable
to the principal. Hence, to implement the desired level of investment he offers each
agent an appropriate incentive compatible reward. It is assumed, that each agent is
capable of performing a project himself. Hence, the principal has a choice between
the following structures of research department: single agent, competing agents and
team.
The project succeeds or fails with a probability that is a function of agents’ investment
decision and (in case of team production) synergy effects. Due to synergy effects the
team is the most efficient arrangement from the technological point of view: for the
fixed amount of resources devoted to the project, the team succeeds on average more
often than a single agent or a pair of competing agents. The competition, on the
other hand, has important positive effect on agents’ incentives.
It is shown, that due to the incentive effect of the competition, the principal always
prefers to employ competing agents, rather than a single agent. The paper is therefore
focused on comparing team production with competing agents.
In the first part of the paper I assume that agents, cooperating in a team contribute
their investments simultaneously. I show that for the fixed level of synergy effect in
team, the relative advantage of competition increases with the value of prize in stake.
The intuition is roughly following. To provide the agents with appropriate incentives
the principal has to balance a reward they receive in case of success and the amount
of investment funds allocated to the agents. The larger is the reward and the smaller
is the amount of investment funds in their discretion, the less tempted are the agents
to consume the part of funds. However, the free-riding hazard in team weakens the
incentives. The presence of synergy effect only accelerates this problem by enabling
agents to achieve high success probability by investing small amounts. Hence, as
the prize in stake increases, the principal is forced to limit resources allocated to
the team more severely, than resources allocated to competing agents (while paying
proportionally higher reward in the former case). Therefore, if the prize is sufficiently
large, competing agents eventually perform better than a team.
The existing literature on team production often suggests to use a message game to
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alleviate the free-riding problem in a one-shot model. The general idea behind this
mechanism is that agents are required to monitor each other and to submit a report to
the principal, based on their observations (Miller 1997, Ma 1988, Marx and Squintani
2002). It is well known that this mechanism requires at least some liability on agents’
behalf.6. Moreover, the message game is difficult to implement in the environment
where “spying” on the team mates is infeasible. Therefore, I suggest to utilize the
ability of team peers to observe each other effort by changing the research process
from simultaneous to sequential contribution of investments.
In the second part of the paper, I show that the principal can indeed improve incen-
tives of team members by instructing them to contribute investments sequentially.
However, this is only true if the investments of agents are strategic complements. In
this case the sequential structure works in the favor of the principal, because a leader
(the agent, who is the first to contribute) is reluctant to shirk in the fear, that so
would the follower (the second mover), which will cause the failure of the project. If
the investments of agents are strategic substitutes, however, the effort of one agent
exerts a negative externality on his team peer: if the leader works hard, the follower
is tempted to shirk. In this case the sequential team structure does not improve
incentives of the agents. The comparison of competition with two alternative team
structures (sequential and simultaneous) allows to characterize the optimal structure
of research department for various levels of synergy effects and prize values.
In the extension of the model I discuss a possibility, which has a principal who is
willing but not able to enforce sequential contribution of the effort. Through the
paper I assume that the principal cannot observe the effort of the agents. Hence his
ability to enforce one of them to contribute the effort before the other is likely to be
limited. The principal can however organize the team as a hierarchy, with a team
leader and his subordinate. In this setting the team leader has a discretion to decide
whether to employ a second agent (the subordinate) and how to allocate investment
funds and rewards. In addition, the team leader is assumed to be able (and is indeed
willing) to enforce sequential contribution of effort.
Unlike the team without hierarchy, the hierarchical team always leads to the inefficient
allocation of resources. The team leader is reluctant to involve the subordinate and
prefers to perform a large part of the job himself. Hence, the hierarchical team makes
only minor use of synergy effects and always leads to the loss of efficiency in terms
of success probability. Still, if investments of the agents are strategic complements,
6Miller (1997) shows that a team can reach efficient output without punishment if one of the
agents can observe the subset of other agents. This result holds, however, only if the number of
partners is at least three
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the hierarchical team has positive effect on incentives due to sequential contribution
of efforts. If this effect is large enough to balance the loss of efficiency, the principal
can use hierarchical structure to improve performance of the team.
Investigating the interaction of agents’ efforts in team setting, my paper contributes
to the discussion in the literature on sequential partnerships, which addresses a ques-
tion whether the ability to observe co-worker’s effort or output improves incentives.
Nafziger (2007) shows that if the output of the co-worker is informative about agent’s
effort, then it might be better not to provide workers any intermediate information
about each other output. Banerjee and Beggs (1989) argue that in the team the
first-best solution can be achieved if the efforts are contributed sequentially, but not
simultaneously. The authors however assume, that the effort of the first agent is not
productive and only affects second agent’s cost of effort.
My results on the tradeoff between sequential and simultaneous structure are close
to Winter (2005). The author uses a framework where a group of agents works col-
lectively on a project. The agents make a binary decision whether to contribute the
effort or not. This decision may be observed by a subset of their team peers, if the
effort is contributed sequentially. Winter (2005) shows that the ability to observe the
effort of team peers improves incentives particulary when agents’ tasks are comple-
mentary. He argues, however, that in this setting more transparency can never harm
incentives, and therefore sequential production is always optimal. To the contrary, I
show that with continuous choice of effort sequential production is optimal only if the
efforts of agents are strategic complements.
Ludwig (2007) also investigates the tradeoff between simultaneous and sequential
structures. Similar to my results, the author concludes that the sequential structure
is optimal when the contributions of agents are perfect complements, while the si-
multaneous structure is optimal when the contributions are perfect substitutes. This
result stems from the ability of the principal to partially deduce the states of the world.
That enables him to save implementation costs for the follower after the leader fails to
provide a high quality contribution (where “contribution” is a stochastic function of
the unobservable effort). In my model, however, the driving force is the strategic effect
which the effort of the leader has on the effort of the follower. This strategic effect
determines the ability of the principal to save implementation costs for the leader.
The structure of this paper is the following. The basic framework of the model is
described in Section 2.2. The setup with a single agent and competing agents are
discussed and compared in Sections 2.4 and 2.5. In Sections 2.6 and 2.7 I discuss team
production and characterize the optimal structure of the research department. The
extension to the hierarchical team is discussed in Section 2.8. Section 2.9 concludes.
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Proofs and figures can be found in Appendix 2.A and Appendix 2.B.
2.2 Basic framework of the model
There are two identical risk-neutral agents (entrepreneurs), each of which could be
employed to perform a research project. If a project succeeds, it yields a prize of
size R. For example, if the project is to find a cure against a disease, then R may
represent a discounted stream of all future payoff, generated by sales of this cure.
It is assumed that the agents have no wealth. The necessary funds for research and de-
velopment are provided by a principal (venture capitalist, grant agency or a firm which
has subcontracted research and development to the agents) who owns the project and
rewards agents for their effort. Although finances are provided by the principal, al-
location decisions are made by agents. They can either invest funds or divert them
for private uses. The principal is not able to observe the allocation decision. All he
can observe is a success or a failure of the project. Following Holmstrom (1982), in
this situation the incentive compatible reward must be a function of a single observ-
able and verifiable outcome in this model, namely a success of the project. I will also
assume that limited liability prevents the principal from imposing a monetary punish-
ment on agents in case of failure. Therefore, I limit my attention to the investigation
of share contracts, where principals rewards a success by transferring agents a share
of the prize. Note, that such limitation is without loss of generality because in this
framework the share contract is equivalent to a wage contract, where agents receive
positive wage in case of success and receive nothing in case of failure.
The principal is risk-neutral and maximizes his expected payoff from the project. I
assume that the principal has all bargaining power, which means that after paying
the agents their contractual payoffs, he retains all the residual surplus. The principal
offers agents a contract, which specifies the share of each agent in case of success and
the size of investment. Moreover, the principal decides whether the agents should to
compete for the patent or should form a research team and join their research efforts.
In the former case the principal shares the prize with a winning agent. In the latter
case, the prize is shared between the team and the principal.
The project succeeds with a probability, which depends on efforts of both agents and
(if agents form a team) on synergy effects. The efforts of agents in this model are
equivalent to their monetary investments into R&D - therefore I will use the terms
“investment” and “effort” interchangeably.7
7Notice, that I make a normalization assuming that x monetary units invested in the project
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Consider the case with one agent. Let the principal transfer amount c to this agent.
The agent allocates amount x ≤ c to the research and consumes c−x. I assume, that
the probability of success is given by:
pA(x) = 1− e−x. (2.1)
A possible justification for this functional form is that a research horizon T is limited
exogenously, so that T = 1. The project succeeds only if it is finished before this time
elapses.8 Hence, if the time of discovery is an exponentially distributed variable with
mean 1
x
, then the probability of success is given by pA(x).
In line with the literature on patent races (Loury 1979, Lee and Wilde 1980, Rein-
ganum 1982) I assume that success probabilities of two competing agents are inde-
pendent. Therefore, given the above specification, a probability that at least one of
two competing agents succeeds can easily be calculated:
pC(x, y) = 1− e−(x+y), (2.2)
where x and y are investments, allocated by first and second agents respectively.
Finally, I assume that compared to other organizational structures a team may have
technological benefits. These technological benefits (further referred to as synergy
effect) allow the team to generate higher success probability for fixed amount of
investments, than each agent in stand-alone situation can achieve. I model the team
production by assuming that joint investments influence the probability of success in
the following way:
pT (x, y) = 1− e−(x1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α
. (2.3)
The parameter α ∈ [0, 1), assumed to be a common knowledge, characterizes a degree
of complementarity between skills of team members, which is the source of synergies
in this model. If α = 0, then there are no technological benefits from employing a
team. It succeeds with probability pT (x, y) = 1 − e−(x+y), which is the same as if a
single agent invests (x+y). Note, that this probability also equals the probability that
result in the probability 1 − e−x. I could alternatively assume that x euros lead to a a probability
of 1− e−θx, where θ is the productivity of 1 euro. However, normalizing θ = 1 does not change any
results.
8The assumption of limited financing horizon is quite realistic, since it is common for the venture
capital firms or grant agencies to set time limits within which the research must be completed. For
theoretical justification see Goldfain and Kova´cˇ (2005).
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at least one of two competing agents succeeds. If α > 0, i.e. there are synergies in
team production, then for the same amount of investment x and y the team succeeds
with higher probability, than a single agent, who invests the same amount (or, for
that matter, than at least one of two competing agents).
Remark 2.1. It is possible to show that the choice of the function (x1−α + y1−α)
1
1−α
for modelling of synergy effects is justified in the framework where the probability
of success depends on two skills or production factors, and each of two agents is
“talented” in different skill. The formal model is provided in the earlier version of
this paper (see Goldfain 2005).
The research and development is modelled as a one-shot game. After the contract is
signed the agents make one-time decision on how much to invest and the probability
of success is a function of this investment.
2.3 Optimal structure in the absence of moral haz-
ard
In this section I establish the results of a benchmark model where actions of agents
are observable and verifiable. In the absence of moral hazard the principal can write
a contract specifying the level of investments, which agents should allocate into the
project (let me denote these investments as c and d for first and second agent respec-
tively). The agents’ reward is zero and the whole payoff from the projects is retained
by the principal. Therefore, the profit of the principal in the set-up with single agent,
competing agents and team is given by ΠAP , Π
C
P and Π
T
P respectively:
ΠAP = R(1− e−c)− c,
ΠCP = R(1− e−(c+d))− (c+ d),
ΠTP = R(1− e−(c
1−α+d1−α)
1
1−α
)− (c+ d).
Note, that for any α > 0 and given the amount of invested resources (c + d) the
probability of success in team is maximized if c = d. Therefore, whenever speaking
about team production, I will call the allocation of resources “efficient” if the team
members allocate equal amounts into the project.
Straightforward maximization of the principal profit in different regimes allows to
establish the equilibrium level of investments.
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Proposition 2.1. The equilibrium level of investments in the respective organizational
structures is given by:
(i) single agent: c = 0 if R ≤ 1 and c = lnR if R > 1
(ii) competing agents: c+ d = 0 if R ≤ 1 and c+ d = lnR if R > 1
(iii) team: c = d = 0 if R ≤ 2 αα−1 and c = d = 2 1α−1 ln
(
2
α
1−αR
)
if R > 2
α
α−1
Further, investigation of the principal’s profit under alternative structures leads to
several observations. The principal is indifferent between employing competing agents,
single agent or team of agents if α = 0. For any α > 0 the principal is strictly better
off employing the team, since it generates larger probability of success.
Corollary 2.1. For α = 0 and R > 1 the principal is indifferent between alternative
organizational structures. He is strictly better off employing a team if α > 0 and
R > 2
α
α−1 .
2.4 Single agent
Let us start the investigation of the principal’s problem in the presence of moral
hazard with the simplest case, where a single agent is employed. The game has two
stages: In the first stage the principal offers a contract, where he determines amount
of investment funds c and the agent’s share βA. In the second stage the agent allocates
x ≤ c into R&D and consumes c − x. In case of success the agent receives a reward
RβA. I will denote the profit of the agent ΠA, where A stays for “single agent”. The
game is solved backwards, starting from the agent’s problem:
max
x∈[0,c]
ΠA = RβA(1− e−x) + c− x. (2.4)
Agent’s profit consists of two parts. First, he enjoys a reward RβA in case of success
(which happens with probability 1 − e−x). Second, he consumes part of funds at his
discretion, so that c− x ≥ 0. The agent’s problem has the following solution:
1. x = 0, if RβA ≤ 1,
2. x ∈ (0, c): is such that RβA = ex, if 1 ≤ RβA ≤ ec,
3. x = c, if RβA ≥ ec.
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The principal chooses the terms of the contract, namely the amount of investment c
and the reward of the agent RβA, taking into account the solution of Problem 2.4.
If the principal chooses RβA ≤ 1, the agent will consume all funds, which leaves a
principal with a negative profit ΠAP = −c. He can do better by not investing in the
project at all. Therefore, if the principal decides to invest in the project, he will
never choose RβA ≤ 1. Hence, we can limit our attention to the investigation of the
strategies, which dominate RβA ≤ 1:
max
c,βA
ΠAP = R(1− βA)(1− e−x)− c (2.5)
s.t. (ICA) Rβ
A ≥ ex,
(RCA) x ≤ c,
(CSA) (Rβ
A − ex)(x− c) = 0.
The incentive compatibility constraint (ICA) ensures, that the agent invests in R&D.
According to resource constraint (RCA) he can only invest as much as c. Finally,
according to complimentary slackness condition (CSA) at least one of the two other
constrains should be binding, as follows from the equilibrium conditions above. If
the incentive constraint does not bind, the agent invests all available funds, so that
(RCA) binds. If the resource constraint does not bind, then the incentive constraint
will necessarily be binding.
Both the incentive compatibility constraint and the recourse constraint will bind in
the optimum. To prove this important result that I will repeatedly use, assume that
(RCA) does not bind, so that x < c, where x is the equilibrium choice of the agent.
If the principal marginally decreases c, the agent’s investment does not change (the
probability of success stays unaltered), but the investment expenditures decline, so
that the profit of the principal increases. Hence, in optimal solution the principal
always chooses c so, that (RCA) binds. The same intuition justifies why the incentive
compatibility constraint should be binding. Indeed, assume that the constraint does
not bind, so that RβA > ex. Then the principal can decrease a share of the agent
(hence, increase his own share) without altering the probability of success. So, in
optimum the principal will choose such βA, that (ICA) constraint binds.
With binding constrains the solution to the principal’s problem is immediate. It is
formalized in the proposition below.
Proposition 2.2. Assume that the principal employs one agent. Then in SPNE the
following statements hold:
(i) the amount of investment resources is given by c = ln 1
2
(−1 +√1 + 4R), if R > 2
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and c = 0, if R ≤ 2.
(ii) the agent allocates all funds into the project: x = c.
(iii) the reward of the agent is RβA = ec.
The proof of the fist part is given above. The second and the third part follow directly
from the solution of (2.5).
Both the equilibrium amount of investment c and the reward of the agent RβA increase
in the value of R. This is the essence of the tradeoff which the principal faces. He is
willing to increase his investment, if the project promises a lucrative payoff. However,
in order to ensure that the agent does not divert funds to private consumption, the
principal has to balance the incentive constraint of the latter by promising him a
larger share of the prize.
Note further, that the c = 0 as R = 2. Since the equilibrium investment expenditures
of the principal increase in R, for any R ≤ 2 the principal will not employ a stand-
alone agent in equilibrium. Naturally, the equilibrium level of c is smaller in the
presence of the moral hazard, than in the benchmark model, while the value of R
which makes financing of a single agent feasible is larger in the former case.
2.5 Competing agents
In a setting with competing agents, the prize is shared between the winning agent and
the principal. After the terms of a contract (i.e., agents’ reward in case of success and
the amount of investments) are announced, the agents simultaneously decide which
part of funds they allocate to R&D and which part they consume.
Let the principal transfer amount c to the first agent and amount d to the second
agent. Let x ≤ c be the funds which the first agent allocates to the project and
c− x ≥ 0 be the funds that he diverts to the private consumption. Likewise, I define
y and d− y. The second agent wins the prize, if he successfully completes the project
at time ty, such that ty ≤ tx and ty ≤ 1, where tx is a time, when the first agent
completes his project. Hence, the probability that second agent succeeds is:
P (ty ≤ tx ∧ ty ≤ 1) = P (ty ≤ 1 ≤ tx) + P (ty ≤ tx < 1) =
= e−x(1− e−y) +
∫ 1
0
∫ t
0
xe−xtye−yududt =
(
1− x
x+ y
)(
1− e−(x+y)) .
Then, the expected payoff of the second agent is ΠC2 , where C stands for “competition”
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is :
ΠC2 (x, y) = Rβ
C
2
y
x+ y
(
1− e−(x+y))+ d− y,
where RβC2 is a reward which the second agent receives according to a contract.
Analogically, the expected payoff of the first agent is
ΠC1 (x, y) = Rβ
C
1
x
x+ y
(
1− e−(x+y))+ c− x,
where RβC1 is a reward which the first agent receives according to a contract. Note,
that conditional on the fact, that at least one agent succeeds, the probability that
first agent succeeds is x
x+y
and the probability that the second agent succeeds is y
x+y
.
This result is typical for the literature on contests and patent races (Tullock 1980,
Dixit 1987, Loury 1979).
In equilibrium, each agent plays his best response to the rival’s strategy by choosing
amount of investment x (respectively, y) and taking RβC1 , Rβ
C
2 , c and d as given. Let
us consider the best response correspondence for the first agent. The derivative of ΠC1
is given by the following function:
∂ΠC1
∂x
= RβC1
(
1− e−(x+y)
(x+ y)2
y +
x
x+ y
e−(x+y)
)
− 1.
Denoting k1(x, y) :=
ex+y(x+ y)2
x(x+ y) + y(ex+y − 1) I can write the best response correspon-
dence for the first agent:
1. x = 0, if RβC1 ≤
y
1− e−y ,
2. x ∈ (0, c) such that RβC1 = k1(x, y), if
y
1− e−y ≤ Rβ
C
1 ≤ k1(c, y)
3. x = c, if RβC1 ≥ k1(c, y).
The best response of the second agent can be derived similarly. Depending on param-
eters, there are following equilibrium candidates in the last stage of the game: (0, 0),
(x∗, 0), (0, y∗), (x∗, y∗), (c, y∗), (x∗, d), (c, d). Here x∗ ∈ [0, c] and y∗ ∈ [0, c] denote
the equilibrium level of effort, given by respective incentive compatibility constraint.
Incentive compatibility constraints for each equilibrium candidate, are summarized
in Table 3 in Appendix (there (IC1c ) and (IC
2
c ) denote the incentive compatibility
constraint for first and second agent respectively).
The problem of the principal is to choose the terms of the contract so that the residual
expected payoff (gross payoff net of agents compensation) is maximized. I first derive
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the optimal contract for each equilibrium candidate and then choose the one, which
delivers the principal the highest profit.
If in equilibrium the agents choose x ∈ (0, c], y = 0 or x = 0, y ∈ (0, d], then
the outcome of the game is equivalent to the game with a single agent. Solution of
the problem in this case is described in previous section. If, given the terms of the
contract, the agents invest (x, y) = (0, 0) then the principal is better off not financing
a project at all, in which case he earns zero profit. For R > 2 the principal can do
better than that by employing a single agent.
Finally, if x > 0 and y > 0 in equilibrium, then the problem of principal is to maximize
his profit subject to the appropriate incentive compatibility constraints (see Table 3).
The principal receives his share of the prize if at least one of the agents wins, which
happens with probability (1− e−(x+y)). Since the agents are identical, in equilibrium
the principal is going to treat them symmetrically, so that βC1 = β
C
2 and c = d (this
result is formally proved in Proposition 2.3). Further, the optimal contract will be
such, that the agents find it just incentive compatible to allocate all recourses which
they receive to R&D. In other words, they will receive exactly a share which makes
them to invest x = y = c into the project. The intuition behind this result was already
discussed in the previous section.
In the reduced form9, i.e. with binding constrains and symmetric agents the problem
of the principal is as follows:
max
βC , c
ΠCP = R(1− βC)(1− e−2x)− 2c
s.t. RβC := RβC1 = Rβ
C
2 =
e2x4x
2x− 1 + e2x ,
x = c.
The solution to this problem leads to the optimal contract and is formalized in Propo-
sition 2.3.
Proposition 2.3. Let competing agents be employed. Then in equilibrium the follow-
ing statements hold:
(i) Equilibrium level of investment c increases in R and is given by
R =
e2c [4c(e2c − 1) + 3(e2c − 1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c)]
(e2c + 2c− 1)2 if R > 2,
c = 0 if R ≤ 2.
9For the general form of the principal’s problem see Proof of Proposition 2.3 in Appendix
52
(ii) The agents allocate all funds in R&D: x = c, y = d.
(iii) The agents are treated symmetrically: βC1 = β
C
2 , c = d.
(iv) The reward of each agent is given by RβC =
4ce2c
e2c − 1 + 2c .
Remark 2.2. The optimal contract for the competing agents is developed under the
assumption, that only the winner of the patent race receives a reward. It is easy to
see that the equilibrium outcome of any contract, where the follower also receives
some reward, will be strictly worse from the principal’s point of view. Indeed, for
each amount of investment funds the principal allocates to the project, such contract
increases the reward of the agents without altering the probability of success. Hence,
in a more general contract, where an agent earns a reward RβL if he wins the patent
race, and a reward RβF , if he looses this race (“L” and “F” stay for the “Leader” and
the “Follower” respectively), the principal will optimally choose RβF = 0.
Finally, it remains to verify whether the principal indeed prefers to employ competing
agents instead of a single agent. The competition has a twofold effect in this model.
Due to the independent success probabilities (let us call this scale effect) two compet-
ing agents investing x and y succeed with the same probability as a single agent, who
invests (x+y). In addition, the competition improves incentives of agents making the
diversion of funds for the own uses less attractive (the disciplining effect). Indeed,
by diverting funds in the competing setting an agent suffers twice: The diversion of
funds decreases a probability that the agent wins and increases a conditional prob-
ability that his rival wins. Hence the presence of a rival disciplines the agents and
makes it cheaper for the principal to provide them with required incentives.
Corollary 2.2. Let R > 2. Then the principal is always better off employing compet-
ing agents, rather than a single agent.
This result conforms to the intuition in the first chapter of this thesis, where it is
shown that competition is always beneficial for the principal, when the agents are
identical and there are no fixed costs of employing an agent.
2.6 Team production: simultaneous choice of ef-
fort
An alternative organization of R&D, which the principal might use, is a research
team. In the team the agents join their efforts in order to complete the project. If
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the project is successful, the prize is divided according to the contract between the
principal and the team. I assume, that the principal observes neither individual nor
the joint contribution of agents to the project. Hence, each agent’s reward must
be conditional upon the success of the project. The problem inherited in the team
production is a free-riding. If the team wins the prize, each agent receives his share, no
matter how much he has invested in the research. Hence, each agent faces a tradeoff
between increasing a joint probability of success by investing and increasing his own
payoff by consuming the funds.
2.6.1 Optimal contract
The principal signs two separate contracts with both agents, in which he determines
investment funds (denoted c and d) allocated to each agent and a reward which an
agent receives in case of success (denoted RβT1 and Rβ
T
2 for the first and second agent
respectively). As before, the game is solved backwards starting from the last stage,
where the agents choose x and y, given the terms of contract.
In this section I assume that agents choose their efforts simultaneously. For this reason
I will often refer to this setting as the simultaneous team. Each member of the team
maximizes his own profit (labelled “T” for team), by playing the best response to
the investment decision of his teammate, taking the terms of contract as given. The
decision problem of the first and second agent respectively are:
max
x∈[0,c]
ΠT1 = Rβ
T
1 (1− e−(x1−α+y1−a)
1
1−a
) + c− x, (2.6)
max
y∈[0,d]
ΠT2 = Rβ
T
2 (1− e−(x1−α+y1−a)
1
1−a
) + d− y. (2.7)
Consider the problem of the first agent. The first derivative of the payoff function is
the following:
∂ΠT1
∂x
= RβT1 (x
1−α + y1−α)
α
1−αx−αe−(x
1−α+y1−a)
1
1−a − 1. (2.8)
Let me define k2(x, y) :=
xαe(x
1−α+y1−a)
1
1−α
(x1−α + y1−α)
α
1−α
. The best response of the first agent to
any choice y of the second agent is:
1. x = 0, if RβT1 ≤ 1 and y = 0,
2. x ∈ (0, c) such that RβT1 = k2(x, y) , if 1 ≤ RβT1 ≤ k2(c, y)
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3. x = c if RβT1 ≥ k2(c, y).
The best response for the second agent is defined analogically. Depending on pa-
rameters of the contract there are following equilibrium candidates in the last stage
of the game: (0, 0), (x∗, y∗), (c, y∗), (x∗, d), (c, d), where x∗ and y∗ denote a level
of effort corresponding to the appropriate incentive compatibility constraint. The
incentive compatibility constraints are summarized in Table 4 in Appendix (there
ICT1 and ICT2 are the incentive compatibility constraints for first and second agent
respectively).
Solving for SPNE, there are several considerations to be taken into account. First,
in equilibrium the principal will give the agents exactly the amount of money, which
they are willing to invest. Hence, in equilibrium x = c and y = d. Further, the agents’
rewards must be just sufficient to ensure that in equilibrium they allocate all resources
into the project. Hence, in equilibrium the incentive compatibility constrains of both
agents are going to be binding. The intuition behind this result was discussed in
Section 2.4. Finally, as I have already mentioned in Section 2.3, the probability of
success in team is maximized if agents allocate equal amounts to R&D. Hence, the
principal will offer symmetric contracts to both agents, so that x = y = c = d (this
result is proved in the Proposition 2.4). The problem of the principal can be written
in the following reduced form:10
max
βT ,c
ΠTP = R(1− 2βT )(1− e−2
1
1−α x)− 2c (2.9)
s.t. RβT := RβT1 = Rβ
T
2 =
e2
1
1−α x
2
α
1−α
,
x = c.
Proposition 2.4. Assume that agents in a team contribute their investments simul-
taneously. Than, in SPNE the following holds:
(i) if R > 1+2
1
1−α , then there is a unique equilibrium (full-investment equilibrium).
In this equilibrium agents allocate all funds into R&D.
(ii) if 3·2 αα−1 < R ≤ 1+2 11−α then there are two SPNEs: full-investment equilibrium
with (x, y) = (c, c) and no-investment equilibrium with (x, y) = (0, 0).
(iii) if R ≤ 3 · 2 αα−1 the project is not financed.
10The general form is given in the proof to Proposition 2.4
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In the full investment equilibrium the optimal contract has the following features:
(i) the contracts are symmetric: βT1 = β
T
2 , c = d.
(ii) each agent’s reward is RβT = e
2
1
1−α c
2
α
1−α
.
(iii) amount of investment funds is c = 2
1
α−1 ln 1
4
(
−1 +
√
1 + 2
1
1−α4R
)
.
The most surprising result of the Proposition 2.4 is that teams with very high synergy
effects (α close to 1) might end up investing nothing to the research and development.
From the proposition it follows, that the higher is the synergy effect, the higher should
be the price in stake to ensure full-investment equilibrium. Actually, for α close to
1, the prize should be infinitely large to ensure unique (c, c) equilibrium. For smaller
prizes there is a second equilibrium (0, 0). The intuition is that for high synergy
effects it is sufficient to invest a small amount in order to have a success with high
probability. Hence, the principal will allocate relatively small c to the project and
consequently will promise low reward to the agents. If one of the team peers decides
to divert funds, the other has low probability of winning the prize alone, and the share
is not large enough to justify the effort.
However, the equilibrium (0, 0) is Pareto-dominated by equilibrium (c, c). Indeed
using the Proposition 2.4, the expected profit of each agent in the (c, c) equilibrium is
ΠTi (c, c) = 2
α
α−1 (e2
1
1−α c − 1), where i = {1, 2}. In equilibrium (0, 0) each agent earns
ΠTi (0, 0) = c. It is then straightforward, that Π
T
i (c, c) > Π
T
i (0, 0) for any α ∈ [0, 1)
and c > 0. In line with the theoretical literature (see for example Harsanyi and
Selten 1992) I will consider the Pareto-dominant equilibrium a natural focal point and
will therefore assume that the agents are able to coordinate on the full - investment
equilibrium.11
Note, that this equilibrium selection is also in line with the experimental literature.
On one hand this literature shows, that in the games with Pareto-ranked equilibria
(called coordination games), the Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium is not always the
unique outcome. However, according to Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1990)
the coordination failure is likely to happen when decisions of the agents are influenced
by the presence of a cooperative dominated strategy, which gives the agents larger
payoff, than the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Their results suggest, that otherwise
the agents are likely to choose the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
11According to Harsanyi and Selten (1992) p.221-223, among two equilibria U and V , equilibrium
U dominates equilibrium V if it results in strictly higher payoff for both players. The authors take a
point of view, that “there is no risk involved in a situation, where expectations can be coordinated
by common payoff interests of the relevant players”.
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It is easy to show in my model that, given the optimal contract, the joint profit of a
team is maximized if agents invest (x, y) = (c, c). Therefore, there is no cooperative
strategy which would give the agents a higher outcome than the equilibrium (c, c).
Hence also the argument of Cooper et al. (1990) is in favor of selecting the equilibrium
(c, c) over (0, 0).
2.6.2 Team versus competition
The compensation in a setting with competing agents is a special case of relative per-
formance evaluation scheme (RPE), which is used to penalize a member of a team,
who performs worse than his pears (see Holmstrom 1982, Mookherjee 1984, Che and
Yoo 2001). This feature is also present in my model: if the agents compete, each of
them is rewarded only if he has better result than his rival (which also means that
he wins the prize). On the other hand, the compensation scheme in a team rewards
each entrepreneur if the whole team performs well; this is so-called joint performance
evaluation (JPE). The insights from the optimal contract literature suggest that in a
one-shot game the optimal payment scheme for teams is RPE. Intuitively, this conclu-
sion should also hold if we compare the competing agents and team without synergy
effects. However, in the presence of synergies the team could potentially become
an attractive arrangement, if the increase in success probability due to synergies is
sufficiently high.
I show in Proposition 2.1 that in the absence of moral hazard the principal is better
off employing a team for any α > 0. Moral hazard, however, changes this result
significantly. According to Propositions 2.3 and 2.4 the reward and amount of in-
vestment funds which agents receive in equilibrium are such that both agents find
it incentive compatible to invest entire funds in the project. Hence, the principal
has two mechanisms how to induce the most efficient investment decision: the size of
funds and the size of reward. For given prize R and synergy effect α, the larger are
the funds which agents receive, the larger is the amount which they can potentially
divert from investing. On the other hand, the larger is their reward, the more prone
are the agents to invest in the project. Therefore, the principal always faces a tradeoff
between increasing his investment (hence increasing the probability of success) and
increasing the reward of the agents in order to balance their incentive constraint. In-
tuitively, because of the inherited free-riding problem it is more difficult to provide
required incentives for team, than for competing agents. Hence, one should expect
that the team will never be a preferred arrangement if the technological benefits of
team production are moderate. This intuition is confirmed in Proposition 2.5.
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Proposition 2.5. Let R ≥ 2, so that ΠCP ≥ 0. Then the following statements hold.
1. The principal prefers to employ competing agents, rather than a team for any
α < α1, where α1 =
log 3−log 2
log 3
≈ 0.37.
2. For any R ≥ 2, let αˆ(R) denote a solution of ΠTP (α,R) − ΠCP (R) = 0. Then,
αˆ(R) is an increasing function and converges to 1 as R→∞.
On Figure 2.1 the line, labelled αˆ(R), shows combinations of α and R, such that the
principal is indifferent between team and competition. According to the corollary
above, αˆ(R) converges to 1 as R becomes infinite.
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Figure 2.1: Competing agents versus team.
Competing agents will never be employed, if R < 2 (on the Figure 2.1 the correspond-
ing regions are labelled a and c). On the other hand, the team will never be employed,
if R ≤ 3 · 2 αα−1 (the region corresponds to the union of a and b on the picture). If
α > α1, then 3 · 2 αα−1 < 2 and for all 3 · 2 αα−1 < R < 2 the profit of the principal is
positive if he employs team, but is negative if competing agents are employed (region
c). The principal will not finance a project, if 3 · 2 αα−1 > R (region a). For all values
of R, such that 2 < R < 3 · 2 αα−1 the profit of the principal is positive, if he employs
competing agents, but is negative, if he employs a team (the corresponding region is
b). When the parameters R and α are such that both the team and competing agents
generate a positive profit (regions d and e), the principal chooses an arrangement,
which maximizes his surplus from the project: team in region d and competition in
region e.
Let R ≥ 2, so that financing of competing agents is feasible. According to the Corol-
lary 2.5, the team is never a preferred arrangement, if the synergy effects are moderate
(α ≤ α1). If α → 1, than team is always a preferred arrangement, because it gener-
ates success with almost certainty. However, for α1 < α < 1 the competition becomes
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more beneficial from the principal’s point of view, as R increases. This result is due
to the strict incentive compatibility constraint which the principal faces financing a
team. In particular, if the synergy effects are high in team, the agents can generate
high probability of success by investing small amounts. Hence, it is very tempting
for them to divert fraction of investment resources. To balance the incentive com-
patibility constraint the principal is forced to limit his investments in team. On the
other hand the disciplining effect of competition enables the principal to increase in-
vested resources significantly, while increasing the incentive compatible reward only
marginally. Therefore, for sufficiently large R, competition becomes more attractive
arrangement for the principal, even when team production is beneficial from the tech-
nological point of view.
2.7 Team production: Sequential choice of effort
The literature has extensively discussed mechanisms, which can reduce a moral hazard
within the team and hence increase the surplus of the principal. In one way or another
many of these mechanisms utilize an ability of team members to observe their peers’
effort.
Che and Yoo (2001) show that repeated interaction reduces the moral hazard in a
team if after each period each agent can observe whether his team peer has shirked.
In the present model, however, I concentrate on one-time interaction between the
principal and the agents. Namely, the interaction will be terminated, as soon as the
project succeeds or as soon as the maximal financing horizon elapses. In such static
setting the ability of the team members to monitor each other can be useful, if it
creates a potential for peer pressure, such as mental or physical harassment (Barron
and Gjerde 1997, Kandel and Lazear 1992). Alternatively, the ability of agents to
observe each other effort may be utilized by a principal through a mechanism which
requires agents to report the effort executed by their team peers (Marx and Squintani
2002).
I will assume that a contract between the principal and an agent, which requires
the latter to monitor his team peers and to report on them is infeasible.12 I will
also disregard the effect of psychological peer pressure. Abstracting from these two
mechanism allows me to investigate the strategic effects which arise from the ability
of agents to observe the effort of their peers in the environment where the agents are
instructed to contribute their efforts sequentially.
12This may be the case if agents face moral costs “spying” on their team peers.
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Consider a game where agents, cooperating in the team, execute their effort sequen-
tially (the team is henceforth referred to as sequential team). The game has three
stages. In the first stage the principal offers a contract (Rβ1, c) to the first agent (the
leader) and a contract (Rβ2, d) to the second agent (the follower). In the second stage,
the leader executes an effort x ≤ c; the follower observes an effort of the leader (but
not the outcome of this effort) and executes an effort y ≤ d. In the third stage payoffs
are realized. As before, I assume that the principal observes neither individual nor
the joint contribution of agents to the project. For the time being I assume that the
principal nevertheless is able to ensure that the efforts are contributed sequentially.13
The decision problem of the follower is given by (2.7). In equilibrium the principal
always chooses contracts, where first-order conditions of the leader’s and the follower’s
problem are satisfied with equality and the rewards, promised to both agents are just
sufficient to induce an effort x = c and y = d. The intuition behind this observation
was already discussed in Section 2.4.
Taken this consideration into account, one can obtain the incentive compatibility
constraint (IC) of the follower’s problem:
Rβ2 =
yαe(x
1−α+y1−a)
1
1−α
(x1−α + y1−α)
α
1−α
=
yαet
tα
, (2.10)
where t = (x1−α + y1−α)
1
1−α is the team contribution to the project.
Using Equation (2.10), it is possible to express x and y as follows:
y = t
(
Rβ2
et
) 1
α
, x = t
(
1−
(
Rβ2
et
) 1−α
α
) 1
1−α
. (2.11)
Making his investment decision, the leader takes into account the reaction function
of the follower, which is implicitly given by equation (2.10)
13The assumption that the follower can observe the effort of the leader, but not the outcome of
his task is in the spirit of Winter (2005) and Strausz (1998).
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max
x∈[0,c]
ΠS1 = Rβ1(1− e−(x
1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α
) + c− x (2.12)
s.t. Rβ2 =
yαet
tα
,
x = t
(
1−
(
Rβ2
et
) 1−α
α
) 1
1−α
,
x ∈ [0, t], t ∈ [0, (c1−α + d1−α) 11−α ].
Note, that x ∈ [0, t] implies 0 ≤ (Rβ2
et
)
1−α
α ≤ 1.
As discussed above, in equilibrium the first order condition of the leader’s maximiza-
tion problem is satisfied in the interior of the feasible set. Hence, the first order
condition can be written as follows:
Rβ1 = e
t(1−B) α1−α
(
1 +B
t− α
α
)
, where B :=
(
Rβ2
et
) 1−α
α
, B ∈ [0, 1] (2.13)
The IC constraint resulting from the follower’s problem can also be re-written as a
function of B and t:
Rβ2 = B
α
1−α et. (2.14)
Finally, the principal’s decision is described by the following maximization problem:
max
c,d,Rβ1,Rβ2
ΠSP = (R−Rβ1 −Rβ2)(1− e−(x
1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α
)− (c+ d) (2.15)
s.t. x = c, y = d,
x+ y = t(B
1
1−α + (1−B) 11−α ),
(2.13), (2.14).
The problem of the principal can be expressed in terms of B and t. Note, that if the
principal chooses B = 0 or B = 1, he effectively employs only one agent.
The first order conditions to this problem are complicated and generally can not be
solved analytically.14 Nevertheless, it is possible to show that for some parameters
the principal can improve performance of the team if he instructs agents to contribute
14In order to characterize the optimal structure of research department on Figure 2.2 I solve the
problem numerically using the first order condition for variable t and the grid of 0.01× 0.01× 0.01
for parameters α and R and variable B.
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effort sequentially, rather than simultaneously.
Proposition 2.6. There exist an open set of parameters, where the principal is better
off if agents contribute their investments sequentially, rather than simultaneously.
On the Figure 2.2 I characterize the optimal organization of the research department
depending on parameters (α,R). The solid lines divide regions, corresponding to the
different structures of research department. The dashed lines are used to provide
comparison to Figure 2.1. In the shaded region (labelled “S”) the principal employs
the team and instructs the agents to contribute effort sequentially. In the region “T”
the principal employs a team and instructs agents to contribute their effort simulta-
neously. In the region“C” the principal employs competing agents. Finally, in the
region “N” the project is not financed.
1 2 3 4 5 6
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
R
α
S
N
T
C
Figure 2.2: Optimal structure of research department.
Let us discuss the intuition behind the decision of the principal to use sequential team
for some range of parameters. Applying the implicit function theorem to Equation
(2.10), I obtain the derivative of the follower’s reaction function (let me call it Ry(x)):
dRy(x)
dx
=
y1+α(α− (x1−α + y1−α) 11−α )
αxyα + xαy(x1−α + y1−α)
1
1−α )
=
y1+α(α− t)
αxyα + xαyt
.
The reaction function of the follower increases in the effort of the leader if α > t. To
illustrate the intuition let x¯ and y¯ = y(x¯) be such that t(x¯, y¯) = α and t(x, y(x)) > α
for any x > x¯. If x is small (x < x¯) the follower is willing to increase his investments
in response to an increase in x. Indeed, for small x he can considerably improve the
probability of success by allocating funds into the project. Therefore, his marginal gain
from additional monetary unit invested in the project is larger, than from consuming
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it. The incentives of the follower are exactly opposite if x is large. If the leader
invests significant amount of resources, it is sufficient to generate a high probability
of success. The follower now can afford to free-ride on the effort of the leader and is
prompted to reduce his investments in response to an increase in x.
The sequential structure does not affect the incentives of the follower but alters sig-
nificantly the incentives of the leader. In the sequential setting increasing function
Ry(x) makes the leader reluctant to shirk in the fear that so would do the follower,
which would cause the failure of the project. Hence, when the parameters (α,R) are
such that α > t in equilibrium (the efforts of agents are strategic complements), the
sequential structure works in the favor of the principal making it easier to provide
incentives for the leader. In particular, as I demonstrate in the proof of Proposition
2.6, the leader may even be ready to contribute the same effort as the follower for
smaller reward.
On the contrary, if optimal contract results in α < t (the efforts are strategic substi-
tutes), the reaction function of the follower decreases in the effort of the leader. In
this case the sequential structure works against the principal by creating what Gould
and Winter (2005) call a “negative peer effect”: a high effort of one agent decreases
the effort of another agent.
Note, that α > t is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the principal to prefer
the sequential setting. Although the sequential setting improves incentives on behalf
of the leader, it may also result in asymmetric allocation of funds. Since efficient
allocation of resources requires c = d, the principal may still prefer the simultaneous
setting for α > t. I use the numerical calculations to illustrate this fact on the Figure
9 (see Appendix). The set of parameters with ΠSP > Π
T
P and α > t are almost identical
(up to the region “B”, where ΠSP < Π
T
P , but α > t).
15
The result that sequential structure improves incentives of agents only if their efforts
are complementary is in line with evidence provided by Gould and Winter (2005).
Using data on professional baseball they show that performance of the agents with
complementary tasks increases with the performance of their fellows. On the contrary,
performance of agents with substitutable tasks decreases in the performance of their
colleagues.
Another paper, which proves a similar result, is Ludwig (2007). The author shows that
the principal is better off under sequential structure if the contributions of agents are
perfect complements. The author, however, provides different intuition for this result.
15Note, that region “S” on the Figure 9 is a subset of the region “A” on the Figure 2.2. The former
characterize a range of parameters, where ΠSP > Π
T
P and Π
S
P > Π
C
P , while the latter characterizes a
larger set, where ΠSP > Π
T
P .
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In the model the principal gains from the sequential structure because it makes easier
for him to provide incentives for the follower. In my model, however, the principal
gains because strategic complementarity makes it easier for him to provide incentives
for the leader.
2.8 Hierarchical team
In the previous section I showed that the principal can benefit from the sequential
team production because it improves incentives of the team leader if efforts of the
agents are strategic complements. The sequential team however has an important
drawback. The principal can not observe efforts of the agents, therefore his ability to
coordinate who is the first to exert effort and who is the second may be limited. Since
the contracts in sequential team are generally not symmetric, the agents themselves
will fail to coordinate the sequence of moves. For example, if the contract is such, that
the follower benefits more than the leader, both agents will not agree on who is going
to be the leader.16 In this situation to enforce the sequential contribution of effort the
principal may appoint a team leader who has a discretion to decide on allocation of
funds and tasks between himself and his subordinate and can enforce the sequential
contribution of effort. In this section I analyze how such hierarchical structure alters
the incentives of agents and the production efficiency.
It is clear that the profit of the principal is at least as large in the sequential team set-
ting as in the setting with hierarchical team. Indeed, if the principal is able to enforce
a sequential production, then (using the appropriate incentives) he can replicate the
equilibrium outcome of the hierarchical team. Nevertheless, teams where one of the
members has a higher level of hierarchy are common. Therefore, it is useful to under-
stand the limits of such set up. As I show below, hierarchical team is inefficient. This
inefficiency stems from the reluctance of the team leader to employ a subordinate. He
prefers to complete a large part of the project himself, making therefore only minor
use of synergy effect.
I will assume, that in the case when a team is structured as a hierarchy the principal
signs a contract only with the team leader. The contract determines the total amount
of investment expenditures c, distributed to the team, and the total reward Rβ1 ≤ R
which the team receives in case of success. The team leader decides whether to
employ a second agent (a subordinate) and offers him a contract. Since the leader
16This result is in the spirit of Dowrick (1986), who shows that in the Stackelberg duopoly model
the agents may disagree over the choice of roles of the leader and the follower.
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has no wealth of his own, he can only reward the subordinate by distributing him a
share Rβ1β2 ≤ Rβ1 of the total reward and allocating him the part of total investment
funds d ≤ c.
I will assume that the agents can observe but not verify the effort of each other.17
Further, it is natural to assume that the team leader can (unlike the principal) induce
the subordinate to perform investment before, after or simultaneously with himself.
The team leader, obviously, is at least as well off in a sequential setting, where he
has the role of a Stackelberg leader, as in a simultaneous setting. Hence, he is indeed
willing to induce the sequential contribution of effort.
In the following I will concentrate on the case where the team leader has a position
of a Stackelberg leader at the investment stage of the game (he exerts effort before
his subordinate). I will then briefly discuss the alternative situation where the team
leader has the position of a Stackelberg follower.
The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The principal signs a contract (Rβ1, c) with the team leader.
2. The team leader decides whether to employ a subordinate. If the subordinate
is employed, then he and the leader sign a contract (Rβ1β2, d), where d ≤ c.
3. The team leader allocates x ≤ c− d into the project.
4. The subordinate observes x and chooses the level of investment y ≤ d.
5. The outcome is realized and the payoffs are distributed
The game is solved by backward induction starting from the problem of the subordi-
nate. He chooses the optimal level of investment y, such that y ≤ d:
max
y∈[0,d]
ΠH2 = Rβ1β2(1− e−(x
1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α
) + d− y.
The derivative of the profit function is
∂ΠH2
∂y
= Rβ1β2y
−α(x1−α + y1−α)
α
1−α e−(x
1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α − 1.
I have already discussed, why the principal always chooses such a contract, that the
agents find it just incentive compatible to invest all funds which they receive into
17If the team leader is able to observe and verify the effort of his subordinate, the moral hazard
on behalf of the latter is eliminated. This, obviously, improves the performance of the team.
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R&D. The same argument applies in the case when the first agent acts as a principal
to the second agent. The team leader will choose such combination (Rβ1β2, d), that
for any given x the second agent finds it just incentive compatible to allocate all
funds into R&D. Hence, the first order condition to the subordinate’s problem will be
satisfied at the boundary y = d of the set [0, d]. Defining t := (x1−α+ y1−α)
1
1−α , I can
re-write the first order condition of the subordinate’s problem in the following form:
Rβ1β2 =
yα
tα
et. (2.16)
Note that in equilibrium the team leader always invests at least as much as his subor-
dinate, so that x ≥ y. Indeed, the probability of success p(x, y) = 1− e(x1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α
is symmetric in x and y. On the other hand, a share which has to be paid to the
subordinate increases in y. Hence, if the team leader wants to implement the to-
tal amount of investment x + y, he is better off choosing such contract and level of
investment, that x ≥ y.
The presence of synergies creates a complicated tradeoff for the team leader. He
can employ the second agent and allow him to allocate part of investment funds
into the project, which will increase the probability of success due to synergy effect.
However, he also has to promise this agent a share of the prize, large enough to
deter the latter from consuming the investment funds. Hence, by employing the
subordinate the team leader suffers twice: he has to give away part of the funds,
which he otherwise could consume himself, and he has to give up part of the reward
in case of success. It is therefore intuitive, that the team leader should be reluctant
to employ the subordinate and if he does employ him, he allocates to the latter only
a small part of total investment funds.
Taking into account the reaction function of the subordinate, the team leader solves
the following problem:
max
{d,β2,x}
ΠH1 = Rβ1(1− β2)(1− e−t) + c− (d+ x) (2.17)
s.t. t = (x1−α + y1−α)
1
1−α , y = d,
0 ≤ d ≤ t, x ≥ 0,
d+ x ≤ c,
Rβ1β2 =
yα
tα
et.
In the solution to the team leader’s maximization problem (2.17), the derivatives with
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respect to d and t become:
∂ΠH1
∂d
= −1− αdα−1(et − 1)t−α + d−α(t1−α − d1−α) α1−α ,
∂ΠH1
∂t
= e−tt−(1+α)
(
αdαet(et − 1)− t
(
−Rβ1tα + et(dαet + (t1−α − d1−α) α1−α )
))
.
Investigation of the first-order conditions allows to make a number of propositions
about the investment decisions of the agents.
Proposition 2.7. Let the team leader have a position of the Stackelberg leader at the
investment stage of the game. Then the following statements hold.
(i) The team leader will not employ agent the second agent, whenever α ≤ α2, where
α2 ≈ 0.43 solves the equation 1 + α = (1− α)
1−α
2α−1 (1− 2α).
(ii) If the team leader employs the second agent, then the allocation of investment
resources between the agents is suboptimal, i.e., d < x.
It follows from Proposition 2.7 that the hierarchical team is an inefficient arrangement.
Due to the suboptimal allocation of resources between the agents, it generates the
smaller probability of success for given c, then the simultaneous team. On Figure 8
in Appendix 2.B I illustrate the allocation of funds in case of hierarchical team for
α = 2
3
. This example shows, that the team leader is willing to transfer the second
agent only a small fraction of the investment recourses, which he receives from the
principal. In other words, the team leader makes only a minor use of the synergy
effects, compared with efficient allocation x = d. Therefore, if the principal opts for
a hierarchical team, then in order to achieve the same probability of success as in
simultaneous team, he has to invest more in the former case.
According to the Proposition 2.7, for any α < α2 the hierarchical structure is infea-
sible for the principal in a sense that in equilibrium the team leader will not employ
the subordinate. Consider therefore such (α,R), that the hierarchical team is feasible.
Following the intuition of Section 2.7, the sequential nature of the research process
will have a positive effect on the leader’s incentives, if the efforts of agents are comple-
mentary. Since in the hierarchical team the resources are allocated inefficiently, the
principal can replicate any probability of success in the simultaneous setting incurring
smaller costs. He, however, might still benefit from the hierarchical team, if it allows
sufficient reduction in the reward distributed to the agents.
Corollary 2.3. Let the team leader have the position of the Stackelberg leader at the
investment stage of the game. Then there exists an open set of parameters (α,R),
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such that the hierarchical team is feasible for the principal and he prefers it to a
simultaneous team and competing agents.
The natural question which arises in the framework of hierarchical team is whether
the team leader prefers a position of a Stackelberg leader or Stackelberg follower in
the investment stage of the game. The analysis of the latter situation is untractable
in the framework of this model. It is possible to show, however, that the inefficiency
resulting from the suboptimal allocation of resources between the leader and the
follower is present also in this case.
2.9 Conclusion
In this paper I investigate the alternative organizational designs of a stochastic pro-
duction process (i.e. R&D) in a framework where financing decisions (made by a
principal) and allocation decisions (made by agents) are separated. The allocation
decisions are not observable to the principal, which creates a moral hazard problem.
The common implication for the contracts between the principal and the agents is
that the principal has to increase a reward which the agents obtain in the case of
success, when he decides to increase the amount of financial resources invested in the
project. Otherwise, the agents will consume part of funds, instead of contributing
them into R&D.
Different structures have, however, different effect on the incentives, which leads to
decrease or increase in the rent, allocated to the agents. Comparison of alternative
structures leads to several conclusions about the optimal organisation of the produc-
tion process.
First conclusion deals with the tradeoff between team production and production by
competing agents. While the team is technologically more efficient, competition has
advantages from the incentives’ point of view. The team production is shown to be
optimal when the technological gains (synergy effect) are significant and the prize in
stake is not too large. For any level of synergy effects, however, as the prize in stake
increases, the competition becomes more attractive arrangement from the principal’s
point of view.
The second conclusion concerns the tradeoff between the sequential and the simulta-
neous team production. The sequential team production allows agents to observe the
effort of their team peers, which may have positive effect on the incentives. Yet, the
sequential structure improves the incentives only if the efforts of agents are strategic
complements. If the efforts are strategic substitutes, then the high level of effort,
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contributed by one agent makes the other agent more prone to shirk. This result is in
line with empirical evidence by Gould and Winter (2005). Investigating the perfor-
mance of professional baseball players the authors conclude, that the performance of
players with substitutable tasks is negatively correlated and the performance players
with complementary tasks is positively correlated.
The last conclusion is related to the tradeoff between hierarchical team and team with-
out hierarchy. The hierarchical structure allows the principal to induce the sequential
contribution of effort in the environment where he is unable to do it himself. The hier-
archical team, however, always leads to the suboptimal allocation of resources, being
therefore less efficient, than the simultaneous team. Still, for the range of parame-
ters where the agents’ investments are strategic complements, the sequential nature
of production process has a positive effect on the incentives. If this positive effect
counterbalances the loss of efficiency, the principal can use hierarchical structure to
improve performance of the team.
The paper has a number of interesting implications for the organization of production
process. It suggests that we should observe principals switching to financing compet-
ing teams, rather than a consortium of teams, as the prize in stake increases. The
casual examples, such as the one cited in introduction, indicate that this indeed might
be the case. Sometimes the necessary degree of competition is provided by the mar-
ket, as was the case with Human Genome Project Consortium, the success of which
was fuelled by the competition with the private firm Celera.18 But it is easy to see
that (at least in the framework of this model) a profit - maximizing principal would
prefer to keep competing teams “in house”, rather than rely on the competition with
the external team (in which case he is left empty-handed whenever the other team
wins).
The paper also implies, that in an environment where a team is organized as a hi-
erarchy and a team leader has difficulties verifying the effort of his subordinates, we
should observe the team leader executing significantly larger effort, than his team
peers. This result is similar to Hermalin (1998) who concludes that a team leader
should work harder than his subordinates. His result relies, however, on the fact that
the leader has an information which is not available to the other team members and
signals this information by “leading by example”. I provide yet another mechanism
which explains why team leaders tend to work harder than their subordinates. This
mechanism is important if a team leader can decide on the allocation of reward be-
18In 2003 HGP Consortium and Celera simultaneously and independently published the sequence
of human genome, see news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/2940601.stm
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tween himself and his subordinate (which is often the case in R&D). Notice, that in
this case unlike in Hermalin (1998), the tendency of the team leader to exert higher
effort than his subordinate reduces the efficiency of production.
The obvious question that arises in connection to the results presented in the paper,
is what should be the optimal structure of a production process with more than two
agents? There is a rich set of possibilities from N competing agents to the multiple
levels of hierarchy. The investigation of this interesting problem is a direction for a
future research.
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Chapter 3
On Compatibility in Two-Sided
Markets
3.1 Introduction
The problem of compatibility choice in the framework of markets with network exter-
nalities has received much attention in the literature. This is not surprising, since the
compatibility of products in this environment affects the size of relevant network and
hence the incentives of agents to buy a particular product. Any decision of a firm op-
erating in such market, from R&D to the introduction of upgrades, crucially depends
on the fact whether its product is compatible with those of a rival or/and with the
previous generations of the same product. It is surprising, however, that investigating
compatibility choice, the literature did not pay much attention to the fact that many
of the markets exhibiting network externalities are two-sided markets.1
Indeed, examples of two-sided markets are numerous. First of all, they include many
industries of the classical economy: newspapers and TV-channels, commercial fairs,
dating agencies and night clubs, shopping malls, etc. The most prominent examples,
however, are related to the New Economy in general and to software platforms in par-
ticular. Operating systems, video-game consoles, payment cards, smart phones and
PDA’s all share features of two-sided (or, more generally, multi-sided) markets. In a
recent book, Evans, Hagiu and Schmalensee (2006) describe multi-sided software plat-
forms as invisible engines that “are in the process of transforming industries ranging
from automobiles to home entertainment” (p. vii).
1Rochet and Tirole (forthcoming) define two-sided markets as markets, where one or several
platforms enable interaction between two distinct group of agents and the volume of transaction is
affected by a price structure.
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In this paper we investigate the choice of compatibility between two generations of
platforms (old and new) in the framework of two-sided markets. We provide classi-
fication of the compatibility regimes that one can observe on two-sided markets and
develop a theory that explains how the choice of a particular regime depends on the
characteristics of the market (the size of the installed base and the market growth
rate) and technological features of the new platform. We show that the driving force
which determines the choice of a compatibility regime is the tradeoff between incen-
tives of the new agents on one side of the market and the incentives of the installed
base on the other side of the market.
This paper is motivated by two observations. First, compatibility of technologies on
two-sided markets has several regimes. Obviously, platforms may be incompatible
with each other. GameCube, a video game console of Nintendo, is incompatible with
its predecessor, N 64. Further, platforms may be backward compatible for one side
of the market. Sony PlayStation 3, for example, is backward compatible with Sony
PlayStation 2, its predecessor: a user of the former can play any games designed for
the latter. Finally, platforms may be fully compatible with each other, as is the case
with Palm OS. Not only a user of Palm OS can run on it any program designed for
the older version of this operation system, but also any program designed for the new
version of operation system can be run on the older version.
The second observation is that the choice of compatibility not only differs across
industries (as illustrated by examples above) but (for the same firm) across time
periods. As an example, consider Nintendo, which, after producing generations of
incompatible game consoles, made its new game console, Wii, backward compatible
with its predecessor, GameCube.
To explain these observations and to provide a theory of compatibility choice in two-
sided markets we consider a framework with two platforms owned and operated by a
single firm (referred to as the monopolist). The platforms enable interaction between
two groups of agents, labelled as users and sellers. One of the platforms represents
an old generation of technology and the other platform represents a new generation
of technology. The new platform is superior to the old one in the extent of network
benefits (which we also call per-interaction benefits) that it confers to users and sellers.
In addition it has some intrinsic benefits, that are independent on the size of network,
and reflect fashion or alternative uses of the platform. The size of network benefits
and stand-alone benefits determine the extent of technological progress.
The old platform has an installed base: some users and sellers are already subscribed
to this platform and can use it to interact with each other. In addition, there is a
number of new users and sellers entering the market (their measure represents market
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growth rate). These new agents cannot subscribe to the old platform. To interact
with agents on the other side of the market they have to, therefore, subscribe to the
new platform. This indeed reflects the situation on many markets of interest, where
the old generation of the platform (for example, an outdated operation system or an
old generation of a game console) is no longer available (unless in a secondary market).
The users and sellers are assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to net costs which
they incur when adopting a new platform.
The price-discriminating monopolist earns profit by selling the new platform to the
installed base and to the new agents and charging them a subscription fee. In ad-
dition the monopolist is free to choose among four compatibility regimes: making
the new platform incompatible with the old one, fully compatible, or only backward
compatible for agents on one side of the market. In the absence of any form of com-
patibility, only agents subscribed to the same generation of platform can interact.
By imposing compatibility, the monopolist enables an interaction between users and
sellers subscribed to different generations of platform.
Finally, deciding on compatibility, the monopolist can also determine the quality of
interaction between agents, subscribed to the new platform and the agents on the
other side of the market, subscribed to the old platform. The minimal quality which
the monopolist can choose is zero, which corresponds to the situation where the new
platform and the old platform are incompatible. It is assumed that the quality of
interaction between agents subscribed to different platforms can never exceed the
quality of interaction between agents subscribed to the old platform. In other words,
the people who play a game designed for PlayStation 2 on PlayStation 3 can only
enjoy the graphic and sound to the extent they would enjoy it using PlayStation 2.
Any quality of interaction between zero and the maximal value corresponds to partial
compatibility, because it only confers a part of maximal network benefits to agents on
both sides od the market.
Our first crucial result is that the monopolist will never choose partial compatibility.
He either will make technologies incompatible for one side on the market or will make
them compatible to the extent that agents can enjoy the maximal network benefits.
This result is new to the literature on network externalities, which up to now assumed
that the compatibility is a yes/no decision (Katz and Shapiro 1985, Katz and Shapiro
1986, Farrell and Saloner 1986, Katz and Shapiro 1992, Doganoglu and Wright 2006),2
although there always was an unease about this assumption (see, for example, Choi
2One exception from this rule is Farrell and Saloner (1992), who assume that compatibility is
provided through the use of converter, which can be imperfect. However, the quality of converter in
their model is exogenously determined and is not chosen by firms, who provide converter.
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1994). Our result provides a justification for this assumption and allows to concentrate
our analysis on four extreme compatibility regimes (incompatible platforms, fully
compatible platforms and two types of backward compatibility).
Analyzing the choice of the compatibility regime, we showed that at the heart of
monopolist’s decision to make technologies compatible is the tradeoff between demand
of new agents on one side of the market and demand of the old agents on the other side
of the market. In particular, if the monopolist introduces backward compatibility for,
say, users, he encourages new users to buy the new platform but discourages the old
sellers to do so (direct effect). For illustration consider a case, where monopolist makes
platforms backward compatible for users. This improves incentives of new users to
buy the new platform. Indeed, now, using this platform, they can access the installed
base of sellers. On the other hand, the sellers, who belong to the installed base have
less incentives to buy the new platform. Indeed, now, using their old platform they
can interact with all users, subscribed to the new platform.
The decrease in the demand of old sellers triggers the decrease in demand of old users
and of the new users (feedback effect). The negative feedback effect becomes more
important if the technological progress is revolutionary, while the direct positive effect
less so. Indeed, if the new platform is very advanced, then the new users have large
incentives to buy it even if it does not allow them to access the installed base of sellers.
The compatibility therefore will bring only moderate improvement in their demand.
The tradeoff between direct and feedback effects determines which type of compatibil-
ity will be chosen on the market. To provide trackable analysis of compatibility choice,
in the second part of the paper we concentrate on several market structures which
are characterized by extreme values of one or several parameters and are observed in
reality. These are mature market (the market growth rate is small), emerging market
(the installed base is small) and the asymmetric market (the installed base exists only
on one side of the market).
We characterize the optimal choice of compatibility for these chosen market struc-
tures. As follows from our analysis, the monopolist is more likely to make platforms
compatible if the technological progress is moderate. Further, the compatibility for,
say, users is likely to be imposed if the installed base of sellers is relatively small, the
installed base of users is relatively small and the growth rate of their installed base is
moderate.
Although our model is static we are able to provide some intuition about dynamics of
compatibility choice as the market develops from emerging to mature or as the monop-
olist, who treated his market as one-sided business, embraces a two-sided model. We
illustrate our predictions with examples from video game console market and market
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for personal digital assistants.
The set-up of our model shares common features with the literature on two-sided
markets (Rochet and Tirole 2002, Caillaud and Jullien 2003, Armstrong forthcoming,
Armstrong and Wright 2004, Rochet and Tirole forthcoming). Our results, however,
are novel to this literature, which up to now typically ignored compatibility. The
exception is Doganoglu andWright (2006), who investigate the incentives of competing
firms to make their platforms compatible given that consumers of their products
may (or may not) multihome, i.e. subscribe to both platforms. The authors mainly
investigate markets with simple network externalities (i.e. there is only one group
of agents). They, however, also discuss implications of their model for two-sided
markets. The focus of this model is very different from ours. First, the incentives to
make platforms compatible stem from competition. Second, the ability of consumers
to multihome in their model is the driving force of the result, while in our model
this is the tradeoff between incentives of old and new agents. Finally, the authors do
not distinguish between different compatibility regimes and view compatibility as a
yes/no decision (full compatibility/incompatibility).
The literature on compatibility in the presence of simple network externalities may
be divided into two groups. The first group of papers investigate compatibility of
technologies on perfectly competitive or oligopolistic market. The incentives of firms
to make technologies compatible stem mostly from competition. Katz and Shapiro
(1986) show that in a dynamic framework the competing firms have incentives to
achieve compatibility of the products in order to soften the price competition on the
early stage of the industry development. Kristiansen (1998) shows that compatibility
may also be used to reduce the R&D competition at the stage of product introduction.
Katz and Shapiro (1992) study a dynamic model, where consumers entering at each
date choose between buying a incumbent technology or waiting until the entrant
introduces a more advanced technology. The authors show that, depending on the
size of the installed base, market growth rate, and consumers’ beliefs, either entrant
or incumbent (but seldom both of them) would prefer to make both technologies
compatible.
Unlike this strand of literature, we study the situation where both old and new plat-
form (technology) are owned by a monopolist. We do this for two reasons. First, the
structure on many industries involving multi-sided markets indeed is monopolistic (or
close to monopolistic), for instance, PC operating systems with Microsoft, internet
auctions with eBay, etc. Second, we want to analyze the incentives for achieving com-
patibility other than those which are related to competition. We show in the paper
that incentives of the monopolist to make platforms compatible are determined by
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the extent to which he looses the demand on the behalf of the existing agents from
one side of the market, which free-ride on the compatibility of platforms for agents
on the other side of the market.
The second group of papers in the literature on network externalities is a literature on
planned obsolescence. The paper which shares a number of similarities with our model
in this literature is Choi (1994). This paper considers a decision of the monopolist
in a two-period model. The monopolist sells a technology in the first period, forming
an installed base, and a new generation of this technology in the second period. He
has a choice between making the technologies compatible or incompatible with each
other. Choi (1994) shows that the decision to introduce an incompatible technology
crucially depends on the fact whether the monopolist intends to sell this technology
to both installed base and new agents or only to new agents. In the former case the
monopolist will make technologies incompatible, while in the latter case he will make
them compatible. The first strategy (incompatible technology, sell to both groups of
agents) is shown to be optimal if the new technology has sufficiently high stand-alone
benefits and the first group of agents (installed base) is sufficiently large, compared
to the number of new agents.
The intuition, underlying these results, that the tradeoff between the demand of old
and new agents, is determinant for the compatibility decision, is similar to ours.
Important difference, however, between this paper and Choi (1994) is that in our
framework it is demand of the new agents on one side of the market and the demand
of the old agents on the other side of the market which matters for compatibility
choice. Further, in the framework of two-sided markets we are able to characterize
the richer set of compatibility regimes than Choi (1994). Finally, we also investigate
how the choice of compatibility regime depends on the extent of network benefits that
the new technology confers to the agents on both sides of the market. Turns out
that higher network benefits intensify the negative feedback effect while making the
positive direct effect less important. This analysis allows us to predict how the choice
of compatibility changes with the technological progress.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we describe the
setup of the model and provide a classification of compatibility regimes. Section 3.3
analyzes compatibility of platforms under a general demand specification. In Sec-
tion 3.4 we introduce assumption of linear demand function and investigate three
market structures: mature market, emerging market and asymmetric market. In Sec-
tion 3.5 we illustrate our predictions about compatibility choice with two examples.
Section 3.6 concludes. Appendix 3.A contains proofs of all lemmas and propositions.
Figures and tables are given in Appendix 3.B.
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3.2 Description of the model
There are two types of agents on the market: agents of type x and agents of type
y. For simplicity we will often refer to the x-agents as users and to the y-agents as
sellers. In line with the literature on two-sided markets, we assume that agents of
each type derive utility from interacting with the agents of the other type, but not
from interacting with the agents of their own type. The utility of each agent increases
with the number of agents he can interact with.
In order to interact with (connect to) an agent of type j, an agent of type i (where
i, j ∈ {x, y}, i 6= j) needs to be subscribed to a platform. There are two different
platforms available: Platform 0 and Platform 1. Platform 0 represents the old (de-
fault) technology and Platform 1 represents the new technology.3 Both platforms are
operated by a single monopolistic firm, which also retains all profits generated by the
platforms. The extent to which these platforms differ will become clear later.
We present our model in a general setting that allows to derive general results for
two-sided markets. In the Introduction we have described numerous examples of such
two-sided markets. Although, each specific example may involve some properties not
captured by the model, we believe that the mechanisms described in this paper is
robust in most cases. As a typical example to illustrate the assumptions on the tech-
nology, we will use the market for video-game consoles. Agents of type x (users) are
represented by the players of video-games and agents of type y (sellers) are represented
by software developers. A platform in such a market is a video-game console, which
enables users to play games, developed by software developers. Old technology then
corresponds to an old generation of the console (e.g., Sony PlayStation 2) and the new
technology corresponds to a new generation of the console (e.g., Sony PlayStation 3).
We assume that there are non-negative measures bx and by of users and sellers respec-
tively, who are already subscribed to the old platform (Platform 0). We will refer to
these agents as existing members, old agents, or installed base. In addition, there are
measures cx and cy of new agents (of types x and type y respectively) who are not
subscribed to any platform. We assume that these agents cannot subscribe to the old
technology. Their only way to connect to the agents of the other type is to subscribe to
the new technology. This assumption reflects the situation where the old technology
is discontinued (no longer available) and has been replaced by the new technology.
For example, in case of video-game consoles, after introducing a new console, the old
one cannot be purchased (unless in a secondary market).
3We will often use the words platform and technology interchangeably.
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The existing members, already subscribed to Platform 0, may also subscribe in addi-
tion to Platform 1. In this case, the agents retain also the old technology4 and may
use either the new or the old technology to interact with the agents of the other type.
This assumption is justified in the situation where the parallel use of two platforms
generates no or only negligible additional costs. Note that if there is no possibility of
resale and the use of the old platform does not involve any additional costs, agents
who subscribed to the new platform have no incentives to stop using the old one.
Subscription to the new technology may be beneficial due to two reasons. First, it may
involve some technological advantages (better graphics, sound, etc.) or alternative
uses (as a DVD player), that increase the utility from interaction. Second, it may
enable interaction with agents, not subscribed to the default technology.
If two agents interact using the old technology, their benefit from this interaction is
normalized to 1. This implies that users and sellers that are subscribed to the old
technology, are guaranteed to receive the benefit of by (respectively bx) by interacting
with the agents from the opposite group, who are also subscribed to this technology.
We will further assume that when interaction is realized through the new platform
(Platform 1), the benefit from this interaction is scaled up by a constant factor s ≥ 1.
Hence, new technology is beneficial for both users and sellers, because it allows to
extract a higher utility from the same number of interactions. Finally, if the two
technologies are compatible, also agents using different technologies can interact. We
assume that in this case the benefits of interaction are determined by the lowest
technology which enables the interaction. For example, when old games can be played
in the new console, there is usually no additional benefit compared to the old console.5
The profit-maximizing monopolist, who owns and operates both platforms, makes
profit by charging per-subscription prices for Platform 1. It is intuitive to think
about this situation as a three-stage game: in the first stage the monopolist chooses
the compatibility regime, in the second stage he chooses the prices, and in the third
stage the agents simultaneously decide whether to subscribe to Platform 1. As a
solution concept we use subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium.6 We denote Ai0 the price
4This is often called multihoming.
5If we define something like quality of the platform, then this amounts to assuming that benefit
from the interaction is determined by the minimal quality of platforms used. This is an assumption
on the technology of interactions. Alternatively, one could consider the benefits from interactions to
be determined by the maximum of qualities, some convex combination of qualities, or by own type’s
quality.
6Further, we will call it only equilibrium. We will also refer to the monopolist’s choice in the
second stage given the compatibility regime (i.e., equilibrium in the second stage) as optimum or
maximum.
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charged to installed base, Ai1 the price charged to new agents (i ∈ {x, y}). Observe
that we allow for price discrimination, i.e., the monopolist can charge different prices
to old and new agents of the same type. This can be achieved by selling the new
platform in form of an update to the old platform with a different price than the
stand-alone platform. The assumption of price discrimination is in line with existing
literature on network externalities (Ellison and Fudenberg 2000, Choi 1994). The most
prominent example are the rebates for the users of operating systems for updates.
For simplicity, we will assume that there is no cost of operating a platform. The
monopolist cannot charge a price for Platform 0 (it is not any more available for
sale) and cannot make any profit on those agents which use the old technology. Let
mi ∈ [0, 1] denote the share of the existing members that subscribe to Platform 1 and
let ni ∈ [0, 1] denote the share of the new agents that subscribe to Platform 1. Then
bimi and cini are their demands for Platform 1. Since the monopolist has no costs
and charges per subscription prices, his profit is
Π = Ax0b
xmx + Ay0b
ymy + Ax1c
xnx + Ay1c
yny. (3.1)
The model we presented so far is a modification of the traditional model of two-sided
markets (Rochet and Tirole 2004). Our main contribution is the analysis of monopo-
list’s decision about compatibility between the old and the new technology. There are
four possible compatibility regimes. The new technology may be incompatible (NC)
with the old technology. It may be backward compatible with the old technology for
x-agents (BCx); it may be backward compatible for y-agents (BCy) or it may be
fully compatible with the old technology (FC).
type x
type yold new
old new
NC
type x
type yold new
old new
BCx
type x
type yold new
old new
BCy
type x
type yold new
old new
FC
Figure 3.1: Interactions in various compatibility regimes
Under incompatibility, the new and old technologies cannot be interconnected. Back-
ward compatibility for i-agents means that an i-agent, who is subscribed to the new
technology may use it to interact with an j-agent subscribed to the old technology (see
Figure 3.1). In the example of game consoles, backward compatibility for users means
that games produced for the old console (PlayStation 2) can be played on the new
console (PlayStation 3). In technical language, this form of compatibility is simply
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called “backward compatibility.” A related notion of “forward compatibility” means
that games written for the new console can be played using the old console.7 In our
setting of two-sided markets, forward compatibility is equivalent to backward compat-
ibility for sellers — it simply means that sellers subscribed to the new technology can
interact with users subscribed to the old technology. Finally, if the new technology
is backward compatible for both sides of the market, we say that the technology is
fully compatible. Example of full compatibility is the USB standard: USB 2.0 is fully
compatible with USB 1.1.
All these compatibility regimes can be easily nested within one general framework.
Towards this end let us assume that the benefit from interaction of a new x-agent with
an old y-agent is γx and the benefit from interaction of a new y-agent with an old
x-agent is γy.8 Thus, γx and γy can interpreted as degrees of backward compatibility
for x-agents and y-agents. The value γx = 0 means that the benefit from interaction
(between a new x-agent and an old y-agent) is 0, i.e., the new platform is not backward
compatible for x-agents. On the other hand, the value γx = 1 means this benefit is
1, i.e., the new platform is backward compatible for x-agents. The regime NC then
corresponds to the case γx = γy = 0, regime BCx to γx = 1 and γy = 0, regime
BCy to γx = 0 and γy = 1, and regime FC to γx = γy = 1. We will refer to the
case when γx or γy belong to (0, 1) as partial compatibility. As will be shown below
(Proposition 3.1), partial compatibility is never chosen by the monopolist, even if he
is free to choose any γx, γy ∈ [0, 1]. This provides justification for analyzing only the
polar cases NC, BCx, BCy, and FC.
If an agent of type i ∈ {x, y} does not subscribe to the new platform, his utility is
simply equal to his benefit from interactions. We denote U i0 the utility of the old agent
not subscribed to the new platform; the utility of the new agents not subscribed to any
platform is normalized to zero. If the agent subscribes to the new platform, his utility
depends positively on the per-interaction benefits, negatively on the subscription price
Aik (where k ∈ {0, 1}) and on intrinsic benefits or costs of acquiring the new platform.9
We will summarize those by θi, i ∈ {x, y} that represents the net costs of acquiring
7For more details see en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backward compatibility and en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Forward compatibility.
8Alternatively this can mean that a new x-agent is able to connect only to a share of γx of the
old y-agents and vice versa.
9The intrinsic benefits may reflect alternative uses of the platform (Sony PlayStation can be used
as a DVD player) or fashion.The cost may represent switching costs.
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the new platform. The utility function is assumed to be additive and, thus, equal to
(benefit from interactions)− θi − Aik.
Call U i1 and V
i
1 the utility of old and new agents respectively who are subscribed to
the new platform.
Benefits which an agent derives from interactions depend on the degree of compati-
bility. For illustration, consider an old agent of type x. If he joins Platform 1, he can
interact with bymy+cyny agents using Platform 1 (with per-interaction benefit s) and
with the remaining by(1 −my) agents using Platform 0 (with per-interaction benefit
1). Thus, his benefit from interactions is s(bymy + cyny) + by(1 −my). Here, degree
of compatibility plays no role. On the other hand, if he does not join Platform 1, he
can interact with by old agents using Platform 0 (with per-interaction benefit 1) and
also with cyny new y-agents (with per-interaction benefit γy). In that case, his benefit
from interactions is by + γycyny. Formally, the agent’s utilities are
Ux1 = s(b
ymy + cyny) + by(1−my)− θx − Ax0 , Ux0 = by + γycyny.
A new agent of type x can stay out of the market in which case he has no access
to the agents of type y and receives zero benefits from interactions. Alternatively,
he can subscribe to the new platform. Platform 1 enables him to interact with cyny
new agents (with per-interaction benefit s) and with additional bymy old agents (with
per-interaction benefit γx). Formally,
V x1 = γ
xby + (s− γx)bymy + scyny − θx − Ax1 .
The demand for Platform 1 is given by the number (measure) of existing members
for which U i1 > U
i
0 and the number (measure) of new agents for which V
i
1 > 0. In
particular,
Ux1 > U
x
0 ⇐⇒ (s− 1)bymy + (s− γy)cyny −Ax0 > θx, (3.2)
V x1 > 0 ⇐⇒ γxby + (s− γx)bymy + scyny−Ax1 > θx. (3.3)
All existing x-agents with θx satisfying the former inequality and all new x-agents
with θx satisfying the latter inequality will subscribe to Platform 1.
Comparison across different compatibility regimes reveals the twofold effect which
compatibility has on the incentives of agents. BCx as compared to NC (or in general
increase in γx), for example, increases incentives of new users to subscribe to the
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Platform 1 by enabling them to access the larger population of agents on the other
side of the market. On the other hand, BCx regime (or increase in γx) discourages
existing sellers to buy the new technology. Indeed, in this regime they can interact
with users using their old platform. This tradeoff between incentives of the new
agents on one side of the market and old agents on the other side of the market will
be determinant for the choice of the compatibility regime.
The agents are assumed to be heterogenous with respect to the net costs θi; let F (θi)
be its cumulative distribution function. We assume that the distribution of agents’
net costs has a finite support [θ, θ¯]. In addition, function F is increasing and twice
continuously differentiable on [θ, θ¯], and the following assumption hold.
Assumption 3.1. F ′(θ¯) = 0 and lim
θ→θ+
F (θ)
F ′(θ)
< −θ.
Note that under the introduced specification, the net costs of the old and new agents
have the same distribution, reflecting the fact that the new agents are a “copy” of
the old agents. This setup allows to analyze monopolist’s decision depending on size
of bi and ci. It is straightforward to modify the model in order to allow for different
distributions for old and new agents (assuming still that Assumption 3.1 holds). All
results remain valid, however, at the expense of simplicity of some conditions.10
As will be shown later, Assumption 3.1 guarantees existence of interior solution to
the monopolist’s maximization problem.11 The first inequality implies that there is
no kink at point θ¯ and hence we may use first-order conditions to find the maximal
profit.12 The second inequality requires θ < 0, which means that there is some group of
agents who derive (positive) net benefits from the new technology. These agents then
ensure that all demands are positive in equilibrium. Note that the second inequality
holds whenever θ < 0 and limθ→θ+ F
′(θ) > 0.
It follows from (3.2) and (3.3) that the demands of old and new x-agents and by a
10To analyze the model with different distributions for each type of agents, fix the markets sizes
and analyze the decision with respect to demand elasticities.
11This holds for all values of other parameters. In Section 3.4 we consider F linear on [θ, θ¯] that
satisfies the second inequality, but violates the first inequality. Thus, some corner solutions arise.
12Note that this assumption is by no means restrictive. Indeed, any function can be “smoothed”
in a small neighborhood of θ¯ so that the first and second derivatives become continuous.
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symmetric argument also of old and new y-agents are given by
mx = F
(
(s− 1)bymy + (s− γy)cyny − Ax0
)
, (3.4)
my = F
(
(s− 1)bxmx + (s− γx)cxnx − Ay0
)
, (3.5)
nx = F
(
γxby + (s− γx)bymy + scyny − Ax1
)
. (3.6)
ny = F
(
γybx + (s− γy)bxmx + scxnx − Ay1
)
. (3.7)
Note, that if there is no entry to the market (i.e., cx = cy = 0), then all compatibility
regimes result in the same demand for Platform 1. Therefore, in the absence of new
agents, the monopolist is indifferent between four compatibility regimes.13
3.3 General demand function
In this section we analyze the general model introduced above. Denote the inverse
function of F as G : [0, 1] → [θ, θ¯] the inverse function to F . By assumptions, G is
increasing and twice continuously differentiable. Our assumption on the distribution
of θi implies that G(mi) and G(ni) represent the characteristic θi of the indifferent
old agent and new agent respectively. Note that G(0) = θ and G(1) = θ¯. In order to
simplify the notation, it will be convenient to use function H : [0, 1]→ R such that
H(z) = 1
2
zG(z) for all z ∈ [0, 1]. (3.8)
With this notation, we obtain inverse demands:
Ax0 = −G(mx) + (s− 1)bymy + (s− γy)cyny,
Ay0 = −G(my) + (s− 1)bxmx + (s− γx)cxnx,
Ax1 = −G(nx) + γxby + (s− γx)bymy + scyny,
Ay1 = −G(ny) + γybx + (s− γy)bxmx + scxnx.
and the monopolist’s profit becomes
Π = −[bxmxG(mx) + bymyG(my) + cxnxG(cx) + cynyG(cy)]+
+2(s− 1)bxbymxmy + 2(s− γx)bycxmynx + 2(s− γy)bxcymxny + 2scxcynxny+
+γxbycxnx + γybxcyny. (3.9)
13If imposing compatibility involves some small fixed costs, then in the absence of entry, the
monopolist has no incentives to make platforms compatible.
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This is to be maximized with respect to mx,my, nx, ny ∈ [0, 1]. We may immediately
observe that the “coefficient” at γx is bycxnx(1 − 2my). As will become clear below,
the comparison of my to 1
2
will be important for monopolist’s decision whether to
impose backward compatibility for x-agents.
The following lemmas provide sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of the
maximum.
Assumption 3.2. Function H ′′(z) is bounded from below on [0, 1] and its minimum
∆ = minz∈[0,1]H ′′(z) satisfies the following conditions:
(i) ∆ > 0;
(ii) ∆2 > (s− 1)2bxby + s2bycx; and
(iii) ∆4 + s2bxbycxcy > [(s− 1)2bxby + s2bycx + s2bxcy + s2cxcy]∆2.
Lemma 3.1. If Assumption 3.2 is satisfied, then monopolist’s profit (3.9) is concave
in mx,my, nx, ny for all γx, γy ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 3.2. If Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 are satisfied, then for all γx, γy ∈ [0, 1], the
monopolist’s profit (3.9) has a unique maximum. This maximum is achieved for mx,
my, nx, and ny from (0, 1) that satisfy the first-order conditions:
H ′(mx) = (s− 1)bymy + (s− γy)cyny,
H ′(my) = (s− 1)bxmx + (s− γx)cxnx,
H ′(nx) = 1
2
γxby + (s− γx)bymy + scyny,
H ′(ny) = 1
2
γybx + (s− γx)bxmx + scxnx.
Throughout this section we assume that both Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 are satisfied.
We will focus on the analysis of the optimum. A natural question arises, what would
be the optimal choice of γx and γy if the monopolist could choose any values from
[0, 1]. The answer is surprisingly that the monopolist would never choose γx ∈ (0, 1)
and is formulated in Proposition 3.1. Furthermore, Proposition 3.2 provides sufficient
conditions for comparisons of compatibility regimes. We will use the relation “≺” to
denote the comparison of compatibility regimes.
Proposition 3.1. Partial compatibility is never optimal.
Proposition 3.2. The following statements hold for comparison of optimums in com-
patibility regimes:
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(i) If mx ≤ 1
2
in NC (resp. BCx) regime, then NC ≺ BCy (resp. BCx ≺ FC).
(ii) If mx ≥ 1
2
in BCy (resp. FC) regime, then NC Â BCy (resp. BCx Â FC).
(iii) If my ≤ 1
2
in NC (resp. BCy) regime, then NC ≺ BCx (resp. BCy ≺ FC).
(iv) If my ≥ 1
2
in BCx (resp. FC) regime, then NC Â BCx (resp. BCy Â FC).
Proposition 3.1 provides a justification for analyzing only the polar cases: NC, BCx,
BCy, and FC. The intuition behind Proposition 3.1 is based on a stronger statement.
Namely, the monopolist has incentives to reduce the degree of backward compatibility
for x-agents, if sufficiently many old y-agents subscribe to the new platform. Indeed,
in this case the backward compatibility is less important for new agents of type x,
while they can interact with many old agents of type y, using the new platform.
Sufficiently many here means that the median old y-agent, i.e., agent with costs θ
that satisfy F (θ) = 1
2
, will in optimum subscribe to the new platform. This reminds
on the Median Voter Theorem in the sense that the median agent is determinant
for the compatibility choice. On the other hand, if the median old y-agent does not
subscribe to the new platform, the monopolist has incentives to increase the degree
of compatibility for x-agents. Thus, the only candidate for optimum that remains
is when the median old y-agent is exactly indifferent between subscribing and not
subscribing to the new platform. However, in that case the reduction in γx has a
positive effect on old y-agents’ incentives to subscribe to the new platform and the
monopolist is again willing to reduce the degree of compatibility. Therefore, the
monopolist never chooses a partial degree of compatibility for x-agents.
The remaining sufficient conditions in Proposition 3.2 follow the same intuition. Note
that the sufficient conditions are formulated in terms of the median old y-agent. This
is intuitive, since the measure of old y-agents who join the new platform determines
the incentives of new x-agents. Analogous statements can be also made for backward
compatibility for y-agents.
Unfortunately, given the general form of distribution of agents’ costs, it is not pos-
sible to provide a complete characterization of the monopolist’s compatibility choice
in terms of the primitives of the model (i.e., market sizes bx, by, cx, cy, quality of con-
nection s and distribution of agents’ costs represented by function F ). We are able,
however, to derive some comparative statics results. In particular, we are interested
in comparative statics with respect to γx (with symmetric results for γy). It provides
an important intuition on the effects that drive a choice of compatibility regimes. We
can easily evaluate that all derivatives dmx/dγx, dmy/dγx, dnx/dγx, dny/dγx can be
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written in the form
by(1− 2my)β1 + 2cxnxβ2, where β1 > 0 and β2 < 0
(coefficients β1 and β2 differ across variables, but their signs are always as indicated;
see the proof of Proposition 3.3 for technical details). Thus, the total effect of an
increase in γx can be decomposed in two effects. The first effect, captured by the
term 2cxnxβ2, stems from the change in incentives of old y-agents (direct effect of
compatibility) and is always negative. The second effect, captured by by(1− 2my)β1,
is ambiguous. It stems from the change in incentives of new x-agents and is negative or
positive depending on whether the median old y-agent subscribes to the new platform
or not.
This ambiguity is due to interaction of two effects. The direct effect of increase in
γx is positive for new x-agents and is negative for old y-agents. The reduction in
demand of old y-agents due to direct effect triggers the reduction in demand of new
x-agents (negative feedback effect).14 Intuitively, if my is large the negative effect
should overweight the positive effect. Indeed, in this case sufficiently many old y-
agents purchase the new platform to make it attractive for the new x-agents even in
the absence of compatibility. Hence, as compatibility is improved, the direct positive
effect is negligible and is dominated by negative effect. Since the direct effect of
compatibility on the incentives of the old y-agents is always negative, the total effect
will be negative as well. This intuition is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.3. For any γy ∈ [0, 1], all demands (mx, my, nx, and ny) and also
the monopolist’s profit are decreasing in γx whenever my ≥ 1
2
in optimum.
In a similar way we may derive comparative statics result with respect to γy.
3.4 Compatibility choice with linear demand func-
tions
To investigate the choice of compatibility in more details we will make here an addi-
tional assumption that θi (where i ∈ {x, y}) is uniformly distributed on the interval
[−B, 1 − B], where 0 < B < 1. This means, that there are some agents who derive
net benefit and some agents who derive net costs from the new platform. The value of
B then corresponds to the maximal net benefit (derived by agents with θ = −B). In
14It becomes clear later that demand of the old x-agents is also subject to negative feedback effect.
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the notation of Section 3.2 the corresponding distribution function is F (θ) = θ+B for
θ ∈ [−B, 1−B]. The demands are then linear in prices and are given by (3.4)–(3.7).
To ensure that the demand functions are decreasing in prices, we will impose two
conditions on parameters.
Assumption 3.3.
(i) bx ≤ 1, by ≤ 1, cx ≤ 1, cy ≤ 1,
(ii) 1− bxby(s− 1)2 − s2(bycx + cxcy + bxcy − bxbycxcy) > 0.
These conditions are sufficient conditions on parameters and (for linear demand func-
tion) imply conditions in Lemma 3.1. Indeed, for linear demand function ∆ = 1.
Hence, condition (iii) in Lemma 3.1 becomes identical to condition (i) of Assump-
tion 3.3. Further, for linear demand function Assumptions 3.3 implies condition (ii)
of Lemma 3.1.
Since in equilibrium each demand can be either interior or corner, we have multiple
candidates for equilibrium allocation. However, it is possible to show, that the mo-
nopolist never chooses prices, such that mi = 0 or ni = 0 or both. Indeed, if the
prices are such that, for example, mi = 0, the monopolist can decrease the price Ai0
marginally to gain a positive demand on behalf of old agents of i-type. Since the
prices for other groups of agents remain unchanged, the profit of the monopolist will
be strictly larger. Moreover, the interior solution maximizes the principal’s profit,
whenever feasible.
Lemma 3.3. Consider the maximization of monopolist’s profit with respect to mx,
when keeping my, nx, ny ∈ [0, 1] fixed. Let mx∗ ∈ R solve the first-order condition
∂Πr/∂mx = 0, where r ∈ {NC,BCx,BCy, FC}. Then, the following statements
hold:
(i) mx∗ > 0.
(ii) If mx∗ ∈ [0, 1], then mx = mx∗ maximizes monopolist’s profit when keeping
my, nx, ny fixed.
(iii) If mx∗ > 1, then mx = 1 maximizes monopolist’s profit when keeping my, nx, ny
fixed.
Analogous statements holds for (partial) maximization with respect to any of the vari-
ables my, nx, ny.
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Based on the Lemma 3.3, we can eliminate allocations where either mi = 0 or ni = 0
for any i ∈ {x, y} from the set of equilibrium candidates. This leaves us sixteen
allocations, which are candidates for equilibrium. These allocations are summarized
in Table 9 in Appendix 3.B. Notations are as follows: Ei1i2i3i4 denotes a particular
type of allocation. Indexes i1 ∈ {0, 1}, i2 ∈ {0, 1}, i3 ∈ {0, 1} and i4 ∈ {0, 1} indicate,
whether in this allocation the demands mx, my, nx and ny respectively are interior
(ik = 0) or corner (ik = 1). For example, the allocation wherem
x ∈ (0, 1), my ∈ (0, 1),
nx = 1, and ny ∈ (0, 1) is denoted as E0010.
The use of linear demand functions allows us to derive equilibrium prices, demands and
the monopolist’s profit in closed form. However, with six parameters the presentation
of results in general case (that is bi > 0, ci > 0, s > 1, and 0 < B < 1) does not reveal
the underlying intuition. Therefore, in what follows we discuss several specific market
structures that one can observe in reality, and that are characterized by extreme values
of one or several parameters.
3.4.1 Mature market
We define a mature market (or satiated market) as a market with low growth rate, i.e.
we assume that cx and cy are close to zero. An example of such market is the market
for Microsoft Windows. The operation system is installed on more than 90% of all
computers, hence there are very few users who do not belong to the installed base of
Microsoft and very few software developers who do not adapt their applications for
Windows.15
Recall, that in our model at the market where cx = cy = 0 all compatibility regimes
are equivalent in terms of monopolist’s profit, agents’ demands and prices for the
new technology. Using this result we can compare different compatibility regimes at
the market where the number of new agents is small, investigating the monopolist’s
profit in the neighborhood of (cx, cy) = (0, 0). The comparison is summarized in the
following proposition. Let us first define:
g1(z) =
1−B[1 + z(s− 1)]
z(s− 1)2 .
Proposition 3.4. Assume that cx, cy are sufficiently small (close to zero). Then the
15See en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft Windows.
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following implications hold:
bx <
1−B
2(s− 1) or b
y < g1(b
x) =⇒ NC ≺ BCx and BCy ≺ FC,
bx >
1−B
2(s− 1) and b
y > g1(b
x) =⇒ NC Â BCx and BCy Â FC,
by <
1−B
2(s− 1) or b
x < g1(b
y) =⇒ NC ≺ BCy and BCx ≺ FC,
by >
1−B
2(s− 1) and b
x > g1(b
y) =⇒ NC Â BCy and BCx Â FC.
Using the above proposition we can define curves16 Ix and Iy which represent the
monopolist’s indifference between providing and not providing backward compatibility
for agents of x-type and y-type respectively:
Iy =
{
1−B
2(s−1) , if b
y ≤ 1−B
2(s−1) ,
g1(b
y), if by > 1−B
2(s−1) .
(3.10)
Ix is analogically defined.17 Notice, that Iy decreases in B, s and is non-increasing
in by (analogical result holds for Ix). The curves Ix and Iy and optimal choice of
compatibility regime is illustrated on the Figure 3.2 (the dashed line shows the area
where Assumption 3.3 is satisfied).
There are several observations to be made about the choice of compatibility regime.
As we have already mentioned, backward compatibility for, say, y-agents improves
incentives of new agents of this type to buy the new technology, while it discourages
the old x-agents to buy the new technology (direct effect). The decrease in demand
on behalf of old x-agents triggers the decrease in demand of new y-agents and old
y-agents (negative feedback effect).
Therefore, whether the monopolist is willing to make technologies compatible for y-
agents depends on whether the positive effect on behalf of new y-agents overweighs
the negative effects. This tradeoff explains the fact that for each bx there exist a
cutoff value of by (defined by Iy), such that for all by above this value the monopolist
will make technologies not compatible for y-agents. Moreover, this cutoff value is
non-increasing in bx, since the larger is bx the more important is the negative effect
16With some abuse of notation we use the same notation for the curve and for the function
describing it.
17These curves need to be interpreted properly. Consider, for example, curve Iy. If (bx, by) lies
above (resp. below) the curve Iy, then there exists δ > 0 such that the monopolist prefers NC to
BCy (resp. prefers BCy to NC) for all cx, cy ∈ (0, δ).
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Figure 3.2: Optimal choice of compatibility regimes at the mature market
of backward compatibility for the monopolist’s profit. On the other hand, if by is
sufficiently small (when by < 1−B
2(s−1)), the feedback effect on old y-agents becomes
negligible and the monopolist is willing to make technologies backward compatible
for any value of by. In particular, for s = 1 the negative feedback effect vanishes.
Indeed, if s = 1 the demand of old y-agents does not depend on demand of old x-
agents (one can readily see this from the definition of demand functions). In this case
FC regime will be always chosen in equilibrium.
Another observation is that the larger is the technological progress, the less willing is
the monopolist to make technologies compatible. This follows directly from the fact,
that Ix and Iy decrease in B (value of stand-alone benefits) and s (per-interaction
benefits). The underlying intuition is that the better is the new technology, the more
incentives have the new agents to purchase it even in the absence of compatibility. On
the other hand, the reduction in demand on behalf of old agents becomes more impor-
tant for the principal’s profit as s or/and B increase. This observation is formalized
in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.1. Consider some bx, by > 0. Let s¯ > 1 and B¯ ∈ (0, 1) satisfy Assump-
tion 3.3 (where cx → 0 and cy → 0). If the monopolist makes technologies compatible
for s = s¯ and B = B¯, then he will make technologies compatible for all s ≤ s¯ and
B ≤ B¯.
Finally, as follows from the Proposition 3.4, the decision of the monopolist whether
to make technologies compatible for agents of type x does not depend on the fact,
whether they are already compatible for the agents of type y. In other words, if the
90
monopolist decides to switch from NC regime to BCx regime, he would also switch
from BCy regime to FC regime (the symmetric argument holds the other side of the
market). This result amounts to saying that the change in demand of new agents
of type y is negligible and does not play a role for the decision of the monopolist to
introduce BCx regime. Indeed, for cy → 0 this effect is insignificant and is dominated
by the direct effect of BCx regime (negative effect on the incentives of old agents
of type y and positive effect on the incentives of new agents of type x) and indirect
feedback effect.
3.4.2 Emerging market
We define an emerging market as the market with very small installed base (bx →
0, by → 0) and potentially high growth rate (cx > 0, cy > 0). The examples of
emerging markets are numerous: Video game industry in early 80’s, PDA’s in early
90’s, currently smart phones.
Clearly, if bx = by = 0 then in our model all compatibility regimes are equivalent in
terms of monopolist’s profit, equilibrium demands and prices. We can use this result
to analyze the optimal compatibility choice in a situation where bx and by are small,
by investigating profits of the monopolist in the neighborhood of (bx, by) = (0, 0). The
comparison is summarized in the following proposition. Let us first define:
g2(z) =
2(1−B)−Bz(2s− 1)
zs(2s−B) .
Proposition 3.5. Assume that bx, by are sufficiently small (close to zero). Then the
following implications hold:
cx <
1−B
2s− 1 or c
y < g2(c
x) =⇒ NC ≺ BCx and BCy ≺ FC,
cx >
1−B
2s− 1 and c
y > g2(c
x) =⇒ NC Â BCx and BCy Â FC,
cy <
1−B
2s− 1 or c
x < g2(c
y) =⇒ NC ≺ BCy and BCx ≺ FC,
cy >
1−B
2s− 1 and c
x > g2(c
y) =⇒ NC Â BCy and BCx Â FC.
Similarly as before we can define curves Ix and Iy representing the indifference of the
monopolist between making technologies compatible for agents of the respective type
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and making them incompatible.
Iy =
{
1−B
2s−1 , if c
y ≤ 1−B
2s−1 ,
g2(c
y), if cy > 1−B
2s−1 .
(3.11)
Ix is analogically defined. It is clear from the definition of the Iy and g2(z), that Iy is
decreasing in B, s and is non-increasing in cy (similar result holds for Ix). The curves
and the optimal choice of compatibility regime are illustrated on the Figure 3.3 (the
dashed line shows the area where Assumption 3.3 is satisfied).
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Figure 3.3: Optimal choice of compatibility regimes at the emerging market
As shown on the figure above, the backward compatibility for agents of type i ∈ {x, y}
is chosen if there are few new agents of this type. In particular, it is always optimal
to make technologies compatible for i-agents if ci < 1−B
2s−1 . If c
i > 1−B
2s−1 , then according
to Proposition 3.5 there exist a cutoff value of ci (which is the decreasing function of
cj), such that technologies will be incompatible for i-agents for all ci above this value.
This result is due to the tradeoff between incentives of new i-agents and old j-agents.
Consider for example BCy regime and assume that parameters other than cy are fixed.
If cy is small then introduction of BCy regime has no significant effect on the incentives
of old x-agents to buy the new technology (the direct negative effect is small). Indeed,
it provides the agents who belong to the installed base with few additional connections.
Their decision to purchase the new technology depends therefore on its characteristics
and the demand of old y-agents, rather than on the number of new agents subscribed
to it. As cy increases, however, the access to the new agents starts to play more
important role for the decision of the installed base to buy the new technology. In
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this case introduction of BCy leads to the significant reduction of the demand on
behalf of old x-agents and the resulting feedback effect becomes also pronounced. In
this case the monopolist is better off making technologies incompatible.
The threshold value of cy is non-increasing in cx. Indeed, if cx is large the new y-agents
would buy the technology even if it does not provide them an access to the installed
base of x-agents. Hence introduction of compatibility will only moderately increase
the demand on their behalf, while still discouraging the old agents from buying the
new technology.
As follows from the Proposition 3.5, the decision of the principal to introduce backward
compatibility for agents of type y does not depend on the compatibility of platforms
for agents of type x. The intuition is similar to the case of mature markets. The
monopolist ignores any implications which the change in demand of new x agents due
to BCy has on the demand of old y agents. Indeed, this indirect effect is insignificant,
because the installed base of y-agents is small.
Finally, we should observe that similarly to the case of mature market, the increase
in the stand-alone benefits (B) or in the per-interaction benefits (s) shifts the curve
Iy downwards and Iy to the left. In other words the monopolist is less likely to make
technologies compatible if the technological progress is revolutionary. This observation
is formalized in the following corollary.
Corollary 3.2. Consider some cx, cy > 0. Let s¯ > 1 and B¯ ∈ (0, 1) satisfy Assump-
tion 3.3 (where bx → 0 and by → 0). If the monopolist makes technologies compatible
for s = s¯ and B = B¯, then he will make technologies compatible for all s ≤ s¯ and
B ≤ B¯.
3.4.3 Asymmetric market
We define asymmetric market as a market where there is an installed base only on
one side, that is, for example, a market where bx > 0 and by = 0. Such asymmetry
can exist because the market in question, although having characteristics of two-sided
market, was treated by the monopolist as a “single-sided” business. One example
is iPod/iTunes music platform. The (potential) two sides of the market in this case
are users who download the music and publishers who provide it. However, as is
documented in Evans et al. (2006, Ch. 6, pp. 213–244 and pp. 257), the two sides
of the market in the case of iPod/iTunes platform do not interact with each other;
in fact the publishers have no access to platform at all. Instead, Apple follows a
vertically integrated strategy buying the music by paying publishers royalties and
distributes this music to customers who want it. Also PDA’s and smart phones
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evolved from a product which provided an integrated solution (hardware, operation
system and applications) to the two-sided platforms, where applications and hardware
are provided by the third-party developers (Evans et al. 2006, Ch. 6 and Ch. 9).
In this section we investigate which compatibility regime is going to be chosen at
the market, where the monopolist who treated a platform as a single-sided business
switches to the two-sided model. We assume therefore, that bx > 0, by = 0, cx > 0,
cy > 0. Notice, by = 0 implies, that in terms of monopolist’s profit, prices and
demands, NC regime is equivalent toBCx regime and FC regime is equivalent toBCy
regime. We will consider therefore only the choice between NC and BCy regimes.
The logic, applied in previous cases holds also here. If we fix parameters s, B and
bx, then we can define a curve (let us denote it Iy), such that for the combination of
(cx, cy) below this curve the monopolist would make technologies compatible and he
would prefer them to be incompatible for the parameter range above this curve.
Proposition 3.6. Let by = 0 and bx > 0. Then for any cx there exists a unique
Iy = g3(cx) such that NC ≺ BCy if and only if cy < g3(cx).
The curve Iy and the optimal choice of compatibility regimes is illustrated on Fig-
ure 3.4.
1
1
cx
BCy
NC
Iy1−B2s−1
cy
Figure 3.4: Optimal choice of compatibility regimes at the asymmetric market(s = 2,
B = 0.4, bx = 0.1)
As the intuition discussed for the previous market structures suggests, the curve Iy
must be non-increasing in cx. The tradeoff between NC and BCy regimes is driven by
direct positive effect on the incentives of new agents of type y and the direct negative
effect on the incentives of old agents of type x. If cx is large, than the new agents of
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type y find the platform attractive even if it is not compatible with the old platform.
In this case the positive direct effect of BCy is relatively unimportant, and hence NC
will be chosen. If cx is small, however, then introduction of BCy regime significantly
improves the demand on behalf of new agents of type y — and this effect offsets the
negative effect on demand of old agents of type x.
Improvement in technological characteristics (increase of s or B) of the new platform
has similar effect on incentives of new y-agents as increase in cx. On the other hand,
any loss of demand on behalf of old agents of type x is more important for the
monopolist’s if s or B is large. Introduction of BCy regime not only discourages
some agents from installed base to buy the new platform, but also the reduction in
their demand triggers the reduction in the demand of new agents of type y. These
two effects become more important as s or B increases. Hence, for larger s or B the
monopolist is less willing to make technologies compatible.
Finally, if the size of installed base is large then the monopolist is less willing to
introduce BCy regime. Indeed, if bx is large compared to cy, then the monopolist
should be more concerned with the reduction in demand of the installed base, than
with the increase in demand of new agents.
Although the intuition for comparative statics above does not depend on particular
values of parameters, it is not possible to provide the analytical comparative statics
for a general case. Therefore, let us assume, that the parameters of the model are
such, that the interior solution is feasible.
Corollary 3.3. Let cx, cy > 0, b¯x > 0, s¯ > 1, and B¯ ∈ (0, 1) be such that the interior
solution is feasible. Then the curve Iy = g3(cx) is downward sloping. Moreover, if the
monopolist makes technologies compatible for some s = s¯, B = B¯, and bx = b¯x, then
(other things equal) he will make them compatible for all s ≤ s¯, B ≤ B¯, and bx ≤ b¯x.
3.5 Discussion
We have identified two effects that backward compatibility for, say, agents of y type
has on two-sided market (the argument is naturally the same for the backward com-
patibility for agents of x type). First effect is a direct effect that is positive for new
y-agents (backward compatibility improves their incentives) and is negative for old x-
agents (backward compatibility discourages them from buying the new technology).
Second effect is a negative feedback effect. Namely, decrease in the demand of old
agents of type x leads to the decrease in the demand of old agents of type y and to
the decrease in the demand of new agents of type y. The negative feedback effects
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become more important if the technological progress is revolutionary (s and B are
large), while the direct positive effect less so. Indeed, if the new platform is very
advanced, then the new agents have large incentives to buy it even if it does not
allow them to access the installed base of agents on the other side of the market. The
compatibility therefore will bring only moderate improvement in their demand.
The tradeoff between direct effect and feedback effects determines the optimal compat-
ibility choice. In particular, as follows from our analysis, the backward compatibility
is more likely to be imposed on the market where the technological progress is mod-
erate.18 Further (other things equal), the compatibility for agents of type y is more
likely to be imposed if their installed base is relatively small, the growth rate of the
installed base is moderate and the installed base of x-agents is small.
Our model provides several predictions about patterns of compatibility choice. On
the emerging market, where technological progress is rapid and the entry of agents
on both sides of the market is significant, we should often observe the subsequent
generations of technologies being not compatible with each other. As, however, the
pace of technological improvement slows down and the growth of installed base decel-
erates (the market becomes mature), we should expect some degree of compatibility
between subsequent generations of technology. In particular, technologies are likely
to be backward compatible for some side of the market if the installed base on this
side of the market is relatively small. Technologies are likely to be fully compatible if
the both sides of the market are symmetrically represented. Only if the technological
progress is significant and the installed base on both sides of the market are very large
should the technologies remain incompatible.
The predicted pattern of the compatibility regimes as a market develops from emerging
to mature is nicely illustrated by the experience of video game console industry. The
following discussion is adopted mainly from the Evans et al. (2006). The start of the
video game console industry dates back to the earlier 70’s. However, the industry
was emerging at the slow pace. The leader of the industry, Atari, at the pick of it
success sold only around 5 mln units of video game consoles. Moreover, the game
industry crashed in 1983 due to the overproduction of poor quality games. The credit
for the revival of the industry goes to Nintendo. Around 1983 Nintendo introduced
its first console (Nintendo Entertainment System, NES) which has revolutionized the
way how the video console business was done. Nintendo actively pursued a two-sided
18Note, that this argument does not rely on the costs of achieving compatibility, which are nat-
urally higher if the platforms belong to the very distant generations of technology. Higher costs
provide another reasons why the platforms should be incompatible if the technological progress is
revolutionary.
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market strategy. It drafted licensing agreements with third party providers to ensure
the quality of the games and the critical mass of the games for the new system. The
sales of the NES and related games skyrocketed. It sold around 60 mln consoles world
wide.
Ninetendo operated at a clearly emerging market, where the pace of technological
growth was rapid and the installed base of users of consoles and game developers was
relatively small. The future generations of Nintendo video game consoles were incom-
patible with the previous version.19 Super NES (introduced in 1990) was incompatible
with its predecessor NES; Nintendo 64 (introduced in 1996) was incompatible with
Super NES and Game Cube (introduces in 2001) was incompatible with Nintendo 64.
Presently, in Japan, USA and Europe, the video game console market has reached its
mature state. According to estimation of Nielsen, a market research company, 41.1%
of US households own a game console and the rate of console penetration has slowed
down20. In line with our predictions Nintendo made its new console, Wii (introduced
in 2006) backward compatible with its predeccessor, Game Cube.
Our analysis also indicates how the compatibility of platforms should evolve on the
asymmetric market where a monopolist, who previously treated his market as a one-
sided business decides to disintegrate and to embrace a two-sided model. Following
Section 3.4.3 let us assume that there is an installed base only on the x side of the
market and the growth rate of the market are cx and cy. Then we would expect
subsequent generations of platforms be compatible for agents of type y, if cy is small
and/or if the pace of technological progress is moderate.
To illustrate this prediction, consider the case of Palm company.21 Palm started as a
software company but soon integrated in a hardware. Although it did not produced
the hardware itself, it controlled all stages of the process and treated the involved
firms as subcontractors. PalmPilot, produced in 1996, was a hardware with inte-
grated operation system. However, in late 1997 Palm switched to a two-sided model.
It has concentrated on the development of Palm OS operation system, which it was
licensing to the hardware makers, such as Sony, Kyocera, Nokia, Handspring etc. (y
agents, in the terminology of our model). On the other hand, to ensure the popularity
19Interesting enough, there are add-ons, unlicensed by Ninetendo, which allow to make
subsequent generations of Nintendo consoles compatible. It indicates that Nintendo decided
to make platforms incompatible not because it was technically impossible, but because it
was more profitable strategy. The information about backward compatibility is taken from
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backward compatibility.
20See report of The Nielsen Company (2006)
21The example is taken from Evans et al. (2006, Ch. 6 and Ch. 9). The data about compatibility
of Palm OS is available at www.access-company.com/developers/documents/docs/palmos.
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of Palm OS, Palm has intensively courted the developers of applications (the x side
of the market) from the time of introduction of Palm Pilot. It already had significant
installed base of third party developers when it decided to switch to the two-sided
model. The efficient courting strategy ensured that this base was growing fast. How-
ever, due to some management failures and the market trends, Palm had less success
in ensuring the cooperation of third party providers of hardware. Sony, for example,
has stopped selling PDA’s which run Palm OS. Handspring was purchased by Pal-
mOne (a hardware company, independent from PalmSource, provider of Palm OS). In
line with our prediction, Palm, eager to improve attractiveness of its operation system
for the hardware developers, made it backward compatible. Any version of Palm OS,
installed on hardware device, is not only able to run the applications, written for this
version but also applications written for the older versions of the operation system.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a theory of compatibility choice at two-sided market. This
theory contributes to the literature on two-sided markets which up to now did not
devoted much attention to the issues of compatibility.
Our first important result is that the monopolist will never choose partial compati-
bility. He will either make technologies incompatible or will make them compatible
to the extent that agents, who interact using different platforms, can enjoy maxi-
mal possible network benefits. This result allows us to concentrate our analysis on
four extreme compatibility regimes: full compatibility, incompatibility and backward
compatibility for each side of the market.
We showed that the tradeoff, which is at the heart of monopolist’s decision to make
technologies compatible, is the tradeoff between demand of new agents on one side
of the market and demand of the old agents on the other side of the market. In
particular, if the monopolist introduces backward compatibility for, say, users, he
encourages new users to buy the new platform but discourages the old sellers to do
so (direct effect). The decrease in the demand of old sellers triggers the decrease in
demand of old users and of the new users (feedback effect). The tradeoff between these
effects determines which compatibility regime will be chosen in equilibrium.
Investigating different market structures (mature market, emerging market and asym-
metric market) we characterized the choice of compatibility in terms of primitives of
the model. In particular, we showed, that the compatibility for users will be im-
posed if the proportion of new users is relatively small, installed base of sellers and
users is relatively small and the technological progress is moderate. We illustrate our
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predictions about the pattern of compatibility choice with two examples.
Our model can be modified in several ways. First, we assume that both sides of the
market are symmetric in terms of per-interaction benefits. This is not necessarily the
case on two-sided markets. We could modify the model by introducing some asym-
metry between agents. This modification, however, would not change the underlying
intuition and therefore the basic results.
Throughout the paper we assume that the quality of interaction between users and
sellers is fixed and depends on the lowest technology that enables this interaction. For
some markets other technological assumptions can be more realistic; for example, the
quality of interaction may be determined by the best of two technologies. It would
be useful to see how the choice of compatibility regime depends on technological
assumptions.
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Appendices
1.A Appendix: Proofs
Derivation of the value functions in Section 1.3.1. For illustration consider regime (1/1)
and stopping rule R1. When ∆ is the length of the time period, Equation 1.3 can be
rewritten as:
V 11t = 2(R∆p−∆c)−R(∆p)2 +
1− 2∆p+ (∆p)2
1 + ∆r
V 11t+∆,
Dividing the expression by ∆ and taking ∆ → 0 we receive the following differential
equation:
V 11t (r + 2p) = 2(Rp− c) + V˙ 11t .
Solving the differential equation with terminal condition, which translates to V 11T = 0,
we receive the expression for V 11t :
V 11t =
2(Rp− c)
r + 2p
(1− e−(r+2p)(T−t)).
The derivation of the value function for the case, where stopping rule R2 applies is
identical except for the boundary condition, which now translates to V 11T = V
1
0 in
continuous time. Recall that V 10 is the value of the project in regime (1), i.e., when
only a single entrepreneur is employed.
To derive value functions of entrepreneurs E11t and their incentive compatible shares
s11t we use the same approach. Consider again regime (1/1), stopping rule R1. The
minimization program, which allows us to determine the optimal share st and expected
reward E11t of the entrepreneur is given in Section 1.3 by problem (1.6). With incentive
compatibility constraint being binding this problem results in the following expression
for a share s11t :
pst − 1
2
p2st = c+
p(1− p)
1 + r
E11t+1. (12)
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Considering transition of equality (12) to continuous time, we receive:
st =
c
p
+ E11t
Since incentive compatibility constraint is binding in equilibrium, we can derive solu-
tion to the minimization problem (1.6) from the following equality:
E11t = c+
1− p
1 + r
E11t+1. (13)
Considering transition of the equation (13) to continuous time we obtain again a dif-
ferential equation. After solving the differential equation, with the terminal condition
which translates to E11T = 0, we receive the expression for the value function of an
entrepreneur:
E11t =
c
r + p
(
1− e(r+p)(t−T )) .
Proof of Proposition 1.1. The proof is divided into two parts depending on the sign
of A11. If the parameters are such that A11 > 0, then the feasible contracts are C1, C3
and C4. On the other hand, if A11 ≤ 0, then the available contracts are C1, C2 and C4.
We will show that in both cases contract C1 is optimal.
First we show that contract C1 is always (regardless of A11) preferred to contract C4.
Translated into profits, this is equivalent to the inequality V 110,1 − 2E110,1 > V 10 − E10 ,
with V 110,1, E
11
0,1, V
1
0 , and E
1
0 given in Table 1. After substitution, this can be rewritten
as
2(Rp− c)
r + 2p
− Rp+ c
r + p
+
c
r
−
(
2(Rp− c)
r + 2p
e−2pT − Rp+ c
r + p
e−pT +
c
r
)
e−rT > 0.
Note that the optimal stopping time T is the same for both contracts is T 1 =
−1
p
ln c
Rp−c . Therefore, e
−pT = c
Rp−c . Using a substitution
x =
c
Rp− c, (14)
or equivalently c = Rp x
1+x
, we the rewrite the above inequality as
Rp
1 + x
[
2
r + 2p
− 1 + 2x
r + p
+
x
r
−
(
2x2
r + 2p
− x(1 + 2x)
r + p
+
x
r
)
xr/p
]
> 0.
Note that e−pT = x and the assumption Rp > 2c > 0 implies that x ∈ (0, 1).
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Multiplying the last inequality by (r + 2p)(r + p)r(1 + x)/(Rp) yields
r2 + (p− r)(2p+ r)x+ p(2rx− 2p− r)x1+r/p > 0.
Denote the left-hand side of this inequality as f(x).22 Then
f ′(x) = (r + 2p)[2rx1+r/p − (p+ r)xr/p + (p− r)],
f ′′(x) = (r + 2p)
[
2r
(
1 +
r
p
)
xr/p − (p+ r)r
p
x−1+r/p
]
.
First observe that f(0) = r2 > 0, f(1) = 0, f ′(1) = 0, f ′′(1) = r(r+ p)(r+2p)/p > 0.
Moreover, for p ≤ r, the function f is decreasing on interval (0, 1), since f ′(x) <
(r + 2p)[2rxr/p − (p + r)xr/p + (p − r)] = (r + 2p)(p − r)(1 − xr/p) < 0. Hence,
f(x) > f(1) = 0, for p ≤ r.
On the other hand, for p > r we have f ′(0) = (r + 2p)(p − r) > 0. Therefore,
f(x) > f(0) in some neighborhood of 0. Now, assume by contradiction that f(x0) = 0
for some x0 ∈ (0, 1). Then by continuity there exists some x1 ∈ (0, x0) such that
f(x1) = f(0), which (according to Rolle’s theorem) implies that there exist some
x2 ∈ (0, x1) and x3 ∈ (x0, 1) such that f ′(x2) = f ′(x3) = 0 = f ′(1). Therefore, the
equation f ′′(x) = 0 has at least two solutions in interval (0, 1), which is a contradiction,
since f ′′(x) = 0 only if x = 1
2
. This proves that contract C1 is preferred to contract
C4.
Now, we will show that for A11 > 0, contract C1 is preferred to C3. Obviously the
latter contract is a limiting case of the former, when the research horizon is infinity.
However, for contract C1 the optimal time T 111 = −1p ln cRp−c is finite. Hence, contract
C1 with research horizon T 111 is more profitable for the venture capitalist than contract
C1 with any other research horizon, including infinite research horizon.23 Therefore,
contract C1 is better than contract C3.
It remains to prove that contract C1 is preferred to contract C2, i.e., that V 110,1−2E110,1 >
V 110,2− 2E110,2 > 0, with V 110,1, E110,1, V 110,2, and E110,2 given in Table 1. This can be rewritten
as follows:
−2(Rp− c)
r + 2p
e−(r+2p)T
11
1 +
2c
r + p
e−(r+p)T
11
1 −
−
(
V 10 −
2(Rp− c)
r + 2p
)
e−(r+2p)T
11
1 +
(
E10 −
2c
r + p
)
e−(r+p)T
11
1 > 0.
22Note that f is C2 on (0, 1].
23One can easily see that for the stopping rule R1: ddT (V
11
0 − 2E110 ) < 0, when T > T 111 .
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Using again the substitution (14), we obtain
e−pT
11
1 = x, and e−pT
11
2 =
x(p+ r)
r
· r − p+ (r + p)x
r/p
r + (r + 2p)x1+r/p
.
Then, the above inequality can be, after multiplying by r(p+r)(2p+r)(1+x)/(Rpx2+r/p),
rewritten as follows:24
2r − [r − p+ (r + p)xr/p]
[
p+ r
r
· r − p+ (r + p)x
r/p
r + (r + 2p)x1+r/p
]1+r/p
> 0.
Similarly as in the first part of this proof, denote the left-hand side of this inequality
as g(x). Observe that g(1) = 0 and that
g′(x) =
(r + p)(r + 2p)
p2
[
p+ r
r
· r − p+ (r + p)x
r/p
r + (r + 2p)x1+r/p
]1+r/p
x−1+r/p ×
× r
2(x− 1) + p2x(xr/p − 1)
r + (r + 2p)x1+r/p
,
which is negative, since 0 < x < 1. Therefore, g(x) > g(1) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, 1), which
completes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1.1. 1. Using the expressions for V 110 , E
11
0 , V
1
0 , and E
1
0 from Ta-
ble 1 in Appendix 1.B, we obtain
A10 =
c
r(p+ r)2
(
p2 − pr − r2 − (r + p)2e−rT + pre−(r+p)T ),
B10 =
1
(p+ r)(r + 2p)2
[
c(r + p)(r + 2p)− pr(Rp− c) +
+(Rp− c)(− (r + 2p)2e−(r+p)T + 2p(r + p)e−(r+2p)T )],
with T being the optimal stopping time for contracts C1 and C4 from regime
(1/1), which is the same, i.e., T = T 1 = T 111 = −1p log cRp−c .
Similarly as in the Proof of Proposition 1.1 we use the substitution (14), or
c = Rp x
1+x
. In addition, to simplify the expressions, we use another substitution
z =
r
p
,
or r = zp. Given the conditions on parameters, we have x ∈ (0, 1) and z >
0. With this substitution, e−rT simplifies to a nice form xz and the above
24Note that r − p+ (r + p)xr/p > 0, since A11 = −Rpx/[r(r + p)(1 + x)] · [r − p+ (r + p)xr/p].
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expressions can be rewritten as follows:
A10 =
x[1− z − z2 − (1 + z)2xz + zx1+z]
(1 + x)z(1 + z)2
,
B10 =
−z + (1 + z)(2 + z)x− (2 + z)2x1+z + 2(1 + z)x2+z
(1 + x)(1 + z)(2 + z)2
.
For simplicity denote a(x) and b(x) the numerators of A10 and B10, respectively.
Note that since their denominators are positive, the signs of A10 and B10 are
the same as the signs of a(x) and b(x), respectively.
Depending on the sign of 1−z−z2, we discuss two cases. First, when 1−z−z2 ≤
0, then a(x) < 0, since −(1 + z)2xz + zx1+z = [−(1 + z + z2)− z(1− x)]xz < 0.
Second, when the inequality 1 − z − z2 > 0 holds, we will prove a stronger
statement that this inequality already implies b(x) < 0, regardless of the sign
of a(x). Note that for z > 0, the condition 1 − z − z2 > 0 is equivalent to
0 < z < 1
2
(
√
5 − 1) ≈ 0.6180. Obviously b(0) = −z and b(1) = 0. Taking the
derivatives of b(x) we obtain
b′(x) = (1 + z)(2 + z)
[
1− (z + 2(1− x))xz],
b′′(x) = (1 + z)(2 + z)x−1+z[2(1 + z)x− z(2 + z)].
Then b′(0) = (1 + z)(2 + z) > 0 and b′(1) = (1 + z)(2 + z)(1 − z) > 0. The
second derivative implies that b is concave in the interval (0, x1) and convex on
(x1, 1), where x1 =
z(2+z)
2(1+z)
< 1
2
, due to assumption 1 − z − z2 > 0. Therefore,
b has a local maximum (denote it x2) on interval (0, x1) and a local minimum
on (x1, 1). Its possible shape is illustrated on Figure 6 in Appendix 1.B. Hence,
in order to prove that b(x) < 0 on (0, 1) it remains to show that b(x2) < 0.
Although it is not possible to find a closed formula for x2, we know that
xz2 =
1
z + 2(1− x2) .
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Using this, we obtain
2[z + 2(1− x2)]b(x2) =
= 2[−z + x2(1 + z)(2 + z)] [z + 2(1− x2)]−
−2(2 + z)2x2 + 4(1 + z)x22 =
= −4(1 + z)2x22 + z(z2 + 4z + 6)x2 − z(2 + z) =
= −[2(1 + z)x2 − z(2 + z)]2 + z[z + 2(1− x2)](z2 + 2z − 2) <
< 2z[z + 2(1− x2)](z2 + z − 1) < 0.
As a consequence, A10 > 0 implies that G′(T ) > 0 for all T ≥ 0. Hence the
optimal stoping time is infinite.
2. The optimality condition G(T ) = 0 can be rewritten as e−pT = (r+p)A
10
(r+2p)B10
. The
condition (r + 2p)B10 < (r + p)A10 < 0 implies that e−pT
10
2 ∈ (0, 1), i.e., T 102 is
positive and finite. Moreover, we have G′′(T ) = (r + 2p)2B10e−(r+2p)T − (r +
p)2A10e−(r+p)T , which yields G′′(T 102 ) = (r + p)pA
10e−(r+p)T < 0.
3. We consider two cases. If B10 ≥ 0, then obviously G′(T ) < 0. If B10 < 0, then
G′(T ) < [−(r + 2p)B10 + (r + p)A10]e−(r+p)T < 0 for all T ≥ 0. Hence, G(T ) is
monotonically decreasing and the optimal stoping time is zero.
Proof and numerical simulations for Proposition 1.2.
1. Contract C4 is feasible whenever Rp > 2c. If the second stopping rule is applied,
the optimal stopping time is infinity (see discussion in Section 1.4) and contract
C7 is feasible.
The conditions A10 > 0 and B10 < 0 imply that pE110 + 2c < (r + p)E
1
0 and
(r+2p)V 10 < p(R+ V
11
0 )− 2c respectively. Moreover, from V 10 > E10 > 0 we get
(r + p)E10 < (r + 2p)V
1
0 . Combining the inequalities, we obtain that
pE110 + 2c
r + p
<
p(R + V 110 )− 2c
r + 2p
, and hence T 101 = −
1
p
ln
2c+ pE110
p(R + V 110 )− 2c
> 0,
which means that contract C5 is feasible. We have proved that if the feasibility
condition A10 > 0 is satisfied, then the pool of available contracts is C4, C5, C7.
Further we will compare the surplus which the venture capitalist retains with
each contract, in order to choose the optimal one.
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Consider contracts C4 and C7. From the Proof of Lemma 1.1 we know that
contract for A10 > 0, the contract C7 is optimal among all contracts with stoping
rule R2. As contract C4 is a degenerate case of this stoping rule (when the
research horizon is zero), condition A10 > 0 then implies that C7 Â C4.25
Further, let us compare contract C5 and contract C7. In case of contract C5 the
surplus of the venture capitalist is maximized at finite stopping time, T 105 =
−1
p
ln
2c+pE110
p(R+V 110 )−2c . However, if the financing horizon is infinite, then C5 is identi-
cal to contract C7. Hence, the former contract is always preferred to the latter.
In summary we get C5 Â C7 Â C4. Hence, the optimal contract is C5. Note
that condition A10 > 0 implies that E10 > E
F
0,5 + E
L
0,5. In other words, com-
peting entrepreneurs together require less compensation, than would a single
entrepreneur.
2. Assume that 0 > A10(r + p) > B10(r + 2p). According to Lemma 1.1, contract
C6 is feasible. Recall, that
A10 = E10 −
pE110 + 2c
r + p
, B10 = V 10 −
p(R + V 11)− 2c
r + 2p
.
Hence, the inequality A10(r + p) > B10(r + 2p) implies that
0 < (pE110 + 2c)− E10(r + p) < [p(R + V 110 )− 2c]− V 10 (r + 2p).
Since E10(r + p) < V
1
0 (r + 2p), it necessarily must be that pE
11
0 + 2c < p(R +
V 110 ) − 2c. Hence, T 101 > 0 and contract C5 is feasible as well. Therefore, the
pool of contracts consists of C5, C6 and C4.
Let us first compare contracts C5 and C6. The former contract is preferred to
the latter, if and only if
V 100,5 − V 100,6 >
(
E
(10),L
0,5 + E
(10),F
0,5
)
−
(
E
(10),L
0,6 + E
(10),F
0,6
)
, (15)
where all value functions are given in Table 2 in Appendix 1.B. After straight-
forward but tedious calculations we conclude that inequality (15) is equivalent
to
T 105 < T
10
6 −
1
r + p
ln
2c+ pE110 − E10(r + p)
2c+ pE110
.
25The relation “Â” is used to denote preferences between contracts from the viewpoint of the
venture capitalists, i.e., that one contract generates a larger profit for the venture capitalist than
another one.
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In that case, contract C5 is optimal. Otherwise, the optimal contract is C6.
Note, that now it is sufficient to prove, that C6 is preferred to contract C4, always
when the feasibility condition 0 > A10(r + p) > B10(r + 2p) holds. If this is the
case, then C5 will be optimal, when C5 Â C6 Â C4 and C6 will be optimal, when
C6 Â C5 and C6 Â C4.
Contract C6 is better, than contract C4, if and only if the following inequality
holds:
V 10 e
−(r+2p)T +
p(1 + V 110 )− 2c
r + 2p
(
1− e−(r+2p)T )−
−E10e−(r+p)T −
2c+ pE110
r + p
(
1− e−(r+p)T ) > V 10 − E10 ,
This can be re-written in the form
A10
(
1− e−(r+p)T ) > B10 (1− e−(r+2p)T ) , (16)
where A10 and B10 are defined above. Consider now two cases:
(a) If 0 > A10 > B10, then inequality (16) obviously holds, since
0 <
(
1− e−(r+p)T ) < (1− e−(r+2p)T ) .
(b) If A10 ≤ B10 < 0 we show numerically that (16) holds. In the numerical
simulations we considered without loss of generality (see Remark 1.1) values
r = 0.05 and R = 1. Using a grid 0.001 × 0.001 on the set of all positive
(p, c), such that p > 2c and r+2p
r+p
B10 < A10 ≤ B10 < 0, we plotted points
where profit of the venture capitalist under contract C6 exceeds his profit
under contract C4. The simulations show that this is the case everywhere
in the defined domain. Figure 7 illustrates the case for r = 0.05, p = 0.5,
where ∆ := A10
(
1− e−(r+p)T )−B10 (1− e−(r+2p)T ).
3. According to Lemma 1.1, condition A10(r+p) < B10(r+2p) implies that contract
C6 is not feasible. Moreover, condition (2c+E110 ) < p(R+V 110 )−2c implies that
C5 is feasible. Therefore, we choose the optimal contract between C5 and C4.
Using numerical simulations, we have verified that in domain R4, given that the
feasibility conditions are satisfied for contract C5, the venture capitalist prefers
to finance the leader alone (contract C4 is better than contract C5). Again, the
107
numerical simulations were performed for r = 0.05 and R = 1, using a grid of
0.001× 0.001 for parameters (p, c).
4. If (2c + E110 ) > p(R + V
11
0 ) − 2c, the only feasible (hence, optimal) contract is
C4.
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1.B Appendix: Tables and figures
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
A
B
C
D
c
p
Figure 5: Feasibility of contracts in regime (1/0)
Notes to Figure 5:
1. Contract C4 is feasible in domains A,B,C and D;
2. Contract C5 is feasible in domains A, B and C;
3. Contract C6 is feasible in domain B;
4. Contract C7 is feasible in domain A.
x
0 1/2 1x1x2
−z
b(x2)
b(x)
Figure 6: Shape of function b(x)
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Figure 7: Regime (1/0): Illustration for Case 2; p = 0.5, r = 0.05.
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C1 C2 C3 C4
Stoping rule R1 R2 R2 R3
Share of entrep. s11t,1 =
c
p + E
11
t s
11
t,2 =
c
p + E
11
t s
11
t,3 =
c
p + E
11
t s
1
t =
c
p + E
1
t
Value fnct. E11t,1 =
c
r+p ·
(
1− e−(r+p)(T−t)) E11t,2 = ( 12E10 − cr+p) · E11t,3 = cr+p E1t = cr (1− e−r(T−t))
of entrep. ·e−(r+p)(T−t) + cr+p
Value of V 11t,1 =
2(Rp−c)
r+2p ·
(
1− e−(r+2p)(T−t)) V 11t,2 = (V 10 − 2(Rp−c)r+2p ) · V 11t,3 = 2(Rp−c)r+2p V 1t = Rp−cr+p ·
the venture ·e−(r+2p)(T−t) + 2(Rp−c)r+2p ·
(
1− e−(r+p)(T−t))
Optimal time T 111 = − 1p ln cRp−c T 112 = − 1p ln r+pr+2p
E10− 2cr+p
V 10 − 2(Rp−c)r+2p
T 113 →∞ T 1 = − 1p ln cRp−c
Feasibility condit. 0 > A11(r + p) > B11(r + 2p) A11 > 0
Table 1: Optimal contracts and corresponding expected values in regime (1/1)
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C4 C5 C6 C7
Stoping rule R3 R1 R2 R2
Share of the L. sLt = s1t =
c
p + E
1
t s
L
t,5 =
c
p + E
F
t,5 − E110 sLt,6 = cp + ELt,6 sLt,7 = cp + EL0,7
Value fnct. E1t =
c
r
(
1− e−r(T−t)) ELt,5 = c+pE110r+p · ELt,6 = (E10 − c+pE110r+p ) · ELt,7 = c+pE110r+p
of the L. · (1− e−(r+p)(T−t)) ·e−(r+p)(T−t) + c+pE110r+p
Share of the F. sFt,5 =
c
p + E
F
t,5 − E110 sFt,6 = cp + EFt,6 − E110 sFt,7 = cp + EFt,7 − E110
Value fnct. EFt,5 =
c
r+p · EFt,6 = cr+p
(
1− e−(r+p)(T−t)) EFt,7 = cr+p
of the F. ·(1− e−(r+p)(T−t))
Value of V 1t =
Rp−c
r+p · V 10t,5 = p(R+V
11
0 )−2c
r+2p · V 10t,6 =
(
V 10 − p(R+V
11
0 )−2c
r+2p
)
· V 10t,7 = p(R+V
11
0 )−2c
r+2p
the venture · (1− e−(r+p)(T−t)) · (1− e−(r+2p)(T−t)) ·e−(r+2p)(T−t) + p(R+V 110 )−2cr+2p
Optimal time T 1 = − 1p ln cRp−c T 105 = − 1p ln 2c+pE
11
0
p(R+V 110 )−2c T
10
6 = − 1p ln r+pr+2p
E10−
2c+pE110
r+p
V 10 −
p(R+V 110 )−2c
r+2p
T 107 →∞
Feasibility cond. 2c+ E110 < p(R+ V
11
0 )− 2c 0 > A10(r + p) > B10(r + 2p) A10 > 0
Table 2: Optimal contracts and corresponding expected values in regime (1/0)
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2.A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2.3. The problem of the principal is as follows
max
β1, β2, c, d
ΠCP = R(1− xx+yβ1 − yx+yβ2)(1− e−(x+y))− (c+ d)
s.t. (IC1c ) Rβ1 ≥
ex+y(x+ y)2
x2 − y + ex+yy + xy ,
(IC2c ) Rβ2 ≥
ex+y(x+ y)2
y2 − x+ ex+yx+ xy ,
(RC1c ) x ≤ c,
(RC2c ) y ≤ d,
(CS1c )
(
Rβ1 − e
x+y(x+ y)2
x2 − y + ex+yy + xy
)
(c− x) = 0,
(CS2c )
(
Rβ2 − e
x+y(x+ y)2
y2 − x+ ex+yx+ xy
)
(d− y) = 0.
I will develop the proof in several steps.
Step 1. All constrains are binding. The argument is identical to the one provided in
Section 2.4.
Step 2. With all constrains being binding, we can re-write the principal problem in
the following form:
max
x,y
(
R− e
x+y(x+ y)2
x2 − y + ex+yy + xy −
ex+y(x+ y)2
y2 − x+ ex+yx+ xy
)
(1− e−(x+y))− (x+ y).
Taking the first-order condition with respect to x and y and subtracting resulting
equations from each other, I receive the following expression:
ex+y(ex+y − 1)2(x− y)(x+ y)3(−1 + ex+y − (x+ y))(ex+y + x+ y − 1)
(y2 + x(y + ex+y − 1))2((−1 + ex+y)y + x(x+ y))2 = 0.
The above equality holds, if each of the following conditions are satisfied:
1. [y2 + x(y + ex+y − 1)]2[(−1 + ex+y)y + x(x+ y)]2 6= 0,
2. ex+y(ex+y − 1)(x− y)(x+ y)3[−1 + ex+y − (x+ y)]2(ex+y + x+ y − 1) = 0
From the first condition it follows, that x 6= −y. The second condition holds if at
least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
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1. x = y,
2. x = −y
3. −1 + ex+y + x+ y = 0,
4. −1 + ex+y − (x+ y) = 0.
Condition 2, 3, 4 are ruled out based on the result that x 6= −y. Hence, Condition
1 necessarily holds, i.e. x = y. This automatically implies, that Rβ1 = Rβ2 and
c = d = x = y. Hence the agents are offered a symmetric contract.
Step 3. With binding constrains and symmetric contracts the problem of the principal
can be written in the following form:
max
βC , c
ΠCP = R(1− βC)(1− e−2x)− 2c
s.t RβC =
e2x4x2
2x2 − x+ e2xx,
x = c.
The solution to the problem is given by
R =
e2c (4c(e2c − 1) + 3(e2c − 1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c))
(e2c + 2c− 1)2 . (17)
Taking the derivative of the right-hand side of the Equation (17), one can see that R
is increasing in c if
−7 + 3e3t + 13e2t(t− 1) + t[5 + (t− 3)t] + et[17 + t(2 + t)(4t− 9)] > 0,
where t = 2c. If t = 0, then the left-hand side of this inequality is 0. Since the
left-hand side obviously increases in t, the inequality is strictly satisfied for t > 0.
Hence, R increases in c.
Applying the L’Hospital rule to the (17) it is easy to establish, that R→ 2 as c→ 0.
Since R increases in c the project will not be financed for R < 2.
Step 4. Assume R > 2. Let us verify, that the optimal contract, where
c = d, Rβ1 = Rβ2 := Rβ
C =
4ce2c
e2c − 1 + 2c,
and c is implicitly given by equation (17) leads to unique SPNE. For this, it is sufficient
to show that the reaction functions of the agents cross only once.
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Let us denote the reaction function of the first and second agents as Rx(y) and Ry(x)
respectively. The functions Rx(y) and Ry(x) are symmetric and are implicitly given
by the Equations (18) and (19) respectively:
Rβ1 =
ex+y(x+ y)2
x2 − y + ex+yy + xy , (18)
Rβ2 =
ex+y(x+ y)2
y2 − x+ ex+yx+ xy . (19)
Notice, that Rx(0) = Ry(0) = logRβ1. Hence, to prove that reaction functions cross
only once it is sufficient to prove that dRx(y)
dy
6= −1 and dRy(x)
dx
6= −1. Consider Rx(y).
Applying implicit function theorem to (18) we obtain dRx(y)
dy
= −A(x,y)
B(x,y)
, where
A(x, y) = x3 − y(1− ex+y + y) + x2(1 + 2y) + x(1− ex+y + y2)
B(x, y) = x3 + 2x2y − xy(2− y)− 2y(1− ex+y + y)
It is easy to show, that A(x, y) < B(x, y) is equivalent to x+ y+ 1− ex+y < 0, which
is always true for x > 0, y > 0. Hence, dRx(y)
dy
6= −1. The argument for Ry(x) is
symmetric.
Proof of Corollary 2.2. Recall the incentive compatibility constraints in a setting with
a single agent and competing agents:
RβA = ex, RβC1 =
ex+y(x+ y)2
x2 − y + ex+yy + xy , Rβ
C
2 =
ex+y(x+ y)2
y2 − x+ ex+yx+ xy .
Assume that the principal wants to implement the following probability of success:
p(t) = 1 − e−t. This probability is achieved in the setting with a single agent if the
latter allocates x = t into the project. In the setting with competing agents this
probability is achieved if both agents allocate amount x+ y = t into the project. The
incentive compatibility constraints then can be written as follows:
e−t =
1
RβA
, (20)
e−t +
e−ty(et − 1− t)
t2
=
1
RβC1
. (21)
Obviously, for any positive t and y the left-hand side of the equality (21) is larger
than the left-hand side of the equality (20). Hence the required incentive compatible
share RβC1 is smaller than Rβ
A (the same argument holds for the second competing
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agent). Recall, that if competing agents are employed only the winner receives a
reward. Hence, to implement the same probability of success, the principal has to
pay smaller reward if he employs competing agents than if he employs a single agent
(while investing the same amount t in both cases). It is clear therefore, that in SPNE
the principal is better off employing competing agents.
Proof of Proposition 2.4. The problem of the principal in general form is:
max
β1, β2, c, d
ΠTP = R(1− β1 − β2)(1− e−(x
1−α+y1−α)
1
1−a
)− (c+ d)
s.t. (IC1t ) Rβ1 ≥
e(x
1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α
xα
(x1−α + y1−α)
α
1−α
,
(ICT2) Rβ2 ≥ e
(x1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α
yα
(x1−α + y1−α)
α
1−α
,
(RCT1) x ≤ c,
(RCT2) y ≤ d,
(CST1)
Rβ1 − e(x1−α+y1−α) 11−α xα
(x1−α + y1−α)
α
1−α
 (x− c) = 0,
(CST2)
Rβ2 − e(x1−α+y1−α) 11−α yα
(x1−α + y1−α)
α
1−α
 (y − d) = 0.
The proof is developed in several steps.
Step 1. All constrains for the principal’s problem are binding. See the argument in
Section 2.4.
Step 2. With all constrains being binding, we can re-write the problem of the principal
in the following form:
max
x,y
ΠTP = R
1− e(x1−α+y1−α) 11−α xα
(x1−α + y1−α)
α
1−α
− e
(x1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α
yα
(x1−α + y1−α)
α
1−α
 (1−e−(x1−α+y1−α) 11−a )−(x+y)
Taking the first-order condition with respect to x and y and subtracting the second
one from the first one I receive the following equality:
xy(xα − yα) = α
(
e(x
1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α − 1
)(
x1−α + y1−α
) α
1−α xy(y2α−1 − x2α−1).
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The above equation obviously holds if and only if x = y. This implies, that c = d and
β1 = β2.
Step 3. Given the results of two previous steps, I can re-write the problem of the
principal in the following form:
max
βT ,c,x
ΠTP = R(1− 2βT )(1− e−2
1
1−α x)− 2c (22)
s.t. RβT =
e2
1
1−α x
2
α
1−α
,
x = c.
Solving this problem, I receive the optimal amount of investments c:
R = 2
α
α−1 e2
1
1−α c(1 + 2e2
1
1−α c)⇔ c = 2 1α−1 ln 1
4
(
−1 + 2 11−α
√
4
1
α−1 + 22+
1
α−1R
)
. (23)
Step 4. According to (23), c is increasing in R. Let us determine the threshold Rˆ,
such that c > 0 if R > Rˆ. Solving (23) for c = 0, I obtain Rˆ = 3 · 2 αα−1 . So, for
R ≤ 3 · 2 α1−α the team generates negative profit for the principal and will never be
employed. For R > 3 ·2 α1−α the team generates positive profit. To see this, notice that
ΠTP (Rˆ) = 0 and Π
T
P is increasing in R, if R > Rˆ. Indeed, substituting the expression
for optimal c into the ΠTP , I receive:
ΠTP =
1
4
(
4R− 8
√
4
1
α−1 + 22+
1
α−1R + 23+
1
α−1 (2 + ln 4)−
−23+ 1α−1 ln
(
−1 + 2 1α−1
√
4
1
α−1 + 22+
1
α−1R
))
.
Taking the derivative of the profit I establish the following equivalence:
dΠTP
dR
=
−5 · 2 1α−1 +
√
4
1
α−1 + 22+
1
α−1R
−2 1α−1 +
√
4
1
α−1 + 22+
1
α−1R
> 0⇐⇒ R > Rˆ
In addition, ΠTP (Rˆ) = 0. Together with the equivalence above it implies that for any
R > Rˆ, the profit of the principal is positive.
Step 5. Since agents are offered symmetric contracts, we can concentrate our attention
on symmetric equilibria. This leaves us with two equilibrium candidates: (0, 0) and
(c, c), where c was derived on Step 3.
According to the incentive compatibility constraints (see Table 4), an equilibrium
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(0, 0) emerges if Rβ1 = Rβ2 ≤ 1. From 22, the optimal contract results in Rβ1 =
Rβ2 =
e2
1
1−α c
2
α
1−α
. Therefore, (0, 0) is not an equilibrium, if
e2
1
1−α c
2
α
1−α
> 1⇐⇒ c > 2 1α−1 ln 2 α1−α ⇐⇒ R > 1 + 2 11−α .
Hence, if 3 · 2 α1−α < R ≤ 1 + 2 11−α , then there are two equilibria (c, c) and (0, 0).
Otherwise, there is a unique equilibrium (c, c).
The following lemma will be useful for proof of Proposition 2.5.
Lemma 2.2. Consider the difference F (α,R) = ΠTP (α,R) − ΠCP (R). The following
statements hold:
1. For fixed R, as α→ 1 the F (α,R) converges to a positive constant.
2. For any fixed R, function F (α,R) increases in α.
3. For fixed α < 1, as R→∞ the function F (α,R) converges to −∞.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.
1. As α → ∞ the team succeeds with certainty for arbitrary small investment.
Hence, Πsim → R. On the other hand for any R, ΠCP < R. Therefore,
ΠTP (α,R) > Π
C
P (R) for α→ 1.
2. F (α,R) increases in α if ΠTP (α,R) increases in α. Using Proposition 2.4 I obtain
the following expression for the profit function:
ΠTP (α,R) =
1
4
(4R− 8A+ 23+ 1α−1 (2 + log 4)− 23+ 1α−1 log(−1 + 2 11−αA)),
where A =
√
4
1
α−1 + 22+
1
α−1R. From Proposition 2.4 follows, that for all (α,R)
where c > 0 holds 2
1
1−αA− 1 > 4.
The derivative of ΠTP (α,R) is positive if the following inequality is satisfied:
2
1
α−1 + 2
1
1−α (4
α
α−1 + 22+
1
α−1R) + (A− 2 1α−1 )(log(2 11−αA− 1)− log 4) > 3A (24)
Both sides of the above inequality are positive. Moreover, for any α ∈ [0, 1):
2
1
1−α (4
α
α−1 + 22+
1
α−1R) > 2
1
1−α (4
1
α−1 + 22+
1
α−1R) = 2
1
1−αA2.
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Hence, to prove that inequality (24) holds it is sufficient to show, that 2
1
1−αA2 >
3A. The latter inequality is satisfied due to the result 2
1
1−αA− 1 > 4, which is
equivalent to A > 3 · 2 1α−1 .
3. ΠTP (α,R) is explicitly defined in terms of exogenous parameters (α,R). On the
contrary, ΠCP (R) can not be explicitly expressed in terms of R. However, from
Proposition 2.3 follows, that there is a a functional relationship between R and
c:
R =
e2c (4c(e2c − 1) + 3(e2c − 1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c))
(e2c + 2c− 1)2 (25)
From (25) follows that R→∞ as c→∞. Using this expression in the place of
R, I receive the following result:
ΠTP (α,R)− ΠCP (R) = k1A(c)− k2
√
B(c)− k3 log(−1 + k4
√
B(c)) + k5,
where A(c) and B(c) are functions of c, while k1−k5 are constants, independent
of c.
A(c) =
4(8c3 + 3(e2c − 1)2 + 12c2(2e2c − 1) + c(2− 8e2c + 6e4c))
(e2c + 2c− 1)2 , (26)
B(c) = 4
1
α−1 +
22+
1
α−1 e2c (4c(e2c − 1) + 3(e2c − 1)2 + c2(4 + 8e2c))
(e2c + 2c− 1)2 . (27)
Notice, B(c)→∞ as c→∞. Using the fact that log(x− 1) < x for any x > 2
we can estabish the following inequality:
k1A(c)− k2
√
B(c)− k3 log(−1 + k4
√
B(c)) + k5 > k1A(c)− k6
√
B(c) + k5.(28)
It easy to show, that A(c)
c
→ const and B(c)
e2c
→ const as c→∞. Finally, let me
re-write the right-hand side of Inequality (28):
ec
(
c
ec
k1
A(c)
c
− k6
√
B(c)
e2c
+
k5
ec
)
.
To complete the proof, notice, that as c → ∞ the expression in brackets con-
verges to a negative constant, so that the whole expression converges to −∞.
Proof of Proposition 2.5. To proof the first statement, notice that α1 =
log 3−log 2
log 3
im-
plies 3 · 2 αα−1 = 2. From Propositions 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4 follows, that for any R > 2 and
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α such that 3 · 2 αα−1 ≤ 2 , ΠAP (R) > 0, ΠCP (R) > 0 and ΠTP (α,R) > 0.
It is immediate, that ΠAP (R) ≥ ΠTP (R) for any R if α = 0. Indeed, in the absence
of synergy effects the principal is at least as well off employing a single agent, as
employing a team. However, by Corollary 2.2, ΠCP (R) > Π
A
P (R) for any R. Hence, for
α = 0 holds ΠCP (R) > Π
T
P (α,R).
Further, ΠCP (R) > Π
A
P (R) > Π
T
P (α1, R). To see this, consider profit functions Π
A
P (R)
and ΠTP (α,R), which can be defined from Proposition 2.2 and Proposition 2.4 respec-
tively.
Evaluating ΠTP (α,R) at α1 and subtracting the resulting expression from Π
A
P (R), I
receive the following function:
f(R) = ΠAP (R)− ΠTP (α1, R) =
1
3
(
− 1− 3√1 + 4R +
+ 2
√
1 + 12R− log 2− 3 log(−1 +√1 + 4R) + 2 log(−1 +√1 + 12R)
)
.
The function f(R) increases in R and f(2) = 0. Hence, ΠAP (R) > Π
T
P (α,R) for any
R > 2, which implies that ΠCP (R) > Π
T
P (α,R).
Finally, by Lemma 2.2 the difference ΠTP (R) − ΠCP (α,R) increases in α for fixed R.
Hence, for all α ∈ [0, α1) this difference is negative, so that ΠTP (R) < ΠCP (α,R).
Consider now α ≥ α1 and let me prove, that αˆ(R) increases in R. Taking into
account the functional relation between R and c, given by (25), αˆ(R) can be written
as αˆ(R(c)). Therefore,
dαˆ
dc
=
dαˆ
dR
· dR
dc
. (29)
From Proposition 2.3 it is known, that R(c), given by (25) is an increasing function.
Hence, to prove that dαˆ/dR > 0 it is sufficient to show, that dαˆ/dc > 0.
It is possible to calculate the derivative dαˆ/dc by applying the implicit function the-
orem to F (α,R), where R(c) is given in (25) and F (α,R) is defined in Lemma 2.2:
dαˆ
dc
= − ∂F/∂c
∂F/∂α
. (30)
From Lemma 2.2, ∂F/∂α > 0. Hence, to show that dαˆ/dc > 0 it is sufficient to proof
that ∂F/∂c < 0. Substituting R(c) into F (α,R) and taking the derivative of this
function with respect to c, one can derive the following equivalence:
∂F
∂c
< 0⇐⇒ B(c) < (2 1α−1 + 22+ 11−α e2c)2, (31)
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where B(c) is given in (27).
The inequality above can be re-written as
2
α
α−1 >
4c(e2c − 1) + 3(e2c − 1) + c2(4 + 8e2c)
(2c+ e2c − 1)2(1 + 2e2c) . (32)
Let me denote the right-hand side of this inequalityK(c). Taking the derivativeK ′(c),
it is easy to show that this derivative is negative if
4− (7− 26c+ 4c2 + 8c3)e2c + 5(1− 2c)2e4c + (16c2 − 5− 6c)e6c + 3e8c > 0.
For simplicity, let me denote the left-hand side of this inequality as k(c). Note, that
k(c) = 0 if c = 0. Hence, for any c > 0, k′(c) > 0 implies k(c) > 0. Note, that
k′(0) = k′′(0) = 0. Further, k′′′(c) > 0 for any c > 0:
−4c3 + 4c2(−5 + 20e2c + 54e4c) + c(40e2c − 11 + 135e4c)+
+2(5− 5e2c − 36e4c + 48e6c) > 0.
Hence, k′′(c) > 0 for any c > 0, which implies that k′(c) > 0 for any c > 0.
Since K(c) is a decreasing function, for any α there exist cˆ, such that 2
α
α−1 > K(c) if
c < cˆ and 2
α
α−1 < K(c) if c > cˆ. Therefore, function F (R(c), α) reaches its maximum
in c = cˆ.
From Proposition 2.3 it follows that R(c) → 2 as c → 0. For any R ≤ 2 competing
agents are not employed. On the other hand, from Proposition 2.4, team is employed
(and generates positive profit) whenever R > 3 · 2 αα−1 . Since 2 ≥ R > 3 · 2 αα−1 implies
α ≥ α1, the team generates positive profit for any R ≤ 2 and α ≥ α1. Hence,
F (α,R(α)) > 0 as c→ 0.
Finally, from Lemma 2.2, it follows that F (α,R) → −∞ as R → ∞. Since R(c)
given by (25) is an increasing function, which converges to infinity as c → ∞, this
also implies F (α,R(c))→ −∞ as c→∞.
Combining all results, I conclude, that F (α,R(c)) reaches its maximum in cˆ; for
any c ∈ [o, cˆ], F (α,R(c)) > 0 and F (α,R(c)) → −∞ as c → ∞. Therefore, there
exist c∗ > cˆ, such that F (α,R(c∗)) = 0. Further ∂F/∂c(c = c∗) < 0, which implies
dα/dc > 0.
To proof the result that αˆ(R)→ 1 as R→∞, notice that the first statement of this
Corollary implies, that F (0, R) < 0 for any R > 2. This, together with continuity of
F (α,R) and statements (1) and (4) of the Lemma 2.2 implies the existence of αˆ(R).
As was shown above, αˆ(R) is an increasing function.
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Further, assume by contradiction, that αˆ(R) does not converge to 1 as R → ∞.
Then, there exists ε > 0, such that for all M > 0 there exists R > M such that
αˆ(R) < 1 − ε. Since F (α,R) is increasing in α, then αˆ(R) < 1 − ε is equivalent
to F (1 − ε,R) > F (αˆ(R), R) = 0. Using mathematical induction I will construct
a sequence R1, R2, . . . , converging to +∞, such that F (1 − ε,Ri) > 0 for all i =
1, 2, . . . This would contradict statement (3) of the Lemma 2.2, according to which
F (1− ε,Ri)→ −∞ as i→∞.
It remains to construct such sequence. Let M1 = 2. Then there exists R1 > M1, such
that αˆ(R1) < 1− ε or equivalently F (1− ε,R1) > 0. For a sequence R1, R2, . . . , Ri let
Mi+1 = Ri + 1. Then, there exists Rı+1 > Mi+1, such that F (1 − ε,Ri+1) > 0. This
way it is possible to construct a sequence R1, R2, . . . . This sequence is increasing,
since Ri+1 > Mi+1 = Ri + 1 > Ri > i and converges to infinity as i → ∞. This
completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.6. The proof of is done by the mean of example. Let α = 0.5.
Then the first order conditions of the principal’s problem are:
dΠSP
dB
= (2B − 1)(1− 4t+ et(2t− 1)) = 0,
dΠSP
dt
= e−t(−(1− 2B)2et +R + e2t(B2(1 + 2t)−B(1 + 2t)− 1)) = 0.
The first of these conditions is satisfied, if B = 0.5 or if t = tˆ, where where tˆ ≈ 1, 06 is
a solution of equation 1− 4t+ et(2t− 1) = 0. Assume, B 6= 0.5. The sign of Hessian
matrix depends on the following derivatives:
∂2ΠSP
∂t2
= e−t(e2t((3 + 2t)(B2 −B)− 1)−R),
∂2ΠSP
∂B2
= 2(1− 4t+ et(2t− 1)),
∂ΠSP
∂B∂t
= (2B − 1)(−4 + 2et + et(2t− 1)).
∂2ΠSP
∂B2
= 0 if 1−4t+et(2t−1) = 0. Hence, if t = tˆ, the determinant of Hessian matrix is
non-positive since
(
∂ΠSP
∂B∂t
)2
≥ 0. For any B 6= 0.5 the determinant of Hessian matrix
is negative and therefore function ΠSP (B, t) does not reach its maximum at t = tˆ.
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Hence, the maximum is determined by the following conditions:
B = 0.5, R =
e2t
4
(5 + 2t). (33)
B = 0.5 implies x = y = t
4
, Rβ1 =
et
2
and Rβ2 =
et
2
(1
2
+ t). Note, that although agents
contribute the same effort, the leader receives smaller reward (Rβ1 < Rβ2).
Optimal value of t is implicitly given by (33). Using Equations (2.11),(2.13) and (2.14)
the profit of the principal in the sequential team setting can be written as
ΠSP =
(
R− e
t
4
(2t− 1)
)
(1− e−t)− t
2
. (34)
From (33), R→ 1.25 as t→ 0. Since R increases in t, ΠSP > 0 for any R > 1.25. At the
same time, Proposition 2.4 implies, that given α = 0.5, ΠTP < 0 if R ≤ 3 · 2
α
α−1 = 1.50.
Hence, ΠSP > Π
T
P for any R ∈ (1.25, 1.50]. Moreover, since profits are increasing in
R, there exist a set of R > 1.50, where both teams generate positive profit, but the
principal is better off under sequential arrangement.
The following lemma will be useful for the proof of Proposition 2.7.
Lemma 2.3. If the team leader employs the second agent in equilibrium, the optimal
solution to the maximization problem (2.17) is reached in the interior of the feasible
set, so that
∂ΠH1
∂d
= 0 and
∂ΠH1
∂t
= 0.
Proof. Recall, that the domain of d and t is such, that d ∈ [0, t] and t ∈ [d, ((c −
d)1−α+d1−α
) 1
1−α ]. Let me first consider the derivative
∂ΠH1
∂d
= −1−αdα−1(et−1)t−α+
d−α(t1−α − d1−α) α1−α . If in the SPNE the team leader employs a subordinate this
derivative must be increasing in d = 0. Further, for d = t the derivative
∂ΠH1
∂d
takes
the value
∂ΠH1
∂d
= −1 − α
t
(et − 1) < 0. Hence, d = t cannot be the optimal solution.
Therefore, the optimum must be reached in the interior of the interval [0, t], so that
∂ΠH1
∂d
= 0.
Consider now the derivative
∂ΠH1
∂t
. I have already discussed, that it is optimal for the
principal to provide such incentives, that agents invest all funds in their discretion
into the R&D. Hence, the principal will choose such c, that the optimal choice of
x and d satisfies c = d + x = d + (t1−α − d1−α) 11−α , which is equivalent to t =
((c− d)1−α + d1−α) 11−α . But, for this t to be an equilibrium choice of the first agent,
it must be, that
∂ΠH1
∂t
≥ 0, or, equivalently
Rβ1 ≥ ett−(1+α)
(
−αdα(et − 1) + t(dαet + (t1−α − d1−α) α1−α )
)
.
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Since t = ((c − d)1−α + d1−α) 11−α for any β1, which satisfies the inequality above,
the principal will choose β1, such that the inequality above is just satisfied, so that
∂ΠH1
∂t
= 0.
Proof of Proposition 2.7. Consider the first statement of the proposition. The team
leader will not employ a subordinate, if derivative
∂ΠH1
∂d
< 0 for any d. This condition
is satisfied, if
−1− αdα−1(et − 1)t−α +
((
t
d
)1−α
− 1
) α
1−α
< 0.
Using the fact, that et − 1 > t, the following inequality holds:
−1− αdα−1(et − 1)t−α +
((
t
d
)1−α
− 1
) α
1−α
< (35)
< −1− αd−1+αt1−α +
((
t
d
)1−α
− 1
) α
1−α
Let me substitute z =
(
t
d
)1−α
. Note, that z > 1 since d < t. Then, I can re-write the
right-hand side of the inequality (35), as:
−1− αd−1+αt1−α +
((
t
d
)1−α
− 1
) α
1−α
= −1− αz + (z − 1) αα−1 .
If f(z) = 1 + αz − (z − 1) αα−1 is positive for some α, then the right-hand side of
inequality (35) is negative, which implies
∂ΠH1
∂d
< 0. The function f(z) reaches its
minimum in z∗ = 1 + (1 − α) 1−α2α−1 . The value of function in z = z∗ is f(z∗) =
1− (1− α) α2α−1 + (1 + (1− α)) 1−α2α−1 . This value is positive, if α < α¯, where α¯ ≈ 0.43.
Hence, for all α ≤ α¯, f(z) ≥ 0. This implies that the derivative ∂ΠH1
∂d
is strictly
negative, so that the team leader will never employ the subordinate.
The second statement of the proposition follows directly from the Lemma 2.3. If the
team leader employs the subordinate, then the first order condition with respect to d
is
∂ΠH1
∂d
= 0. Substituting x = (t1−α − d1−α) α1−α I receive the equivalent condition:
xα = dα + αd2α−1(et − 1)t−α.
Given t > 0, this condition directly implies x > d.
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Proof of Corollary 2.3. The proof is done by a mean of example. Let α = 2
3
. Using
Lemma 2.3, the first order conditions of the team leader’s problem are:
d =
27t4
8(3t+ et − 1)3 , (36)
Rβ1 =
et
3t
5
3
(
−6d 13 t 43 + 3t 53 + d 23 (2 + 3t+ et(3t− 2))
)
. (37)
The problem of the principal is
max
{c,β1}
ΠHP = R(1− β1)(1− e−t)− c
s.t. c = x+ d = (t1−α − d1−α) 11−α + d
(36), (37).
The first order condition results in the following equation:
R =
1
4(3t+ et − 1)3 e
t
(
14 + 4et − 27t2 + 27t3 + e3t(54t− 26)+
+et(−46 + 59t− 9t2) + 18e2t(3− 6t+ 2t2 + 3t3)
)
. (38)
It is tedious, but relatively straightforward to verify, that R increases in t.
The fact, that t = ((c − d)1−α + d1−α) 11−α and d < c implies, that t = 0 iff c = 0.
Hence, we can use Equation (38) to find R, such that c(R) = 0. Applying L’Hospital
rule to the Equation (38), one can establish, that R → 47
64
≈ 0.73 as t → 0. Since R
is increasing in t, the hierarchical team generates positive profit, if R > 47
64
≈ 0.73.
For R ≤ 0.75, the simultaneous team will not be financed (this follows from the
Proposition 2.4). The profit functions ΠHP and Π
T
P are increasing in R, which implies,
that ΠHP > Π
T
P if R ∈ (0.73, 0.75]. Moreover, due to continuity that there exists a
range of R > 0.75, where both teams generate a positive profit, but the principal is
better off under hierarchical arrangement. Finally, for any R ∈ [0.73, 2] competing
agents generate negative profit (and are therefore never financed). Hence, for this
range of parameters hierarchical team also performs better than competing agents.
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2.B Appendix: Tables and figures
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Figure 8: Equilibrium investments of the subordinate and the team leader in the
hierarchical team: α = 2
3
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1
R
α
A
←− B
Figure 9: The set of parameters where ΠSP > Π
T
P (region A) and α > t (region A ∪
B)
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(IC1C) (IC
2
C)
(0, 0) Rβ1 ≤ 1 Rβ2 ≤ 1
(x∗, 0) Rβ1 = ex Rβ2 1−e
−x
x
≤ 1
(0, y∗) Rβ1 1−e
−y
y
≤ 1 Rβ2 = ey
(x∗, y∗) Rβ1 =
ex+y(x+y)2
x(x+y)+y(ex+y−1) Rβ2 =
ex+y(x+y)2
y(x+y)+x(ex+y−1)
(c, y∗) Rβ1 ≥ ec+y(c+y)2c(c+y)+y(ec+y−1) Rβ2 = e
c+y(c+y)2
y(c+y)+c(ec+y−1)
(x∗, d) Rβ1 =
ex+d(x+d)2
x(x+d)+d(ex+d−1) Rβ2 ≥ e
x+d(x+d)2
d(x+d)+x(ex+d−1)
(c, d) Rβ1 ≥ ec+d(c+d)2c(c+d)+d(ec+d−1) Rβ2 ≥ e
c+d(c+d)2
d(c+d)+c(ec+d−1)
Table 3: Competition: Equilibrium candidates and corresponding incentive compati-
bility constraints
(IC1T ) (IC
2
T )
(0, 0) Rβ1 ≤ 1 Rβ2 ≤ 1
(x∗, y∗) Rβ1 = e
(x1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α ·xα
(x1−α+y1−a)
α
1−α
Rβ2 =
e(x
1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α ·yα
(x1−α+y1−a)
α
1−α
(c, y∗) Rβ1 ≥ e(c
1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α ·cα
(c1−α+y1−a)
α
1−α
Rβ2 =
e(c
1−α+y1−α)
1
1−α ·yα
(c1−α+y1−a)
α
1−α
(x∗, d) Rβ1 = e
(x1−α+d1−α)
1
1−α ·xα
(x1−α+d1−a)
α
1−α
Rβ2 ≥ e(x
1−α+d1−α)
1
1−α ·dα
(x1−α+d1−a)
α
1−α
(c, d) Rβ1 ≥ e(c
1−α+d1−α)
1
1−α ·cα
(c1−α+d1−a)
α
1−α
Rβ2 ≥ e(c
1−α+d1−α)
1
1−α ·dα
(c1−α+d1−a)
α
1−α
Table 4: Simultaneous team: Equilibrium candidates and corresponding incentive
compatibility constraints
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3.A Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Taking the second derivatives, we obtain the Hessian matrix :
H =

−bxH ′′(mx) (s− 1)bxby 0 (s− γy)bxcy
(s− 1)bxby −byH ′′(my) (s− γx)bycx 0
0 (s− γx)bycx −cxH ′′(nx) scxcy
(s− γy)bxcy 0 scxcy −cyH ′′(ny)
 (39)
In order to obtain concavity, we need to show that (−1)jDj > 0, where Dj is the
leading principal minor of order j = 1, 2, 3, 4.
Let us now fix some γx, γy ∈ [0, 1]. We will show that the following three conditions
are sufficient for concavity:
(i’) ∆ > 0;
(ii’) ∆2 > (s− 1)2bxby + (s− γx)2bycx; and
(iii’) ∆4 + Γ2bxbycxcy > [(s− 1)2bxby + (s− γx)2bycx + (s− γy)2bxcy + s2cxcy]∆2,
where Γ = s(s− 1)− (s− γx)(s− γy). Note that these conditions reduce to (i)–(iii)
when γx = γy = 0.
Because ∆ > 0, then H ′′(z) > 0 for all z ∈ [0, 1]. Consequently, D1 < 0. Condition
(ii’) implies that ∆2 > (s − 1)2bxby and, thus, D2 > 0. Moreover, it follows from
condition (ii’) that ∆2 > (s− γx)2bycx and
∆2[∆2 − (s− 1)2bxby − (s− γx)2bycx] =
= [∆2 − (s− 1)2bxby] [∆2 − (s− γx)2bycx]− (s− 1)2bxby(s− γx)2bycx ≤
≤ [∆H ′′(mx)− (s− 1)2bxby] [∆H ′′(nx)− (s− γx)2bycx]− (s− 1)2bxby(s− γx)2bycx =
= ∆[∆H ′′(mx)H ′′(nx)− (s− 1)2bxbyH ′′(nx)− (s− γx)2bycxH ′′(mx)]
Now,
− D3
bxbycx
= H ′′(mx)H ′′(my)H ′′(nx)− (s− 1)2bxbyH ′′(nx)− (s− γx)2bycxH ′′(mx)
and the inequality D3 < 0 follows from the fact that H
′′(my) ≥ ∆.
In order to prove that D4 > 0, consider first the matrix H when H
′′(mx) = H ′′(my) =
H ′′(nx) = H ′′(ny) = ∆. It follows from conditions (i’)–(iii’) that this matrix is
negative definite. Thus, we obtain similar conditions as (ii’) also for other principal
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minors of order 3:
∆2 ≥ (s− 1)2bxby + (s− γy)2bxcy, ∆2 ≥ (s− γx)2bycx + s2cxcy,
∆2 ≥ (s− γy)2bycx + s2cxcy.
By the same procedure as above, we may show that all principal minors of order 3 of
matrix H are non-negative. Direct computation reveals that
D4
bxbycxcy
= H ′′(mx)H ′′(my)H ′′(nx)H ′′(ny) + Γ2bxbycxcy−
− [(s− 1)2bxbyH ′′(nx)H ′′(ny) + (s− γx)2bycxH ′′(mx)H ′′(ny)+
+ (s− γy)2bxcyH ′′(my)H ′′(nx) + s2cxcyH ′′(mx)H ′′(my)].
Now, it can be easily shown that the value of D4 does not increase when subsequently
substitute H ′′(ny) = ∆, H ′′(nx) = ∆, H ′′(my) = ∆, and H ′′(mx) = ∆. At the end we
obtain a positive expression due to (iii’).
Now it remains to show that conditions (i)–(iii) imply conditions (i’)–(iii’). Con-
dition (i’) is identical to (i) and clearly, the condition (ii’) follows from (ii), since
its right-hand side is decreasing in γx. Now, let is rewrite the condition (iii’) as
∆4 + Γ2bxbycxcy − [(s − 1)2bxby + (s − γx)2bycx + (s − γy)2bxcy + s2cxcy]∆2 > 0. It’s
derivative with respect to γx is 2bycx
[
bxcys(s−1)(s−γy)+(s−γx)(∆2−(s−γy)2bxcy)],
which is non-negative. Similarly, we may show that the derivative with respect to γy
is non-negative.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. The uniqueness of the maximizer follows from concavity. Taking
the first derivative of the profit with respect to mx we obtain
∂Π
∂mx
= bx[−H ′(mx) + (s− 1)bymy + (s− γy)cyny].
If follows from the definition of H that H ′(z) = 1
2
G(z)+ 1
2
zG′(z). By Assumption 3.1
we have limz→1− G′(z) = +∞. Thus, limz→1− H ′(z) = +∞ and ∂Π/∂mx|mx=1 <
0. Moreover, when G(z) = θ, then 2H ′(z) = θ + F (θ)/F ′(θ) and 2H ′(0) = θ +
limθ→θ+ F (θ)/F
′(θ), which is negative by Assumption 3.1. Therefore, ∂Π/∂mx|mx=0 >
0. This implies, that 0 < mx < 1 in maximum. Such mx then satisfies the first-order
condition ∂Π/∂mx = 0. The proofs for my, nx, and ny are analogous.
Proof of Proposition 3.1. The proposition follows from part (i) of Lemma 3.4.
Proof of Proposition 3.2. The proposition follows immediately from Lemma 3.4, parts
(ii) and (iii).
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Lemma 3.4. For any γy ∈ [0, 1] the following statements hold:
(i) If the monopolist is free to choose any γx ∈ [0, 1], he would choose either γx = 0
or γx = 1.
(ii) If my ≤ 1
2
in optimum for γx = 0, then the monopolist would choose γx = 1.
(iii) If my ≥ 1
2
in optimum for γx = 1, then the monopolist would choose γx = 0.
Proof of Lemma 3.4. Taking the partial derivative of monopolist’s profit (3.9), we
obtain
∂Π
∂γx
= bycxnx(1− 2my). (40)
For γx ∈ [0, 1], let m˜x(γx), m˜y(γx), n˜x(γx), and n˜y(γx) be the solution of the first-
order conditions from Lemma 3.2 and let Π˜(γx) = Π
(
m˜x(γx), m˜y(γx), n˜x(γx), n˜y(γx)
)
.
Using the Envelope Theorem we obtain that dΠ˜(γx)/dγx = bycxn˜x(γx)
(
1− 2m˜y(γx)).
Now we will show that if m˜y(γ¯x) ≥ 1
2
for some γ¯x > 0, then m˜y(γx) > 1
2
for all
γx ∈ [0, γ¯x). Using the Implicit Function Theorem for the first-order conditions, we
obtain that m˜y(γx) is continuous and differentiable with derivative
dm˜y
dγx
(γx) =
bxbycxcy
2D4
cx
[
by(1− 2my)((s− γx)H ′′(mx)H ′′(ny) + (s− γy)Γbxcy)+
+2nx
(−H ′′(mx)H ′′(nx)H ′′(ny) + s2cxcyH ′′(mx) + (s− γy)2bxcyH ′′(ny))], (41)
where D4 is the determinant of the Hessian matrix H defined in (39) and Γ = s(s−
1) − (s − γx)(s − γy). Observe that the coefficient at nx is actually a third minor
of matrix H multiplied by a positive factor and is, thus, negative. In addition, as
(s−γx)(s−γy)2 ≥ −(s−γy)Γ and H ′′(mx)H ′′(ny) > (s−γy)2bxcy, then the coefficient
at (1−2my) is positive. Therefore, if m˜y(γx) ≥ 1
2
, then dm˜y(γx)/dγx < 0, which yields
the desired statement.
Consequently, if m˜y(1) ≥ 1
2
, then m˜y(γx) > 1
2
for all γx ∈ [0, 1). Thus, Π˜(γx) is
decreasing on [0, 1] and the monopolist would choose γx = 0. This proves (iii). On the
other hand, if m˜y(0) ≤ 1
2
, then it is not possible that m˜y(γx) ≥ 1
2
for some γx ∈ (0, 1].
Thus, m˜y(γx) < 1
2
for all γx ∈ (0, 1] and Π˜(γx) is decreasing on [0, 1]. Therefore, the
monopolist would choose γx = 1, which proves (ii). Finally, if m˜y(0) > 1
2
> m˜y(1),
then there exists unique γ˜x ∈ (0, 1) such that m˜y(γ˜x) = 1
2
. Then also m˜y(γx) > 1
2
when γx ∈ [0, γ˜x) and m˜y(γx) < 1
2
when γx ∈ (γ˜x, 1]. Thus, Π˜(γx) is decreasing
on [0, γ˜x) and increasing on (γ˜x, 1]. This means, that the monopolist’s profit can
achieve its maximum only when γx = 0 or γx = 1, which together with the previous
statements proves (i).
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Proof of Proposition 3.3. The derivatives can be obtained from the first-order condi-
tions in Lemma 3.2 using the Implicit Function Theorem. The derivative dmy/dγx is
computed in the proof of Lemma 3.4 and is given by (41). The coefficients β1 and
β2 can be written as β1 = β˜1b
xbycxcy/(2D4), and β2 = β˜2b
xbycxcy/(2D4), where the
expressions for β˜1 and β˜2 are summarized in the Table 8 in Appendix 3.B. Using
analogous arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3.4, we can verify that β1 > 0 and
β2 < 0. The effect on profit also follows from that proof.
Proof of Lemma 3.3. To prove the first statement, consider a case where monopolist
sets prices so that the demands are given by mx = 0,my ∈ [0, 1], ny ∈ [0, 1] and
nx ∈ [0, 1]. This allocation is never an equilibrium. Indeed, the monopolist can
marginally decrease price Ax0 to gain a positive demand on behalf of old x-agents. Since
the prices for other groups of agents remain unchanged, the profit of the monopolist
will be strictly larger.
The proof of the second and the third statement results from the fact that, given
fixed my, nx and ny, the profit of the monopolist is quadratic, concave function of
Ax0 . Hence, if the solution of the first-order condition with respect to A
x
0 leads to
mx∗ ∈ [0, 1], then mx = mx∗ maximizes monopolist’s profit. If mx∗ > 1, then the
profit of the monopolist increases in mx = 1 and therefore on the interval mx ∈ [0, 1]
the profit is maximized if mx = 1.
Corollary 3.4. Assume that ik, jk ∈ {0, 1} are such that ik ≤ jk for k = 1, 2, 3, 4
and at least one of these inequalities is strict. If both equilibria Ei1i2i3i4 and Ej1j2j3j4
feasible, then monopolist’s profit in equilibrium Ei1i2i3i4 is higher.
Proof of Corollary 3.4. The proof follows directly from Lemma 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.4. We provide comparison between NC and BCx regimes.
The comparison of other regimes is done by analogously.
Before proceeding with comparison of NC and BCx regimes we need to describe
equilibrium allocations for each regime. Here we will derive the equilibrium allocations
for NC regime. The equilibrium allocations for BCx regimes are derived by analogy.
Let us denote
h1 =
2−B
Bs+ bx(s− 1)(2s− 2 +B) , h2 =
2−B −Bbxs
bx(s− 1)(2s− 2 +B) ,
h3 =
2−B
[B + 2bx(s− 1)](s− 1) , h4 =
2−B(1− bx + bxs)
2bx(s− 1)2 .
Further, let by = h5(b
x) be implicitly given by the equation bx = 2−b
y−B[1+by(s−1)]
(2−by)by(s−1)2 .
Obviously, functions hi, i = 1, . . . , 5 are decreasing in b
x.
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The feasibility conditions for each equilibrium candidates are summarized in Table 10
in Appendix 3.B in the first and third column for NC and BCx regimes respectively.
Notice, that each allocation Ei1i2i3i4 is feasible only for some range of parameters. The
relevant feasibility conditions result from the requirement that in equilibrium demands
must be such, that mi ∈ [0, 1] and ni ∈ [0, 1] for any i ∈ {x, y}. With some abuse
of notation and terminology, we will say that allocation Ei1i2i3i4 dominates allocation
Ej1j2j3j4 (Ej1j2j3j4 ≺ Ei1i2i3i4) if the profit of the monopolist is larger in the former
case, than in the later.
We call conditions which ensure that a particular allocation is an equilibrium optimal-
ity conditions. The optimality conditions for NC and BCx regimes are summarized
in the second and the fourth column of Table 10 respectively.
Consider NC regime, allocation E1000:
mx = 1, nx =
−2bxby(s− 1)s− 2bxcys2 −B(1 + bys+ cys)
2(−1 + bycxs2 + cxcys2) ,
my =
−B(1 + cxs) + bx(2− 2s− 2cxcys2)
2(−1 + bycxs2 + cxcys2) , n
y =
B(−1− cxs)− 2bxs(1− bycxs)
2(−1 + bycxs2 + cxcys2) .
It is easy to verify that given cx → 0, cy → 0 this allocation is feasible if
bx <
2−B
2s
and by <
2−B
s[B + 2bx(s− 1)] .
From Table 10, allocation E0000 is feasible if b
y < min[h1, h2]. It is clear, that h1 >
2−B
s(B−2bx+2bxs) . Further, h1 and h2 are decreasing in b
x and h1 = h2 if b
x = 2−B
2s
. Hence,
whenever E1000 is feasible, E0000 is also feasible. By Corollary 3.4, E1000 ≺ E0000.
Similar argument allows to establish, that allocations E1001, E0100, E0110, E1100, E1110,
and E1101 never occur in equilibrium.
Therefore, the set of equilibrium candidates is limited to nine allocations E0000, E0010,
E0011, E0001, E1010, E1011, E0111, E0101, and E1111. Using Lemma 3.3 we can immedi-
ately see, that whenever E0000 is feasible, it is optimal. By Corollary 3.4, E0011 ≺ E0010
and E0011 ≺ E0001 whenever the allocations are simultaneously feasible. Further,
E1010 ≺ E0010, E0101 ≺ E0001, E1011 ≺ E1010, E0111 ≺ E0101, E0111 ≺ E0011, and
E1011 ≺ E0011, whenever allocations are simultaneously feasible. Combining these re-
sults, we establish that the feasibility conditions divide the whole range of parameters
into nine domains as characterized in the Table 10.
Having established the characterization of equilibrium allocation, we now proceed
with comparison of profits in BCx and NC regimes. As follows from Table 10, if we
fix B and s then the whole range of parameters bx ∈ [0, 1], by ∈ [0, 1] can be divided
132
into several domains where for each compatibility regime a particular allocation is
optimal. These domains are illustrated on Figure 10 in Appendix 3.B. Note, that
the dashed line shows the range of parameters where Assumption 3.3 is satisfied. In
the proof of the proposition we will assume that these conditions are satisfied for all
domains. This assumption is without loss of generality, because if the conditions are
not satisfied for some domain, then this domain is not feasible.
To prove the proposition we need to compare profits of the principal in NC and
BCx regimes in each of those domains. The domains and corresponding equilibrium
allocations are summarized in Table 5. We analyze each domain separately.
type of allocation
domain feasibility condition NC BCx
a by < min[h1, h2, h5] E0000 E0000
b h5 < b
y < h1 E0000 E0010
c h1 < b
y < h5 E0010 E0000
d max[h1, h5] < b
y < min[h2, h3] E0010 E0010
e by > h3, b
x < 2−B
2s
E1010 E1010
f by > h3,
2−B
2s
< bx < 2−B
2(s−1) E1011 E1011
g max[h2, h5] < b
y < min[h3, h4] E0011 E0011
h max[h1, h2] < b
y < min[h4, h5] E0011 E0001
i h2 < b
y < min[h1, h4] E0001 E0001
j h4 < b
y < 2−B
2s
E0101 E0101
k max[2−B
2s
, h4] < b
y < 2−B
2s−1 E0111 E0101
l max[ 2−B
2s−1 , h4] < b
y < 2−B
2(s−1) E0111 E0111
m min[by, bx] > 2−B
2(s−1) E1111 E1111
Table 5: Equilibrium allocations on the mature market
B Domains a, d, g, i
Consider first domain a. In this domain the interior solution (allocation of the type
E0000) is an equilibrium both in NC and BCx regimes. Given c
x → 0, cy → 0, the
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equilibrium prices and allocations in NC regime are as follows:
mx =
B
2
· 1 + b
y(s− 1)
1− bxby(s− 1)2 , n
x =
B
2
· 1 + b
xby(s− 1) + bys
1− bxby(s− 1)2 ,
my =
B
2
· 1 + b
x(s− 1)
1− bxby(s− 1)2 , n
y =
B
2
· 1 + b
xby(s− 1) + bxs
1− bxby(s− 1)2 ,
Ax0 = A
y
0 = A
x
1 = A
y
1 =
B
2
.
In BCx regime the equilibrium allocation and prices are
mx =
B
2
· 1 + b
y(s− 1)
1− bxby(s− 1)2 , n
x =
B
2
· 1 + b
y(s− 1)
1− bxby(s− 1)2 +
by
2
,
my =
B
2
· 1 + b
x(s− 1)
1− bxby(s− 1)2 , n
y =
B
2
· 1 + b
xby(s− 1) + bxs
1− bxby(s− 1)2 ,
Ax0 = A
y
0 = A
y
1 =
B
2
, Ax1 =
B + by
2
.
Calculating the respective profits of the monopolist ΠNC and ΠBCx, it is straightfor-
ward to establish, that ΠNC < ΠBCx if and only if B < 1−b
xby(s−1)2
1+bx(s−1) or equivalently
by < g1(b
x). The same result holds for domains d, g and i.
B Domains e and f
Consider now domain e. Here the equilibrium allocation is of the type E1011 in NC
and BCx regimes. Comparing the respective profits, we establish, that
ΠNC < ΠBCx ⇐⇒ −1 +B − cx + 2bx(s− 1) + 2cxs < 0.
Given cx and cy close to zero the above inequality implies that NC ≺ BCx if and
only if bx < 1−B
2(s−1) . The same result holds in domain f.
B Domains j, l and m
In domains j, l and m, NC regime is clearly preferred to BCx regime. Here in
both compatibility regimes my = 1 in equilibrium. Therefore, whether technologies
compatible or not, new x-agents can interact with old y-agents since all of them are
subscribed to the new technology. BCx regime therefore has no positive effect on the
incentives of new x-agents.
B Domain k
In this domain the equilibrium allocation in BCx and NC regimes are of the type
E0101 and E0111 respectively. Comparing the profits of the monopolist we receive the
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following equivalence:
ΠNC > ΠBCx ⇐⇒ 4 +B2 + (by)2(2s− 1)2 − 8bys+B[−4 + by(4s− 2)] < 0.
The inequality above is satisfied if b1 < b
y < b2, where
b1,2 =
B + 4s− 2Bs∓ 2√4s− 1 +B − 2Bs
1− 4s+ 4s2 .
Notice, that 4s− 1+B− 2Bs > 0 for any s > 1, B ∈ (0, 1). In addition, domain k is
feasible if 2−B
2s
< by < 2−B
2s−1 . It is easy to show that b1 <
2−B
2s
and b2 >
2−B
2(s−1) . Hence,
for any 2−B
2s
< by < 2−B
2s−1 , NC regime is preferred to the BCx regime.
B Domains c, b and h
Consider now domain c. Here the optimal allocation in NC regime is of the type
E0010 and in BCx regime is of the type E0000. Comparing the respective profits, we
receive, that ΠBCx ≺ ΠNC if ϕ(bx)/ψ(bx) > 0, where
ψ(bx) = −1 + bxby(s− 1)2 + bycx(s− 1)2 + cxcys2 + bxcys2.
Due to Assumption 3.3, ψ(bx) > 0. We do not list the expression for ϕ(bx) here because
this is a rather complicated. Function ϕ(bx) is quadratic in bx and the coefficient at
(bx)2 is −4B(by)2(s− 1)3 − (by)2[4 + (by)2](s− 1)4 < 0. Hence, ϕ(bx) > 0 if and only
if b1 < b
x < b2, where b1,2 are roots of the quadratic equation ϕ(b
x) = 0.
b1,2 =
[4 + (by)2](s− 1) +B[(by)2(s− 1)2 + 4− 2s− by(s− 1)(2s− 1)∓ 2k(1 + by(s− 1))]
by[4B + (4 + (by)2)(s− 1)](s− 1)2
where k =
√−1 +B −Bs+ (2 + by)s− bys2. In addition, domain c is feasible if
h1 < b
y < h5, which is equivalent to
−2 + by +B[1 + by(s− 1)]
(−2 + by)by(s− 1)2 < b
x <
2−B −Bbys
by(s− 1)(2s− 2 +B) . (42)
Given bx ≥ 0, the inequalities above are satisfied if and only if by < 2−B
s
. It is easy to
show, that b1 <
−2+by+B[1+by(s−1)]
(−2+by)by(s−1)2 and b2 >
2−B−Bbys
by(s−1)(2s−2+B) for any b
y < 2−B
s
. Hence,
ϕ(bx) > 0 for any h1 < b
y < h5, which implies that BCx ≺ NC.
By analogy we can show, that BCx ≺ NC in domain h and NC ≺ BCx in domain b.
Summarizing the results, we receive that BCx ≺ NC if bx < 1−B
2(s−1) or b
y < g1(b
x).
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Similarly as in the proof of Proposition 3.4, we provide com-
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parison between NC and BCx regimes. The comparison of other regimes is done by
analogy.
Before comparing NC and BCx regimes we need to describe equilibrium allocations
for each regime. Here we will derive the equilibrium allocations for NC regime. The
equilibrium allocations for BCx regimes are derived by analogy. For that, let us
denote
h1 =
2−B
Bs+ 2cxs2
, h2 =
2−B −Bcxs
2cxs2
, h3 =
2−B −Bcx(s− 1)
2cxs(s− 1) .
The feasibility conditions for each equilibrium candidates are summarized in Table 11
(in Appendix 3.B) in the first and third column for NC and BCx regimes respectively.
The optimality conditions for NC and BCx regimes are summarized in the second
and the fourth column of Table 11 respectively.
We can directly eliminate the following allocations from the set of equilibrium candi-
dates: E1000,E0100, E1100, E0010 and E0001. Indeed, as demonstrated in Table 11, all
those allocations are feasible if and only if allocation E0000 is feasible, which (according
to Lemma 3.3) always generates larger profit. The same argument readily allows to
establish that E1011 ≺ E1010, E0111 ≺ E0101, E1110 ≺ E1010, and E1101 ≺ E0101. Further
notice, that h1 = h2 =
2−B
2s
if cx = 2−B
2s
. Hence, allocation E0000 is feasible whenever
2−B
2s
> max[cx, cy]. Since feasibility conditions for E0011 require
2−B
2s
> max[cx, cy], we
conclude that E0011 ≺ E0000. Finally, allocation E1001 is feasible if cy < min[h1, 2−B2s ].
Since min[h1,
2−B
2s
] < min[h1, h2], allocation E0000 is feasible whenever E1001 is feasible
and E1001 ≺ E0000 by Lemma 3.3.
This leaves us with four candidates for equilibrium: E0000, E1010, E0101 and E1111.
Whenever allocation E0000 is feasible, it is optimal. Moreover, by Lemma 3.3, when-
ever E1010 and E1111 are simultaneously feasible, E1111 ≺ E1010 (the symmetric argu-
ment holds for allocation E0101). Therefore, the whole range of feasible parameters c
x
and cy is divided into four domains, as summarized in Table 11.
Having the characterization of equilibrium allocation, we now proceed with compari-
son of profits in BCx and NC regimes. As follows from Table 11, if we fix B and s
then the whole range of parameters bx ∈ [0, 1], by ∈ [0, 1] can be divided into several
domains where for each compatibility regime a particular allocation is optimal. These
domains are illustrated on Figure 11 in Appendix 3.B. Note, that the dashed line
shows the range of parameters where Assumption 3.3 is satisfied. In the proof of the
proposition we will assume that these conditions are satisfied for all domains. This
assumption is without loss of generality, because if the conditions are not satisfied for
some domain, then this domain is not feasible.
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To prove the proposition we need to compare profits of the principal in NC and
BCx regime in each of the domains. The domains and corresponding equilibrium
allocations for NC and BCx regimes are summarized in Table 6. We analyze each
domain separately.
type of allocation
domain feasibility condition NC BCx
a cy < min[h1, h2] E0000 E0000
b h1 < c
y, cx < 2−B
2s
E1010 E1010
c cy > 2−B
2s
, 2−B
2s
< cx < 2−B
2(s−1) E1111 E1011
d cy > 2−B
2s
, cx > 2−B
2(s−1) E1111 E1111
e h3 < c
y < 2−B
2s
E0101 E0101
f h2 < c
y < min[h3,
2−B
2s
] E0101 E0001
Table 6: Equilibrium allocations on the emerging market
B Domains d and e
We can immediately establish, that BCx ≺ NC in domains d and e . Indeed, for
both compatibility regimes the allocation in these domains is such, that my = 1. In
this case BCx regime has, clearly, no positive effect on the incentives of new x-agents,
and hence NC regime is optimal.
B Domain a
Here the equilibrium is of the type E0000 in both NC and BCx regimes. Let us denote
K1 = 1− bxby(s− 1)2 − s2(bycx + cxcy + bxcy − bxbycxcy),
K2 = 1− bxby(s− 1)2 − bycx(s− 1)2 − s2(cxcy + bxcy).
Notice, that due to Assumption 3.3, K1 > 0, K2 > 0. The equilibrium prices and
demands in NC regime are as follows:
mx =
B
2
· 1 + c
ys+ by(s− 1− cxs)
K1
, my =
B
2
· 1 + c
xs+ bx(s− 1− cys)
K1
,
nx =
B
2
· 1 + b
ys+ cys+ bxby(s− 1− cys)
K1
, ny =
B
2
· 1 + b
xs+ cxs+ bxby(s− 1− cxs)
K1
Ax0 = A
y
0 = A
x
1 = A
y
1 =
B
2
.
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In BCx regime the prices and allocations are
mx =
B[1 + by(s− 1) + cys] + bycx[by(s− 1)2 + cys2]
2K2
,
my =
B[1 + bx(s− 1) + cx(s− 1)− cys(bx + cx)] + bycx(s− 1)
2K2
,
nx =
B[1 + by(s− 1) + cys] + by[1− bxby(s− 1)2 − bxcys2]
2K2
,
ny =
B[1 + bycx(s− 1) + cxs+ bxby(s− 1) + bxs] + bycxs
2K2
,
Ax0 = A
y
0 = A
y
1 =
B
2
, Ax1 =
B + by
2
.
Calculating profits ΠNC and ΠBCx and comparing them for bx → 0, by → 0, it is easy
to establish, that NC ≺ BCx if
cy <
1−B[1 + cx(s− 1)]
cx(s− 1)2 ≡ g2(c
x).
Note, that g2(c
x) < h1 if c
x > (1−B)/(2s− 1)
B Domain b
Comparison of equilibrium profits in domain b leads to the conclusion, that ΠNC <
ΠBCx if B − 1 + 2bx(s − 1) + 2cxs < 0. Given bx → 0 the inequality is satisfied if
cx < 1−B
2s−1 .
B Domain c
In domain c, ΠNC > ΠBCx is equivalent to
4(cx)2(s− 1)2 + cx[4 + 4B(s− 1)− 8s] + 4− 4B +B2 < 0.
Let us denote the left-hand side of the inequality as ϕ(cx). Since ϕ(cx) is a quadratic,
convex function, ϕ(cx) < 0 if c1 < c
x < c2, where
c1,2 =
−1−B(s− 1) + 2s∓√4s− 3 + 2B − 2Bs
2(s− 1)2
In addition, domain c is feasible if 2−B
2s
< cx < 2−B
2(s−1) . It is easy to see, that c2 >
2−B
2(s−1)
and c1 <
2−B
2s
. Hence, BCx ≺ NC for any 2−B
2s
< cx < 2−B
2(s−1) .
B Domain f
This domain is feasible, if h2 < c
y < h3. Let us denote ψ(b
y) = ΠNC − ΠBCx. From
the specification of demand functions (see Section 3.4), it is clear, that if by = 0, then
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BCx regime is equivalent to NC regime in terms of equilibrium demands, prices and
monopolist’s profits. Therefore, in order to establish whether ΠNC > ΠBCx for by
and bx in the neighborhood of zero, we will investigate the derivative of ψ(by). In
particular,
∂ψ
∂by
|cy=h2 =
(2−B)(2s−B)
4s2
> 0,
∂ψ
∂by
|cy=h3 =
(2−B)
2s− 1 > 0.
Therefore, BCx ≺ NC for any cy = h2 and cy = h3. It follows that BCx ≺ NC also
for h2 < c
y < h3.
Summarizing the results, we conclude, that NC ≺ BCy for any cx < 1−B
2s−1 or c
y <
g2(c
x).
Proof of Proposition 3.6. Since by = 0, we will omit the second subscript in the no-
tations for equilibria we have used so far. The candidates for equilibrium allocations,
feasibility and optimality conditions are summarized in Table 12 in Appendix 3.B. The
derivation of equilibrium allocations is analogical to the case of mature and emerging
market and is therefore omitted. Again, let us start with some notation:
h1 =
2−B
s[B + 2s(bx + cx)]
, h2 =
2−B −Bbxs−Bcxs
2s2(bx + cx)
,
h3 =
2−B
s(B + 2cxs) + bx[2 +B(s− 1)− 3s− 2s2] ,
h4 =
2− bx −B[1 + bx(s− 1) + cxs]
2[bx(s− 1)2 + cxs2] , h5 =
2−B
(s− 1)[B + 2cxs+ bx(2s− 1)] ,
h6 =
2− bx −B[1 + bx(s− 1)]− 2cxs
2bx(s− 1)2 .
In addition, let k1 =
2−B−2bxs
2s
and k2 =
2−B−2bxs+bx
2s
. If we fix B, s and bx then,
using optimality conditions in Table 12, the whole range of parameters (cx, cy) can be
divided into several domains. These domains are summarized in the Table 7 and are
illustrated on Figure 12 in Appendix 3.B. We split the proof of the proposition in a
number of cases.
B Domains i and k
From the table we can readily see that in domains i and k, BCy ≺ NC. Indeed, in
both domains equilibrium allocation is such, that mx = 1. In this case BCy does not
improve incentives of new agents of type y and hence has no advantages compared
with NC regime.
B Domain l
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type of allocation
domain feasibility condition NC BCy
a cy < min[h1, h2, h4] E000 E000
b h2 < c
y < h4 E000 E001
c max[h2, h4] < c
y < 2−B
2s
E001 E001
d max[2−B
2s
, h4] < c
y < h2 E001 E000
e 2−B
2s
< cy < h4, c
x > k1 E111 E000
f h1 < c
y < h3, c
x < k1 E110 E000
g h3 < c
y < h5, c
x < k1 E110 E010
h h3 < c
y < [h5, h6], c
x > k1 E111 E010
i h5 < c
y, cx < k1 E110 E110
j h5 < c
y, k1 < c
x < k2 E111 E000
k cy > 2−B
2s
, cx > k2 E111 E111
l max[2−B
2s
, h6] < c
y < 2−B
2(s−1) E111 E011
Table 7: Equilibrium allocations on the asymmetric market
Calculating the respective profits and comparing them we receive, that
ΠNC > ΠBCy ⇐⇒ B2 + 4B[−1 + cy(s− 1)] + 4[1 + cy + (cy)2(s− 1)2 − 2cys] < 0.
Let us denote the expression on the left-hand side of the inequality as ϕ1(c
y), which
is a quadratic, convex function of cy. Hence, ϕ1(c
y) < 0 if c1 < c
y < c2, where
c1,2 =
−1 +B + 2s−Bs∓√−3 + 2B + 4s− 2Bs
2(s− 1)2 .
In addition, feasibility constrains for domain l require 2−B
2s
< cy < 2−B
2(s−1) . Since
c1 <
2−B
2s
and c2 >
2−B
2(s−1) , for all range of parameters in domain l, ϕ1(c
y) < 0, which
implies BCy ≺ NC.
B Domains j, g and h
The inequality ΠNC > ΠBCy is equivalent to
4− 4B +B2 + (bx)2(1− 2s)2 − 8bxs+
+4(cx)2s2 +Bbx(4s− 2) + cx[4s(B − 2) + 4bxs(2s− 1)] < 0.
Let us denote an expression on the left-hand side of the inequality as ϕ2(c
x), which is
140
a quadratic, convex function of cx. Hence, ϕ2(c
x) < 0 if c1 < c
x < c2, where
c1,2 =
2−B ∓ 2√bx + bx − 2bxs
2s
.
In addition, feasibility constrains requires that k1 < c
x < k2. It is easy to check, that
c1 < k1 and c2 > k2. Hence, ϕ2(c
x) < 0 in domain j, which implies BCy ≺ NC.
Using very similar line of argument it is easy to show, that BCy ≺ NC also in domains
g and h.
B Domain b
Consider now domain b, which is feasible if h2 < c
y < h4. Observe, that h2 < h4
if cx > 4s−2−b
xs2+B[1−(2−bx)s−bxs2]
s[B(s−1)+s] ≡ k3. Notice further, that h2 and h4 are decreasing
functions, and the value of these functions at cx = k3 is (1 − B)/[2(2s − 1)]. Hence,
everywhere in domain b, cy < (1−B)/[2(2s− 1)]. Finally, h2 < cy < h4 is equivalent
to
2− bx(1 + 2cy(s− 1)2) +B(−1 + bx + bxs)
s(B + 2cys)
< cx <
2−B −Bbxs− 2bxcys2
s(B + 2cys)
.
Calculating the profits and comparing them, we receive, that
ΠNC < ΠBCy ⇐⇒ ϕ3(c
x)
4[−1 + bx(cy)2 + cxcys2] < 0
(the expression for function ϕ3 is not listed here as it is rather complicated). Due
to Assumption 3.3, we have bx(cy)2 + cxcys2 < 1. Hence, ΠNC < ΠBCy if and only
if ϕ3(c
x) > 0. Function ϕ3(c
x) is quadratic in cx with coefficient on (cx)2 being
−B2cys2 − 4B(cy)2s3 − 4(cy)3s4 < 0. Hence, ϕ3(cx) > 0 if and only if c1 < cx < c2:
c1,2 = − 1
s(B + 2cys)2
[
B2(1 + bxs) + 2B
(− 1 + cys(1− bx + 2bxs))+
+ 2cys
(− 2 + bx(1 + cy − 2cys+ 2cys2))±√K1].
where K1 = −bx[−1+B+cy(2s−1)] [bx(cy)2s2(1+cy−2cys)+B2(1+cys)+Bcys(2+
(2− bx)cys)].
It is left to verify that c1 <
2−bx(1+2cy(s−1)2)+B(−1+bx+bxs)
s(B+2cys)
and c2 >
2−B−Bbxs−2bxcys2
s(B+2cys)
.
Both this inequalities hold if cy < 1−B
2s−1 , which is true for any c
y < 1−B
2(2s−1) . Hence, in
domain b, NC ≺ BCy.
B Domain a
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In domain a the profits in NC and BCx regime are as follows:
ΠNC =
B2
[
cx + cy + 2cxcys+ bx(1 + 2cys)]
4(1− bxcys2 − cxcys2) ,
ΠBCy =
1
4(1− bxcys2 − cxcys2)
[
(bx)2cy + 2Bbxcy
(
1 + bx(s− 1) + cxs)+
+B2
(
cx + cy + 2cxcys+ bx(1− 2cy − cxcy + 2cys))].
Comparing profits we receive, that NC ≺ BCy if
cy <
(B − 1)[t− cx +B(2 + cx − t+ 2st)]
s2(cx − t)t− 2Bs2t[1 + cx + t(s− 1)] +B2[1 + 2s(t− 1)− (2− cx)s2t] ,
where t ≡ bx + cx. Let us denote the right-hand side of this inequality as I1.
B Domain d
In domain d feasibility constrains require h2 < c
x < h4, which is equivalent to
2−B −Bbxs− 2bxcys2
s(B + 2cys)
< cx <
2− bx[1 + 2cy(s− 1)2] +B(−1 + bx + bxs)
s(B + 2cys)
.
Comparing profits of the monopolist, we establish that ΠNC < ΠBCy if
ϕ4(c
x)
−1 + bxcy(s− 1)2 + cxcys2 < 0.
The denominator in the above expression in negative by Assumption 3.3. The nomi-
nator ϕ4(c
x) is a quadratic function where the coefficient on (cx)2 equals s2(B+2cys)2.
Hence, ϕ4(c
x) > 0 if cx < c1 or c
x > c2:
c1,2 =−
[
B2
(
1 + bx(s− 1))+ 2cys(− 2 + bxcy(1− 2s+ 2s2))+
B
(− 2 + 2cys+ bx(1 + cy(2− 4s+ 4s2)))∓ 2√K2]/[s(B + 2cys)2].
where
K2 = b
x[−1 +B + cy(2s− 1)] [B2(1 + bxcy(s− 1) + cys)
+Bcys
(
2 + bx + 2cys− bxcy(3s− 2))+ bx(cy)2s2(1 + cy(2s− 1))].
K2 > 0 if c
y > 1−B
2s−1 . Further, c2 >
2−bx(1+2cy(s−1)2)+B(−1+bx+bxs)
s(B+2cys)
for cy > 1−B
2s−1 . Hence,
ϕ4(c
y) > 0 if cx < c1. Let us denote ϕ
−1
4 (c
y) as I2.
B Domains e and f
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Using the same argument, we can show that NC ≺ BCy if cy < I4 in domain e and
NC ≺ BCy if cy < I5 in domain f . Expressions for I4 and I5 can be easily derived
as the roots of the quadratic equation (similar as in previous case). The expressions,
however, are rather complicated and therefore are not presented here.
B Domain c
Finally, consider domain c. Calculating the respective profits and comparing them we
receive, that ΠNC < ΠBCy if B − 1 + cy(2s− 1) < 0, which is equivalent to cy < 1−B
2s−1 .
Let us denote I3 ≡ 1−B2s−1 .
Combining the results we can describe a curve Iy as a function of cx which shows
the indifference of the monopolist between making technologies compatible versus not
compatible with each other.
Iy =

I1, if I1 < min[h1, h2, h4],
I2, if h2 < I2 < min[2−B2s , h4],
I3, if 1−B2s−1 > h4,
I4, if 2−B2s < I4 < h3 and k1 < cx < k2,
I5, if h3 < I5 < h1 and cx < k1.
We have shown, that BCy ≺ NC in domains g, h, i, j, k, l and NC ≺ BCy in
domain b. Further, for each domain a, c, d, e, f there is a single curve, such that
NC ≺ BCy below this curve and the inequality is reversed otherwise. It remains to
show, that for each cx there is a unique cutoff value of cy, such that below this value
NC ≺ BCy and above this value the inequality is reversed.
Assume, to the contrary, that for some cx = cˆ there are two distinct values of cy,
cy = c1 and c
y = c2, such that NC ≺ BCy for all cy < c1 and cy < c2 and BCy ≺ NC
for all cy > c1 and c
y > c2. Note that since for each domain there exist a unique
curve, points (cˆ, c1) and (cˆ, c2) must belong to the different domains. Assume first,
that these domains have a common border (which is the case for domains a and f , a
and d, d and e). Observe, that assumption c1 6= c2 implies, that the curve, describing
the indifference of the monopolist between NC and BCy, cannot be identical with the
border between the domains. For clarity of notations, consider for example domains
a and f (the argument is exactly the same for other pairs of domains).
The border between two domains gives the values of (cx, cy), such that the feasibility
constrains for both domains are satisfied in the limit cases. Hence, if we denote the
difference of profits in domain a as ψa ≡ ΠNC − ΠBCx and in domain f as ψf ≡
ΠNC −ΠBCx, then on the border between two domains must hold ψa ≡ ψf . Then the
existence of distinct c1 and c2 is possible only if ψ
a = ψf = 0. But this contradicts
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the assumption, that there is a unique curve, describing indifference of the monopolist
between two compatibility regimes, for each domain.
Consider now the case, where c1 and c2 belong to the two domains which do not have
a common border (domain a and e). Then the function ψ ≡ ΠNC−ΠBCx must change
sign on the border of the domain d. Since domains e and d are neighbor domains,
see discussion above.
Proof of Corollary 3.3. If the parameters of the model are such, that interior solu-
tion is feasible, then curve, describing the indifference of the monopolist between
two compatibility regimes, is given by Iy = I1, where I1 is given in the proof of
Proposition 3.6.
First we prove that this curve is downward sloping. Consider the derivative ∂I1/∂cx =
ϕ1(B)/[ψ1(B)]
2, where
ψ1(B) = b
xs2t+ 2Bs2t(1− bx + st) +B2[−1− 2s(t− 1) + s2(2 + bx − t)t].
Hence, ∂I1/∂cx < 0 is equivalent to ϕ1(B) < 0. Function ϕ1(B) is polynomial of the
form ϕ1(B) = α0B
4+α1B
3+α2B
2+α3B+α4, where αi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are coefficients
that depend on bx, cx, and s. The function ϕ1(B) has the following properties:
ϕ1(0) = −(bxs) < 0, ϕ′1(0) = −4bxs2[1 + bx(s− 1) + cxs] < 0,
ϕ1(1) = 0, ϕ
′
1(1) = 2s(2s− 1)(1 + bxs+ cxs)2 > 0.
Hence, to prove that ϕ1(B) < 0 for any B ∈ (0, 1) it is sufficient to show, that ϕ′′1(B)
changes sign at most once on the interval [0, 1]. This is indeed the case, since ϕ′′1(B)
is a quadratic function which has the following properties:
ϕ′′1(0) = 4s[−2(bx)2(s− 1)2s− 2s(1 + cxs)2 − bx(1 + cxs)(4s2 − 4s− 1)] < 0,
ϕ′′1(1) = 4s[(4s− 3)(1 + cxs)2 + (bx)2s(1− 5s+ 4s2) + bx(1 + cxs)(1− 8s+ 8s2)] > 0.
Thus, ϕ1(B) < 0 on the interval B ∈ (0, 1), which implies that ∂I1/∂cx < 0.
Second, we prove the statement for s¯. Towards this end consider the derivative
∂I1/∂s = ϕ2(B)/[ψ1(B)]2. By the same argument as above, ∂I1/∂s < 0 is equiv-
alent to ϕ2(B) < 0. Function ϕ2(B) is polynomial of the form ϕ2(B) = β0B
4 +
β1B
3 + β2B
2 + β3B + β4, where βi, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} are coefficients which depend on
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bx, cx and s. The function ϕ2(B) has the following properties:
ϕ2(0) = −2(bx)2st < 0, ϕ′2(0) = −8bxst(1− bx + st) < 0,
ϕ2(1) = 0, ϕ
′
2(1) = 2(1 + st)
2[2 + (4s− 1)t] > 0.
Given this properties, to prove that ϕ2(B) < 0 for any B ∈ (0, 1) it is sufficient to
show, that ϕ′′2(B) changes sign at most once on the interval [0, 1]. This is indeed the
case, since ϕ′′2(B) is a quadratic function which has the following properties. The
function is concave, since the coefficient at B2 is
bxst[bx − t(1 + s)]− bxt− (2− t)(1 + st)2 < 0,
which is negative for any t = bx + cx < 2. Further ϕ′′2(1) < 0 for any b
x < 1:
ϕ′′2(1) = −4(1 + st)
[− 6 + (3− 14s)t+ (3− 8s)st2 + bx(1 + (3s− 1)t)] < 0.
Hence, ϕ2(B) < 0 on the interval B ∈ (0, 1), which implies that ∂I1/∂s < 0.
Third, we prove the statement for B¯. For any s > 1 and B ∈ (0, 1):
∂Iy
∂B
= −2B(2s− 1)(2 + st)
2[B + bx(1−B) +Bst]
[ψ1(B)]2
< 0.
Fourth, the proof of the statement for b¯x follows the same logic as the proof of the
first and the second statement and is therefore abandoned.
3.B Appendix: Tables and figures
dmx/dγx cx[(s− 1)(s− γx)byH ′′(ny) + s(s− γy)cyH ′′(my)]
β˜1 dm
y/dγx cx[(s− γx)H ′′(mx)H ′′(ny) + (s− γy)Γbxcy]
dnx/dγx H ′′(mx)H ′′(my)H ′′(ny)− (s− 1)2bxbyH ′′(ny)− (s− γy)2bxcyH ′′(my)
dny/dγx cx[sH ′′(mx)H ′′(my)− (s− 1)Γbxby]
dmx/dγx by[−(s− 1)H ′′(nx)H ′′(ny) + sΓcycy]
β˜2 dm
y/dγx −H ′′(mx)H ′′(nx)H ′′(ny) + s2cxcyH ′′(mx) + (s− γy)2bxcyH ′′(nx)
dnx/dγx by[−(s− γy)2H ′′(mx)H ′′(ny)− (s− γy)Γbxcy]
dny/dγx by[−s(s− γx)cxH ′′(mx)− (s− 1)(s− γy)bxH ′′(nx)]
Table 8: Coefficients β˜1 and β˜2
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E0000 m
x ∈ (0, 1) my ∈ (0, 1) nx ∈ (0, 1) ny ∈ (0, 1)
E0010 m
x ∈ (0, 1) my ∈ (0, 1) nx = 1 ny ∈ (0, 1)
E0011 m
x ∈ (0, 1) my ∈ (0, 1) nx = 1 ny = 1
E0001 m
x ∈ (0, 1) my ∈ (0, 1) nx ∈ (0, 1) ny = 1
E1000 m
x = 1 my ∈ (0, 1) nx ∈ (0, 1) ny ∈ (0, 1)
E1010 m
x = 1 my ∈ (0, 1) nx = 1 ny ∈ (0, 1)
E1011 m
x = 1 my ∈ (0, 1) nx = 1 ny = 1
E1001 m
x = 1 my ∈ (0, 1) nx ∈ (0, 1) ny = 1
E0100 m
x ∈ (0, 1) my = 1 nx ∈ (0, 1) ny ∈ (0, 1)
E0110 m
x ∈ (0, 1) my = 1 nx = 1 ny ∈ (0, 1)
E0111 m
x ∈ (0, 1) my = 1 nx = 1 ny = 1
E0101 m
x ∈ (0, 1) my = 1 nx ∈ (0, 1) ny = 1
E1100 m
x = 1 my = 1 nx ∈ (0, 1) ny ∈ (0, 1)
E1110 m
x = 1 my = 1 nx = 1 ny ∈ (0, 1)
E1111 m
x = 1 my = 1 nx = 1 ny = 1
E1101 m
x = 1 my = 1 nx ∈ (0, 1) ny = 1
Table 9: Candidates for equilibrium allocations with linear demand function
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NC BCx
feasibility conditions optimality conditions feasibility conditions optimality conditions
E0000 b
y < min[h1, h2] by < min[h1, h2] by < min[h2, h5] by < min[h2, h5]
E0010 b
y < min[h2, h3] h1 < by < min[h2, h3] by < min[h2, h3] h5 < by < min[h2, h3]
E0011 b
y < min[h3, h4] max[h1, h2] < by < min[h3, h4] by < min[h3, h4] max[h2, h5] < by < min[h3, h4]
E0001 b
y < min[h1, h4] h2 < by < min[h1, h4] by < min[h4, h5] h2 < by < min[h4, h5]
E1000 b
y < 2−Bs[B+2bx(s−1)] , b
x < 2−B2s × by < 2−B1+B(s−1)+2bx(s−1)2 , bx < 2−B2s ×
E1010 b
x < 2−B2s b
y > h3, b
x < 2−B2s b
x < 2−B2s b
y > h3, b
x < 2−B2s
E1011 b
x < 2−B2(s−1) b
y > h3,
2−B
2s < b
x < 2−B2(s−1) b
x < 2−B2(s−1) b
y > h3,
2−B
2s < b
x < 2−B2(s−1)
E1001 b
y < 2−Bs[B+2bx(s−1)] , b
x < 2−B2(s−1) × bx < min[ 2−B2(s−1) , 2−B1+B(s−1)+2bx(s−1)2 ] ×
E0100 b
y < min[2−B2s ,
2−B−Bbxs
2bxs(s−1) ] × by < min[ 2−B2s−1 , 2−B−Bb
xs
2bxs(s−1) ] ×
E0110 b
y < min[ 2−B2(s−1) ,
2−B−Bbxs
2bxs(s−1) ] × by < min[ 2−B2(s−1) , 2−B−Bb
xs
2bxs(s−1) ] ×
E0111 b
y < 2−B2(s−1) max[
2−B
2s , h4] < b
y < 2−B2(s−1) b
y < 2−B2(s−1) max[
2−B
2s−1 , h4] < b
y < 2−B2(s−1)
E0101 b
y < 2−B2s h4 < b
y < 2−B2s b
y < 2−B2s−1 h4 < b
y < 2−B2s−1
E1100
2−B
2s < min[b
x, by] × by < 2−B2s−1 , bx < 2−B2s ×
E1110 b
x < 2−B2s × bx < 2−B2s ×
E1111 b
x ∈ [0,∞), by ∈ [0,∞) 2−B2(s−1) < min[bx, by] bx ∈ [0,∞), by ∈ [0,∞) 2−B2(s−1) < min[bx, by]
E1101 b
y < 2−B2s × by < 2−B2s−1 ×
Table 10: Mature market: feasibility and optimality conditions for equilibrium candidates in NC and BCx regimes
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NC BCx
feasibility conditions optimality conditions feasibility conditions optimality conditions
E0000 c
y < min[h1, h2] cy < min[h1, h2] cy < min[h1, h2] cy < min[h1, h2]
E0010 c
y < h1, c
x < 2−B2s × cy < h1, cx < 2−B2s ×
E0011
2−B
2s > max[c
x, cy] × cy < 2−B2s ×
E0001 c
y < min[h2, 2−B2s ] × cy < min[2−B2s , h3] h2 < cy < min[2−B2s , h3]
E1000 c
y < min[h1, h2] × cy < min[h1, h2] ×
E1010 c
x < 2−B2s c
y > h1, c
x < 2−B2s c
x < 2−B2s c
x < 2−B2s , c
y > h1
E1011 c
x < 2−B2s × cx < 2−B2(s−1) cy > 2−B2s , 2−B2s < cx < 2−B2(s−1)
E1001 c
y < min[h2, 2−B2s ] × cy < min[2−B2s , h3] ×
E0100 c
y < min[h1, h2] × cy < [h1, h2] ×
E0110 c
y < h1, c
x < 2−B2s × cy < h1, cx < 2−B2s ×
E0111 c
y < 2−B2s × cy < 2−B2s ×
E0101 c
y < 2−B2s h2 < c
y < 2−B2s c
y < 2−B2s h3 < c
y < 2−B2s
E1100 c
y < min[h1, h2] × cy < min[h1, h2] ×
E1110 c
x < 2−B2s × cx < 2−B2s ×
E1111 b
x ∈ [0,∞), by ∈ [0,∞) 2−B2s < min[cx, cy] bx ∈ [0,∞), by ∈ [0,∞) cy > 2−B2s , cx > 2−B2(s−1)
E1101 c
y < 2−B2s × cy < 2−B2s ×
Table 11: New market: feasibility and optimality conditions for equilibrium candidates in NC and BCx regimes
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NC BCx
feasibility conditions optimality conditions feasibility conditions optimality conditions
E000 c
y < min[h1, h2] cy < min[h1, h2] cy < min[h3, h4] cy < min[h3, h4]
E010 c
y < min[h1, 2−B−Bb
xs−2cxs
2bxs2
] × cy < min[h5, h6] h3 < cy < min[h5, h6]
E011 c
y < 2−B2s × cy < 2−B2(s−1) max[2−B2s , h5] < cy < 2−B2(s−1)
E001 c
y < 2−B2s h2 < c
y < 2−B2s c
y < 2−B2s h4 < c
y < 2−B2s
E100 c
y < min[h1,
2−B(1+cxs)−2bxs
2cxs2
] × cy < min[ 2−Bs(B+2cxs+bx(2s−1)) , ×
2−B(1+cxs)−bx(2s−1)
2cxs2
]
E110 c
x < 2−B−2b
xs
2s c
y > h1, c
x < 2−B−2b
xs
2s c
x < 2−B−b
x(2s−1)
2s c
y > h6, c
x < 2−B−b
x(2s−1)
2s
E111 c
x ∈ [0,∞), cy ∈ [0,∞) cy > 2−B2s , cx > 2−B−2b
xs
2s c
x ∈ [0,∞), cy ∈ [0,∞) cy > 2−B2(s−1) , cx > 2−B−b
x(2s−1)
2s
E101 c
y < 2−B2s × cy < 2−B2s ×
Table 12: Assymmetric market: feasibility conditions for equilibrium candidates
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Figure 10: Equilibrium allocations for NC and BCx regimes at the mature market
(s = 2.5, B = 0.7)
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Figure 11: Equilibrium allocations for NC and BCx regimes at the emerging market
(s = 2.5, B = 0.7)
150
11
cx
h4
cy
h5k1 k2
2−B
2(s−1)
2−B
2s
h1
h3 h6
a
d
e
f
g
h
j↗
i
k
l
c
↓b
h2
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